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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the interpretation and application of the principle of non-refoulement within
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), a system designed to enhance the fair-sharing of
responsibilities among European Union (EU) Member States and to enhance harmonizatio*n on
the application of EU law. It argues that the laws and policies of the CEAS have led to an increased
potential to violate non-refoulement. While the norm of non-refoulement itself is defined in a
robust manner in both international and European law, the actual practice of that law is far from
compliant with minimal standards.
The thesis begins by explaining the norm of non-refoulement and situates it within both
international and European law. It then discusses how, through the lens of containment theory, the
EU is effectively using the laws and policies of the CEAS to deter, deflect, and contain asylum
claimants and refugees away from the EU and to other third countries.
Containment is a type of control theory which is derived from spatial and human geography and
applied to law in the migration context. Defined as the EU’s use of legal measures to restrict,
regulate, and control the mobility and immobility of migrants, the ‘containment’ of asylum
claimants and refugees within the CEAS is demonstrated through the case studies of the United
Kingdom (UK) and Germany. These containment policies are designed to shift the EU’s
responsibility for processing asylum applications elsewhere - outside of the EU, to third countries
deemed ‘safe’ and, in other instances, to another Member State that is assumed to be in compliance
with relevant international and European law obligations.
In the case study examples, both the UK and Germany’s practices of ‘safe’ third country and
Dublin transfers evidence containment policies, which heighten the potential of breaching nonrefoulement. In the UK example, the use of ‘safe’ third country concepts demonstrate that the UK
does not examine the individualized risks to asylum applications before sending claimants back to
third countries through which they have passed and that are deemed ‘safe’. The use of ‘safe’ third
country lists further heightens the potential for the principle of non-refoulement to be breached
when a blanket presumption of safety and mutual trust is applied to countries on the list. In the
Germany example, combining Dublin transfer procedures with the admissibility procedure has the
effect of accelerating the process of determining asylum claims to the detriment of claimants whose
claims are not adequately examined for their substance.
As conflicts and other situations around the world continue to produce large flows of asylum
claimants and refugees, now more than ever, the effects of containment policies must be
counteracted while maintaining due respect for the principle of non-refoulement.
KEYWORDS: Common European Asylum System; containment theory; non-refoulement;
Dublin transfers; ‘safe’ third countries; responsibility-sharing; Refugee Convention.
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SUMMARY FOR LAY AUDIENCE
This thesis examines an individual’s right not to be returned to places where they may be in danger
of serious human rights violations (termed ‘non-refoulement’). The thesis argues that EU asylum
practices can lead to a failure to observe this important right. As dire consequences can result if
individuals are returned to places where they may face death, torture, or other cruel treatment, the
European asylum system must comply with non-refoulement.
However, EU countries use various tactics including legal measures to ‘contain’ asylum claimants
and refugees to other countries, and to evade their responsibilities to observe non-refoulement
under international and European law.
These ‘containment’ strategies are demonstrated in two case study examples: the United Kingdom
and Germany. In the first example, the United Kingdom returns asylum claimants and refugees
back to transit countries where they did not claim asylum. This method of ‘containing’ asylum
claimants and refugees effectively increases the chances of them being indirectly returned to face
violations of human rights.
In the second example, Germany returns these claimants and refugees through transfer processes
back to another EU country by relying solely on guarantees from national governments. This
effectively ‘contains’ the claimants and refugees outside of Germany, again increasing the risks of
human rights violations.
As violence and conflicts persist, this thesis contributes to existing literature by providing human
rights law analysis with a unique lens of ‘containment’. Now more than ever, the human rights of
those seeking refuge must be safeguarded against erosion.
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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS
Accelerated Procedure

A fast track procedure for unfounded asylum claims or
where there are serious national security or public order
concerns in the claim by introducing shorter, but reasonable
time limits for certain procedural steps

Area of Freedom, Security, Justice

An area created by Article 67 TFEU which ensures the
absence of internal border controls and which frames a
common policy on asylum, immigration and external border
control, based on solidary between Member States

Asylum Procedures Directive

A key CEAS directive which determines the common
procedure for granting and withdrawing international
protection

Common European Asylum System A common European asylum policy aimed at enhancing
efficiency and harmonizing asylum standards across the EU
Diplomatic Assurances

An undertaking from the receiving State to the sending State
to the effect that the person being transferred will be treated
in accordance with relevant international human rights
standards

Dublin III Regulation

Mechanism and criteria for determining the Member State
responsible for processing asylum applications

Dublin System

The Dublin III Regulation along with key directives of the
CEAS: the Qualification Directive, Asylum Procedures
Directive, and the Reception Conditions Directive

Dublin Transfer

Transfer of the claimant from one Member State to the
Member State deemed responsible for examining the asylum
application based on presumption of mutual trust

EUNAVFOR MED

EU Naval Force Mediterranean

Eurodac

Biometric database for fingerprint collection

FRONTEX

EU’s external border and coastguard agency

Irregular Movement

In the EU context, refers to accessing Member State
territories to seek asylum through means other than at
authorized checkpoints such as at border crossings
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Margin of Appreciation

Deference given to Council of Europe Member States by the
ECtHR in Member States’ interpretation of international law
and ECHR law obligations

Margin of Discretion

Deference given to EU Member States by the Court of
Justice of the EU, as distinguished from the ‘margin of
appreciation’

Member State Responsible

EU Member State deemed responsible for processing
asylum applications pursuant to Dublin III Regulation

Non-Entrée

Non-admission policies which seek to deter claimants from
reaching territory of States to access asylum

Presumption of Mutual Trust

The presumption that EU Member States all comply with
their relevant international and EU law obligations

Primacy of EU Law

All EU law has absolute and unconditional precedence and
should always be given precedence over all conflicting
provisions of national law

Primary Legislation

A source of EU law at the top of the hierarchy which consists
of EU treaties and general principles of EU law

Principle of Mutual Recognition

The recognition by each Member State of the decisions of
courts from other Member States with minimum procedure
and formality

Qualification Directive

A key CEAS directive which determines the minimum
standards for the qualification of international protection for
Third Country Nationals and stateless persons

Reception Conditions Directive

A key CEAS directive which determines the standards for
reception of applicants for international protection

Responsibility-Sharing

A legal principle binding upon all EU Member States which
requires them to implement EU policies by sharing the
responsibility for the implementation of such policies
between the Member States

Safe Third Country

A country which the applicant for international protection
has passed through where they should have claimed for
asylum but they did not. The onus is upon the claimant to
prove on a rebuttable presumption that they do not have a
connection with the ‘safe third country’ to prevent return.
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Secondary Legislation

A source of EU law superseded by primary legislation which
consists of legislative acts, delegating acts, and
implementing acts

Secondary Movement

In the EU context, refers to activities such as smuggling and
trafficking

Subsidiary Protection

Complementary protection to the Refugee Convention that
qualifies individuals who face a ‘serious harm’ upon return,
but who do not meet the refugee definition

Suspensive Recourse

Non-removal of an asylum claimant from the country of
asylum pending the outcome of an appeal

Take Back Request

A request by the sending Member State to the Member State
responsible to take back the applicant who has withdrawn
the application under examination or whose application has
been rejected and made an application in another Member
State
Example: When an applicant has already applied for asylum
in another Member State

Take Charge Request

A request by the sending Member State to the Member State
responsible to take charge of the applicant who has lodged
an application in a different Member State
Example: When an applicant has stayed in another Member
State before entering the Member State which he/she first
applied for asylum

Third-Country National

A person who does not benefit from the right to freedom of
movement within the EU and who is also not an EU citizen
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BAMF

Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees of Germany)

BverG

Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany)

BverWG

Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court of Germany)

CAT

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment

CEAS

Common European Asylum System

CJEU

Court of Justice of the European Union

ECHR

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms

EU

European Union

ECtHR

European Court of Human Rights

ICCPR

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

TEU

Treaty on the European Union (Treaty of Maastricht)

TFEU

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Treaty of Rome)

UDHR

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UK

United Kingdom

UN

United Nations

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

VCLT

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
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PREFACE
At the time of writing, the Syrian civil war has brought a large number of asylum claimants and
refugees into and across the European Union (EU) in search of refuge.
At the EU level, negotiations for reforms to the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) have
begun to take place, with proposed changes to the Dublin III Regulation, including recasting the
current key instruments from ‘directives’ into binding ‘regulations’ to further promote compliance.
At the same time, various countries within the EU are adopting measures to cope with the mass
influx. In the United Kingdom (UK), plans for exiting the CEAS, following Brexit, are underway.
In Germany, the ‘open door’ policy under Chancellor Angela Merkel has seen diminishing support.
EU countries are continuing to sign bilateral and multilateral agreements with third countries with
the aim of reducing secondary asylum claimant movements and preventing ‘forum-shopping’.
Measures to curtail irregular migration continue to take place daily, especially along the
Mediterranean Sea route, where asylum claimants and refugees make perilous journeys to access
asylum. During this time, the number of claimants being returned to non-EU countries deemed
‘safe’ continues to rise.
In addition to these developments, the use of migration control mechanisms is steadily increasing,
with measures including the criminalization of migrants, securitization of borders, and the
externalization of border control.
Against this backdrop, this thesis examines the protection of non-refoulement within the EU and
its implications for the protection of those most at risk for serious human rights abuses.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction: Setting the Stage
1. Introduction
One person is forcibly displaced every two seconds as a result of conflict or persecution.1 An
unprecedented 79.5 million people are forcibly displaced around the world today, and 26 million
of them, or almost 35%, are refugees.2 In 2011, the Syrian armed conflict began.3 That civil war
has led to the forced displacement of millions of people into neighbouring countries and regions,
including the European Union (EU).4 As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) has confirmed in official numbers, the situation is unprecedented: the number of people
displaced as a result of the Syrian conflict has surpassed the number of people displaced in the
post-World War II era.5 The high number of forcibly displaced persons during this period has
created an urgent need for a fair and efficient method of processing asylum applications and it has
tested the limits of domestic asylum systems in EU Member States. In particular, the Common

1

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Figures at a Glance”, https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-

glance.html; See, also: Anadolu Agency, “World now has nearly 80 million refugees: UN”, 18 June 2020,
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/world-now-has-nearly-80-million-refugees-un/1881306; United

Nations

High

Commissioner for Refugees, “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019” (Denmark: UNHCR Global Data
Service, 2020) at 2.
2

Ibid.

3

BBC News, “Syria Profile - Timeline”, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995.

4

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Syria Emergency”, 19 April 2018, https://www.unhcr.org/syria-

emergency.html.
5

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Forced Displacement Worldwide at its Highest in Decades”, 19

June

2017,

http://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2017/6/5941561f4/forced-displacement-worldwide-its-highest-

decades.html.
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European Asylum System (CEAS), which aims to establish common asylum procedures within
the EU, has been put under constant strain.6
At the same time, the protection of the human rights of those forcibly displaced, including asylum
claimants and refugees, must be monitored and scrutinized, so that instances of ill-treatment are
less likely to occur. While international law obliges States to comply with relevant international
human rights law principles, including the prohibition against refoulement, States are nonetheless
free to accept or reject the granting of refugee status under their domestic laws and to set external
border controls within the boundaries of these obligations.7 Defined as the prohibition against
forced return to persecution, non-refoulement is a cardinal principle of international refugee law.8
A violation of non-refoulement means sending someone to face the risk of death, torture, or other
forms of ill-treatment as well as returning them to territories where there are often consistent
patterns of gross, flagrant, or mass violations of human rights.9 Violations of non-refoulement not
only take place when States send asylum claimants to a situation in which they are at risk of serious
human rights abuses, they also occur when States cooperate internationally to deter or prevent
asylum claimants and refugees from accessing the asylum-granting State’s territory and its asylum
procedures.10
There is an ongoing trend towards more restrictive migration controls in the EU and elsewhere.
These controls are carried out through various tactics such as visa regimes, carrier sanctions, and
‘pushback’ operations by border authorities of EU Member States to discourage asylum claimants

6

European

Commission,

Migration

and

Home

Affairs,

“Common

European

Asylum

System”,

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en [CEAS].
7

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) at art 33(1)

[Refugee Convention].
8

Ibid.

9

Convention Against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1465 UNTS 85

(adopted 10 December 1984; entered into force 26 June 1987) at art 3(2) [CAT].
10

See, for example: James C Hathaway and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, “Non-Refoulement in a World of

Cooperative Deterrence” (2014) Law & Economics Working Papers, 1-64 [Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen].

2

and refugees from entering into Member State territories to access asylum procedures.11 These
controls are also instituted through ‘protection elsewhere’ regimes.12 ‘Protection elsewhere’
regimes send claimants elsewhere to seek international protection or involve measures which
return them to other EU Member States, and which exclude and deter them from entering a
Member State’s territory to access territorial asylum.13 For example, many EU Member States use
‘safe’ third country concepts - countries deemed ‘safe’ which asylum claimants have passed
through and where the Member State believes they should have applied for asylum, but did not,
and to which they may be returned.14 ‘Safe’ third country concepts not only do not have a legal
basis under international law, they also rely heavily upon blanket diplomatic assurances from
receiving States that purport to guarantee that asylum procedures are in place to permit claimants
to access international protection for refugee status.15 EU Member States misuse ‘safe’ third

11

Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen supra note 10 at 12; The term ‘visa regimes’ refers to ‘a visa not being offered

for the purpose of seeking refugee protection’, the term ‘carrier sanctions’ refers to ‘significant fines imposed on
transporting persons without valid visas, and includes impounding aircraft or other vessels’, and the phrase
‘‘pushback’ operations at sea’ refers to ‘the interception and push back of any migrant boat, regardless of whether it
is in need of rescue’, see: Migrants At Sea, “NATO Expands Aegean Sea Migrant Patrols into Turkish and Greek
Territorial Waters”, 7 March 2016, https://migrantsatsea.org/tag/push-back-practice.
11

Daria Davitti and Marlene Fries, “Offshore Processing and Complicity in Current EU Migration Policies: Parts 1 &

2” EJIL!Talk Blog, https://www.ejiltalk.org/offshore-processing-and-complicity-in-current-eu-migration-policiespart-2 [Davitti and Fries].
12

See, for example: Michelle Foster, “Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek

Protection in Another State” (2007) 28:2 Michigan Journal of International Law 223-286; Bill Frelick, Ian M Kysel,
and Jennifer Podkul, “The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other
Migrants” (2016) 4:4 Journal of Migration and Human Security, 190-220 at 193.
13

14

Ibid.
European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Safe Third Country”, https://ec.europa.eu/home-

affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/safe-third-country_en [Europa STC].
15

Note, however, that the reliance upon diplomatic assurances has been cautioned against by both the UNHCR and

the Committee Against Torture; For UNHCR commentary, see: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
“UNHCR

Note

on

Diplomatic

Assurances

and

International

3

Refugee

Protection”,

August

2006,

country concepts when they knowingly return claimants to countries where these claimants do not
actually have adequate access to international protection for refugee status.16 All of these migration
control policies have the ultimate goal of ‘containing migratory flows and tackling irregular
migration through enhanced border management [as well as fighting] against smuggling and
trafficking’.17
Containment policies represent a twofold failure: first, of EU Member States to put into practice
the strong statements of law on non-refoulement they have adopted through various international
and regional instruments, and second, of EU Member States to share responsibility for refugees.
EU law and policy have been crafted to encourage a ‘fair’ distribution of responsibility for
processing asylum applications and the sharing of ‘burdens’ among EU Member States in a
cooperative manner when they implement the CEAS within domestic law, but this approach is not
always reflected in actual practice.18
1.1 Objectives of the Thesis and Key Concepts
There is a ‘paradox’ at the heart of refugee law and policy: EU Member States have committed to
a robust understanding of asylum rights, including non-refoulement, but the actual implementation

https://www.refworld.org/docid/44dc81164.html at 12-15; For the Committee Against Torture, see: Committee
Against Torture, “General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context
of article 22”, 9 February 2018, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a903dc84.html at paras 19-20.
16

TI v United Kingdom, Application No 43844/98, (ECHR, 7 March 2000) at 18 [TI].

17

See, for example: Annalisa Buscaini, “When Will the Time Be Ripe for a European Legal Migration Policy?”,

September

2018,

https://eu.boell.org/en/2018/09/14/when-will-time-be-ripe-european-legal-migration-policy

[Buscaini]; For more on EU’s agenda to tackle irregular migration and secondary movements such as smuggling
activities, see: European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda on
Migration”, COM(2015) 240 final, 13 May 2015 [European Agenda].
18

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version), OJ C326/47, 26 October 2012 at art 80

[TFEU].

4

of these commitments is narrowed and constrained due to containment policies and practices.19
This thesis advances the claim that this paradox needs to be addressed: that, in particular, the gap
between non-refoulement law and practice must be significantly reduced or even eliminated in
order for the legal norm to provide effective protection. It therefore examines this paradox, as it
relates to non-refoulement, through different levels of legal interpretation: from the international
to the domestic, from conceptualization to actual practice.
This thesis advances two key arguments to illustrate the paradox. The first argument is that both
international and European regional law recognize non-refoulement as a fulsome protective norm
and a key legal principle. International refugee law has developed a fairly settled understanding of
the principle of non-refoulement as prohibiting the transfer of an asylum claimant to a country
where he or she is at risk of a future threat of serious personal danger.20 However, the protection
is not absolute: individuals who are deemed to have committed a serious crime or would endanger
the community of the country of refuge may be refouled.21 International human rights law has
adopted a slightly different approach to non-refoulement, applying the protective norm to everyone
without exception, and focusing on prohibiting returns raising the risk of death, torture and cruel
treatment.22 The two branches of international law are intrinsically intertwined, as explained in
Chapter Two, with each filling the gaps of the other, resulting in a robust norm.23 This dual and
robust existence of non-refoulement is repeated at the regional level in the EU, and this dualist
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version of the principle is the one against which the practice of EU Member States must be
measured.
The second central argument of this thesis is that the legal promise of non-refoulement is not being
realized in practice within the EU due to the use of containment policies - policies used to keep
asylum claimants moving, constrained or immobile. The EU employs policies of containment in
two main ways: by excluding asylum claimants and refugees from accessing territorial asylum
within the EU, and by shifting the responsibility of processing the asylum application elsewhere.
This responsibility is transferred to countries outside the EU deemed ‘safe’ on the assumption that
they comply with relevant international and EU law obligations.24 The responsibility is also shifted
internally, within the EU, when EU Member States send asylum claimants to other EU Member
States deemed ‘responsible’.25 The principle of non-refoulement is breached when these tactics to
exclude claimants and to shift the responsibility to process asylum applications elsewhere
effectively prevent the claimants from accessing international protection for refugee status.
Examples of these responsibility-shifting tactics within the EU include the use of Dublin transfers
- transfers to other EU Member States - and reliance on ‘safe’ third country concepts. Case studies
on the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany illustrate how, in both countries, an ongoing trend of
a narrower interpretation of the principle has occurred.26 These trends and methods demonstrate
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that strategies of containment are at work within the EU. (The import of the UK example for the
EU, post-Brexit, is explained below.)
These arguments are brought together to reiterate the centrality of non-refoulement as a cardinal
principle of refugee protection, and to analyze changes that should be made within the CEAS to
better conform to that principle. To reduce the disjuncture between the law of non-refoulement and
the practice of that law, this thesis argues that four changes are needed: procedural guarantees
should be strengthened in order to ensure access to asylum justice; the determination of mutual
trust should be reshaped; the use of diplomatic assurances in transfer cases should be re-evaluated;
and periodic review coupled with a judicial review mechanism should be implemented.
It is important to provide some brief remarks on key terminology that underlies the discussion in
this thesis: ‘refugee’, ‘asylum claimant’, ‘right to seek asylum’, the cardinal principle of nonrefoulement, and the exception to non-refoulement protection. This will set the stage for the
remainder of the chapter.
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) entered into force on
April 22, 1954, after World War II in order to protect people in Europe fleeing from the war.27 The
Refugee Convention is a widely-ratified international human rights instrument protecting the rights
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of refugees.28 Currently, there are 145 ratifications.29 Under Article 1A(2), a ‘refugee’ is defined
as someone who:
[…] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his [or her] former habitual residence as
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.30
The refugee definition contains five important elements, namely: ‘well-founded fear of
persecution’, ‘for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion’, ‘is outside of his [or her] country of nationality’, is unable or unwilling to avail
him or herself of State protection, and owing to such fear, is unable or unwilling to return to his or
her country of origin.31
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In contrast with the term ‘refugee’, an ‘asylum claimant’ is an individual who is in the process of
seeking asylum, and who has not yet been determined to meet the definition of a ‘refugee’ defined
under Article 1A of the Refugee Convention.32 An ‘asylum claimant’ includes individuals seeking
asylum whose claim has yet to be processed or adjudicated.33 The distinction between a ‘refugee’
and an ‘asylum claimant’ is an important one in some contexts as, under international law, the
Refugee Convention provides the bare minimum standards of protection for refugees but not to
those seeking asylum.34 An individual is a ‘refugee’ and is entitled to the protections codified under
the Refugee Convention from the moment in time he or she meets the definition, de facto, under
Article 1A.35 This also means that the individual need not have formally commenced refugee status
determination procedures or have officially been granted the status of a ‘refugee’ by the UNHCR
or the State to benefit from Convention protection.36 Therefore, refugee status is declaratory in
nature, so that the individual does not become a refugee because of recognition (for example,
through an asylum process), but is endowed with this status because he or she meets the definition
in the Refugee Convention as a matter of fact.37
The right to seek asylum, although guaranteed under Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) is not the same as the right to be granted asylum, which is at the discretion
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of the sovereign State.38 Article 14(1) of the UDHR provides that ‘everyone has the right to seek
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’.39 The ‘right to seek asylum’ means that
individuals fleeing from persecution may seek asylum from countries on arrival at their borders or
in transit zones. However, this right to seek asylum does not correspond to a guarantee or an
international law obligation to be granted asylum from the State where asylum is sought.40
Sovereign States are also not obliged under international law to admit the individual to their
territories and to grant the individual refugee status, which is different and to be distinguished from
the requirement to grant the individual access to territory and to asylum procedures.41
International law requires sovereign States, at a minimum, to comply with relevant international
human rights law such as providing the claimant with fair and efficient access to asylum
procedures and to the State’s territory.42 This means having access to minimum procedural
standards that would guarantee ‘fairness’ for the individual asylum claimant and refugee.43
Examples of procedural fairness include having access to legal counsel without cost, access to an
interpreter in a language spoken by the claimant, timely access to reasons for rejected decisions,
the right to be heard in both oral and written formats, and non-removal from the territory of the
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asylum State pending the outcome of asylum decision or on appeal.44 The duty of Member States
to provide access to territory means that individuals seeking asylum must be provided with access
to, at a minimum: a common registration system, reunification with family members, accelerated
and simplified procedures for asylum determination, a common approach to unaccompanied and
separated children, and an efficient system for voluntary return.45 However, the duty of Member
States to provide asylum claimants with access to their territories does not mean a requirement to
admit these individuals to their territories, since only citizens have the right to freedom of
movement within their territories under international law.46
While the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum claimant’ are two separate categories under international
law, for the purpose of this thesis, the distinction is not material. Therefore, both terms are used in
this thesis, as well as the term ‘claimant’, to indicate individuals who are the focus of attention for
the application of the non-refoulement norm. The distinction between ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum
seeker’ is not significant in this thesis because both refugees and asylum seekers are the subject of
the non-refoulement norm: under international and EU regional law, neither category of individual
may be returned to a situation in which they are at risk of serious human rights violations.
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As mentioned, the cardinal principle of non-refoulement protects both asylum claimants and
refugees alike.47 While this concept is explored in detail in Chapter Two, it is important to note
that the principle is codified under Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention, which provides that:
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.48
The right to seek asylum has little meaning without corresponding protection from refoulement
because the individual being granted asylum could, without non-refoulement protection, be
forcibly returned to face persecution or ill-treatment.49 As commentators have observed: ‘the right
to seek asylum guarantees the right to life, liberty and security of an asylum seeker in an absolute
way by allowing them to remain, not expelling them, or restricting their liberty. This defines the
principle of non-refoulement’.50
The principle of non-refoulement is widely held to have risen to the level of customary
international law.51 The principle may be violated directly or indirectly. It is violated directly when
States return, send back, or deport an asylum claimant or refugee to his or her country of origin or
a third country where there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the asylum claimant or refugee may
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face persecution, the death penalty, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.52
The principle can also be violated indirectly. In the context of the EU, the principle is violated
indirectly when Member States send the claimant or refugee back to the Member State deemed
responsible for the processing of the asylum application, where the sending Member State knows
or ought to know of the deficient asylum system in the receiving EU State, which is likely to then
lead to refoulement from that receiving State to the claimant’s country of origin (also called onward
refoulement).53 Indirect refoulement may also occur with the use of third country agreements in
the context of the EU, in cases where EU Member States return claimants by agreement to third
countries deemed ‘safe’ without first ensuring that these individuals would, in practice, be able to
access international protection in those third countries or be subjected to onward refoulement.54
The principle of non-refoulement is considered essential to safeguarding the human rights of
asylum claimants and refugees, and results in a positive duty on States.
1.2 Methodology
The aims of this thesis are three-fold. First, this thesis aims to demonstrate that the international
and legal principle of non-refoulement is robust and relatively far-reaching. It is this version of the
principle that States, including the Member States of the EU, profess to respect. The second aim
of this thesis is to demonstrate that there is a gap between the principle of non-refoulement as set
out under international and regional law and the actual practice within the EU, and that this gap
can be explained through the theory of containment. EU Member States have imposed, on top of
the humanitarian aims of a fair and efficient common asylum system, goals of controlling and
containing migrant movement toward and within the EU. This is demonstrated through an analysis
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of a number of EU policies, and of domestic practice by the United Kingdom and Germany. The
third aim of this thesis is, therefore, to propose ways to reduce the gap between the law and practice
of non-refoulement to strengthen respect for the principle. In order to achieve these aims, this thesis
adopts the central methodology of legal doctrinal analysis, supplemented and informed by
containment theory (from the field of geography and its subfield of migration studies), and aspects
of the comparative approach.
The primary methodology used in this thesis is legal doctrinal analysis. This form of analysis is
used to consider the content and breadth of the international refugee and human rights law principle
of non-refoulement, and how that norm is implemented and practiced at the international, regional
(EU) and domestic (UK55 and Germany) levels. Legal doctrinal analysis provides the means to
identify the contours of the law on non-refoulement and contrast the legal norm with its actual
application.
Legal doctrinal research is defined as ‘research which provides a systematic exposition of the rules
governing a particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas of
difficulty and, perhaps, predicts future developments’.56 It has also been described as ‘research
that is directed at the construction of legal doctrine in a particular legal system’.57 It involves a
‘critical analysis and synthesis of the law’.58 This form of research is ‘the dominant legal method’
employed in common law countries.59 The main purpose of legal doctrinal research is ‘to provide
explicit normative comment (‘how things should be’)’ for the purposes of devising ‘needed
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proposals for improvement’.60 The conceptual and analytical tools used in legal doctrinal analysis
are textual analysis, practical argumentation, and principled or structured reasoning and
interpretation.61 In using these tools, legal doctrinal scholarship ‘does not treat the law as the mere
object of scholarly reflection: the normative content of the law also provides the conceptual
framework that one must rely on to make sense of the legal practice’.62 This insight propels this
thesis: the normative content of non-refoulement provides, it is argued, the conceptual framework
against which the actual practice of EU Member States is assessed and found wanting. This is why
the thesis ends by proposing reforms, so as to propose how asylum law practice can ‘act and reason
without subverting its integrity’63 with respect to the conceptual framework of non-refoulement.
The focus of legal doctrinal analysis within the field of public international law (within which
international refugee and human rights law fall) is on primary sources64 such as treaties, customary
international law, and general principles of law, with secondary sources as ‘subsidiary means’ for
the determination of rules of law.65 In this thesis, the key primary sources examined are
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international treaties; international, regional and domestic court judgments; and European and
domestic legislation. The main international treaties that this thesis examines include the Refugee
Convention, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (CAT),66 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).67
The main judgments that are examined are from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). This thesis also considers the concluding observations
from the Committee Against Torture and the Human Rights Committee, both United Nations treaty
bodies.68 However, its analysis goes further: as Fourie notes, public international law norms are
also evident in more ‘atypical’ secondary forms, such as written reports, organizational documents,
State and other explanations, protocols, and papers.69 Therefore, this thesis also analyzes ‘soft law’
documents that explain, scrutinize and contextualize the primary documents, to enhance the
analysis of primary sources.70 The main ‘soft law’ instruments that this thesis examines include
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UNHCR guidance instruments.71 Additionally, the thesis explores other secondary sources - such
as books and articles by well-respected international refugee law scholars, and literature from
reputable nongovernmental organizations such as the European Council on Refugees and Exiles,
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch - that consider, evaluate and interpret the primary
sources. The aim of this part of the doctrinal analysis is to reinforce, or question, the interpretations
stemming from the inquiry into primary sources.
In studying these sources of law, legal scholars examine ‘how the elements of the law fit together
in their respective fields’, assess ‘whether current developments can be reconciled with the given
normative structures of law’, and propose how to ‘reorder and ‘remap’ the doctrinal structures of
law’ in light of ‘major legislative reforms or groundbreaking judicial decisions’.72 Legal doctrinal
scholarship also addresses ‘contested matters on the exact normative scope of legal materials’,73
which is the focus of part of this thesis in its analysis of the scope of the principle of nonrefoulement. Additionally, the legal doctrinal method covers engagement ‘with issues of
institutional design’, including policy content as it relates to law,74 which is the focus of the latter
part of this thesis in identifying approaches to lessen the gap between the law and actual State
practice regarding non-refoulement. As noted by Bodig, ‘these activities can be usefully
understood as manifestations of the epistemological profile of a distinctive disciplinary
perspective’.75
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As Hutchinson indicates, ‘legal academics are increasingly infusing evidence (and methods) from
other disciplines into their reasoning to bolster their reform recommendations’.76 This
interdisciplinary use of approaches helps to better inform law. Henrard observes that the ‘recurring
criticisms of decisions by public authorities and (international) courts that affect fundamental
rights of minorities [including asylum seekers], as failing to do justice to the complexities involved
and the related multitude of relevant interests, point to the limits of pure legal doctrine in this
respect’.77 In other words, when conducting legal doctrinal research, considering non-legal
research can ‘improve the identification and weighing of all relevant interests for the analysis of
minorities’ rights’.78 This is particularly important when international law itself does not itself
possess the explanation for action or inaction, as other disciplines can help to ‘fill in’ the gap in
understanding.79 It is for this reason that this thesis examines, in Chapter Four, the theory of
containment, which stems from the field of geography, including its sub-field of migration studies.
As explained in that chapter, containment theory, as expressed in the fields of spatial and human
geography, suggests that migrants are kept on the move and that migratory movements are
contained. The field of migration studies adds to this approach by examining the movement of
people, including the study of both mobility and immobility. These approaches are
complementary, and assist, in the context of this thesis, in explaining why there is such significant
discontinuity between the positive law on non-refoulement and the practice of that law by EU
Member States. Containment theory thus serves as an explanatory theory for international refugee
law. In referring to containment theory, this thesis applies a non-legal theory to doctrinal research
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in a manner which ‘necessarily occurs on law’s terms’.80 In this manner, the containment theory
is used to explain a doctrinal dissonance, in order to promote the ‘coherent and socially efficacious
development of the law’.81
Aspects of the comparative legal approach also inform this thesis to an extent, though this is not a
comparativist thesis. Comparative law methodology is described as having the aim ‘to understand
the legal rules and patterns of order that drive a given society’.82 The comparative law methodology
involves certain rules, namely: considering underlying concepts, beliefs and reasons that underlie
the law and that helps drive and structure law; comparing the law of one country against that of
another country with the aim of considering the similarities and differences; and understanding the
forces that lie beneath the surface of the law.83 While this thesis does not fully pursue or fulfill
these three rules, it does compare the similarities and differences between the international refugee
law regime, the European law regime and two domestic regimes (the UK and Germany) related to
the principle of non-refoulement. It does so in order to identify overlaps and differences within the
three levels of legal interpretation of the norm. These overlaps show where there is agreement on
the interpretation of the norm, while the differences tend to demonstrate deviance from the norm
in actual practice.
In order to undertake these comparisons, this thesis confronts three main issues in order to situate
international law on non-refoulement in relation to EU law. First, this thesis considers the
autonomy of the EU legal system relative to the international law system. Here, ‘autonomy of EU
law’ means the doctrine of EU primacy - the idea that the EU legal order is sui generis and
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autonomous.84 Second, it explains the constitutionality of the EU legal system, so that the area of
shared competence between the EU and Member States in the ‘Area of Freedom, Security, and
Justice’ concerning asylum law is examined.85 Third, this thesis explores the centrality of
fundamental rights - in this case, non-refoulement - within the operation of individual Member
States’ legal systems. It is important to discuss these three issues together because they are central
to analyzing the relationship between international and European law, which is important to
ascertain in order to understand how the two legal regimes mutually influence one another.
This thesis examines international and regional treaty-monitoring bodies and their decisions on the
principle of non-refoulement. In particular, this thesis examines the observations of international
treaty-monitoring bodies such as the Committee Against Torture and the Human Rights
Committee and considers whether their approaches are reflected in regional decisions. The
Committee Against Torture issues ‘concluding observations’, which are recommendations to
States Parties of the CAT.86 The Human Rights Committee issues ‘individual communications’
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that are persuasive but non-legally binding to States Parties of the ICCPR and also issues
‘concluding observations’ after examining the compliance of each States Party with the ICCPR.87
The regional treaty-monitoring bodies that are scrutinized in this thesis include the ECtHR and the
CJEU, both European regional courts. These regional courts were selected for comparison because
they issue binding decisions on Council of Europe Member States (for the ECtHR) and EU
Member States (for the CJEU). The ECtHR monitors the interpretation and implementation of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) obligations among Council of Europe Member
States, while the CJEU monitors the interpretation and implementation of EU law obligations
among EU Member States.88 Both sets of States are obligated to respect the norm of nonrefoulement.89
This thesis also studies how the UK’s common law system addresses non-refoulement and
compares it to how the German civil law system does the same. A comparison of both systems
reveals similarities and differences in the interpretation and implementation of international and
EU law on non-refoulement within these legal systems. In comparing the two systems, this thesis
considers a monist legal tradition (Germany) and a dualist legal tradition (the UK).90 Monist
systems are those in which the State incorporates international law obligations automatically
within its domestic legislation without requiring any legislative amendment process.91 In dualist
of Committee members, the considered interpretation of the language of the Covenant, and the determinative character
of the decisions’.
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2018,

systems, the State does not automatically incorporate international law obligations within the
domestic legislation.92 Rather, the State must undertake a legislative amendment process to
incorporate its international law obligations into domestic law.93 The UK and Germany were
selected as case studies because they are among the countries that received, and continue to
receive, the highest numbers of asylum applications in the region.94 Both the UK and Germany
have ratified the CAT and the ICCPR.95 Under both treaties, non-refoulement protection appears
as the prohibition against torture and the right to life.96
For the chapter on the UK, the jurisprudence is drawn mainly from the Immigration Tribunals,
namely the First Tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) as
well as the UK Supreme Court. The First Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum) is responsible
for handling appeals against some decisions made by the Home Office relating to permission to
stay in the UK, deportation from the UK, and entry clearance to the UK.97 The Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) is responsible for handling appeals against decisions made
by the First-Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum) relating to visa applications, asylum
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applications, and the right to enter or stay in the UK.98 The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and
Asylum Chamber) is also responsible for handling applications for judicial review of certain
decisions made by the Home Office as they relate to immigration, asylum and human rights
claims.99 The UK chapter also refers to ‘soft law’ guidance instruments for asylum officers issued
by the UK Home Office, Visas and Immigration division to make decisions on asylum
applications.100
For

the

chapter

on

Germany,

the

jurisprudence

is

drawn

mainly

from

the

Bundesverfassungsgericht (BverG) (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany) and the
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BverWG) (Federal Administrative Court of Germany). The ‘soft law’
guidance instruments that are used include publications issued by the Federal Office for Migration
and Refugees of Germany (BAMF) and nongovernmental organizations such as Pro Asyl. Also,
given the lack of access to English translations of German case law, some German case law is
supplemented by English summaries of the same cases published by the European Database of
Asylum Law, an online database containing case law from 17 EU Member States interpreting
refugee and asylum law.101 This database is a reputable database compiled by the European
Council on Refugees and Exiles, an alliance of 101 nongovernmental organizations across 41
European countries working to enhance protection and advance the rights of asylum claimants and
refugees in the EU.102 The database is used by decision-makers at all levels, policy makers,
nongovernmental organizations, legal practitioners and employees of relevant Member States,
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Asylum

Law”,

European and international bodies and agencies.103 National experts are recruited in each Member
State to select appropriate cases, summarize, and upload them onto the database.104 National
experts are selected for their in-depth knowledge of national jurisprudence, laws and procedures
of their respective countries and general familiarity with EU asylum law and jurisprudence.105
In sum, the central methodology used in this thesis is legal doctrinal analysis. It is the main
methodology used in the legal academic field, and is well-accepted as a valid form of inquiry and
exploration. This methodology is supplemented by reference to containment theory, which stems
from the field of geography and its sub-field migration studies. Containment theory is used as an
explanatory theory in order to situate the practice of EU Member States with respect to transfers
to EU or third party States and other means of moving and controlling migrants within the EU.
Finally, aspects of the comparative legal approach are drawn upon in the consideration of the
international, regional and domestic interpretations of the principle of non-refoulement, though the
thesis does not follow a full-fledged comparativist methodology.
1.3

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is structured so as to present building blocks of the overall thesis statement described
above. While each chapter examines a discrete issue, it also serves a larger role: providing the
underlying legal analysis required in order to consider the dissonance between the legal
understanding of non-refoulement and the actual application of that principle within asylum
systems. This section summarizes the approach of each chapter, in order to illustrate the interlinked
nature of the thesis structure.
Chapter Two introduces the international and regional EU law framework on non-refoulement. It
begins with the drafting history of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention on nonrefoulement protection, as well as the inclusion of a related provision in the ICCPR and the CAT.
It explains the subsequent dual life of the non-refoulement norm, existing simultaneously in
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international refugee law and international human rights law. While the norm co-exists in both
areas of law, its contours are different within each. For example, in refugee law, non-refoulement
protection is provided to asylum claimants and refugees, while in human rights law, its scope is
widened to include protection from torture for everyone. Under refugee law, the principle of nonrefoulement is not guaranteed to everyone without limits: those who have been deemed to be a
danger to the community of the country of refuge are excluded from its reach. However, this
exception does not exist in international human rights law, as the prohibition against torture
protects everyone regardless of their legal or political status. As well, within both international
refugee and human rights law, the principle applies both territorially as well as outside of the
territories of a State, including over persons or areas where the State can exercise its effective
authority and control. This chapter also explains the codification of non-refoulement under the
ECHR, the EU Charter, the Dublin III Regulation, and key directives. The law on non-refoulement
within Europe is quite robust, reflecting the simultaneous application of both the international
refugee law and international human rights law approaches. Additionally, non-refoulement
protection under the ECHR has expanded to be applicable outside of a State’s territory, including
on the high seas, as well as in situations involving risk of harm to health. That said, the actual
practice with respect to this norm has been constrained and contained. This is explored further in
Chapters Three and Four.
Chapter Three explains in more detail the EU law applicable to the principle of non-refoulement,
including in treaties and other binding documents. The ECtHR and the CJEU have interpreted and
applied the prohibition against refoulement, resulting in somewhat disparate case law. The
legislative and jurisprudential picture that emerges shows that non-refoulement is a fundamental
and widely protective norm under European law. However, this chapter also demonstrates that the
actual practice of some EU Member States has been to adopt a narrower understanding of nonrefoulement, one that is limited through domestic interpretation as a result of the ‘margin of
discretion’ allowed to Member States when transposing directives, and limited through the
presumption of mutual trust when transferring asylum claimants to other EU Member States.
Chapter Four describes the theory of containment, derived from the fields of human and spatial
geography and migration studies. Containment policies seek to control, divide, and discipline
‘unruly’ migration (as perceived by States). While rarely applied within public international law
25

and specifically international refugee law, the theory of containment holds particular significance
as an explanatory theory for these fields. The theory suggests that policies of containment are
methods used by EU Member States to circumvent their international refugee law and human
rights law obligations, including non-refoulement. Containment theory provides a rationale for the
differences between the fulsome statements of non-refoulement law in, for example, treaties and
the actual constricted interpretation and application of that law through EU policies such as Dublin
transfers, ‘safe’ third country agreements, the interception of asylum seekers prior to reaching
Europe, migrant tracking, narrow interpretations of the Refugee Convention, and deterrence
policies.
Chapter Five on the UK examines the domestic law and procedures for claiming asylum in the
UK, how international protection is granted or withdrawn from these claimants, and the points in
the system during which the possibilities of refoulement are considered. It also explores how the
principle of non-refoulement has been interpreted in the UK in a restrictive manner, particularly
with respect to the presumption of mutual trust among EU Member States and the burden placed
on the claimant to rebut that presumption.
Chapter Six on Germany describes domestic German refugee law, including on non-refoulement,
and the procedures for claiming asylum in Germany. While German legislation appears to adopt a
more liberal reading of non-refoulement than the UK (in line with international law), the mixed
jurisprudence suggests that the application of non-refoulement requires refinement and
modification for a more consistent approach to interpreting the norm. The final part of this chapter
reviews evidence of containment theory at work in Germany, including Germany’s interpretation
of the presumption of mutual trust in Dublin transfers.
Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter. It reiterates the centrality of non-refoulement as a cardinal
principle of refugee protection. It begins with a focus on the domestic level, comparing the UK
and Germany’s practices on non-refoulement, particularly with respect to ‘safe’ third country
concepts and Dublin transfers. It then considers recommended changes at the regional level that
would help to align the expansive norm on non-refoulement with the actual application of the
principle at the domestic and regional levels. This thesis therefore proposes four main ways to
address and to counteract containment policies in order to strengthen the implementation of the
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non-refoulement norm: strengthening procedural guarantees in order to ensure access to asylum
justice; reshaping the determination of mutual trust; re-evaluating the use of diplomatic assurances
in transfer cases; and the implementation of periodic review coupled with a judicial review
mechanism.
In total, this thesis involves a ‘critical analysis and synthesis of the law’ of non-refoulement, which
is in line with the aims of legal doctrinal analysis.106 In particular, it considers the contours and
substance of the legal understanding of non-refoulement, compares and contrasts this
understanding with the actual practice within the EU, and engages ‘with issues of institutional
design’107 to identify approaches to lessen the gap between the law and actual State practice
regarding the principle.
1.4 Contributions to Existing Literature and Limitations
Despite scholarly work on non-refoulement, including the well-known study by Lauterpacht and
Bethlehem,108 there is recognition that the evolution or actual procedural application of this
principle is undertheorized.109 This is particularly the case with regional analysis: while the
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international law history and content of non-refoulement has received some attention in scholarly
literature, the principle as interpreted at a regional level has received less focused attention.110 This
thesis aims to contribute to the literature by analyzing the legal norm of non-refoulement as
constructed internationally, regionally and at the domestic level in two European countries (one the UK - now in the process of being separated from the EU system). In doing so, it examines the
procedural infrastructure supporting (or not) the legal norm, an area Ramji-Nogales has identified
as underdeveloped.111
This thesis also adds to existing international law literature by applying the theory of containment
from the field of spatial and human geography and the sub-field of migration studies to
international law. This is rarely done in the spheres of public international law and international
refugee law,112 and this thesis argues that there is value in doing so. The application of the theory
of containment to non-refoulement enhances existing literature for its explanatory power: it helps
to explain the underlying reasons for EU Member States’ non-compliance with non-refoulement.
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This thesis also contributes a study of how two domestic systems - those of the UK and Germany
- apply the principle of non-refoulement. Analysis of the principle of non-refoulement in the
current literature does not generally involve a study focusing on specific EU Member States’
interpretation and implementation of the principle of non-refoulement in their domestic legal
systems. This type of domestic analysis of the UK and Germany together has not been done before.
The UK was selected as a case study example for several reasons. First, it receives a substantial
number of asylum claims each year, and is within the top five States within Europe in this
respect.113 Second, UK case law on non-refoulement is considered influential in the EU asylum
law context.114 Further, the UK has opted into the Dublin III Regulation and Phase I of the CEAS.
This means that the UK’s actions regarding its interpretation and application of domestic law can
be used to illustrate compliance with non-refoulement at the domestic level. When this thesis was
begun, in 2015, the UK was solidly a part of the EU. The UK exited the EU as of January 31, 2020.
While this change in status is important, it is not determinative in terms of evaluating the UK’s
practice in terms of non-refoulement, for three reasons: first, the UK is in a transition period until
December 31, 2020, during which time the CEAS rules and inter-EU transfers still apply.115
Second, UK caselaw on non-refoulement will continue to influence the EU for years to come
because the UK is still bound by the ECHR, under which many non-refoulement cases are
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litigated.116 Third, the lessons learned from the UK’s practices will remain relevant for some time,
as they have similarities to the practices of a number of EU Member States.
Germany was selected as a case study to compare with the UK as a civil law country and as the
highest asylum application-receiving country within the EU.117 Germany, as the number one
country in this regard, has opted into the Dublin III Regulation and the CEAS.118 This is important
because the Dublin III Regulation details the criteria for determining responsibility for the
processing of asylum applications among EU Member States.119 German practice, therefore,
determines almost a quarter of all asylum claims made in the CEAS and therefore influences how
asylum law is interpreted in the CEAS and the development of asylum policy. Germany is also
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influential in EU asylum law and practice as the cases referred to the ECtHR, for example, often
set precedent for other EU Member States to follow.120
While this thesis arguably contributes to the international refugee law literature on nonrefoulement, at the same time, there are limitations to this thesis. The first limitation is the
geographical scope of the thesis. This thesis deliberately focuses only on non-refoulement within
the EU. The EU was chosen as it is a region which has been subjected to a significant and highlypublicized strain on its asylum system due to pressures caused by the mass influx of asylum
claimants, termed a ‘crisis’ in recent years.121 Given that other significant refugee-receiving
countries also not on the direct periphery of refugee-producing states - such as Canada, the United
States, and Australia - have not been subjected to the same numerical pressures over a relatively
short period of time, the EU appeared to be an ideal focus allowing for a detailed inquiry of nonrefoulement. Therefore, this thesis does not consider serious non-refoulement concerns related to,
for example, the Canada-United States Safe Third Country Agreement or offshore processing
agreements between Australia and Nauru island.122 It also does not analyze in detail non-
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refoulement issues arising from European practices outside of the EU region, such as the ItalyLibya Memorandum of Understanding123 or the arrangement between the EU and Turkey in the
EU-Turkey statement.124
The second limitation is the temporal scope of the thesis. While Chapter Two of this thesis
addresses the history of the adoption of the principle of non-refoulement within international law,
for the most part, the thesis focuses on the position and understanding of the principle within the
CEAS within a limited timeframe, spanning from the onset of the Syrian war (2011) to the time of
writing (2015-20). This period was selected because it coincides with the mass influx of refugees
through Mediterranean routes into the EU, and therefore with what has been termed a ‘refugee
crisis’ or ‘migration crisis’ within the EU.125 This phenomenon prompted the increased use of
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containment strategies within the EU, leading to increased questioning about the EU’s compliance
with the principle of non-refoulement.126
A further limitation of this thesis is the focus upon doctrinal analysis rather than empirical research
with fieldwork data. As mentioned, this approach was chosen in order to pursue ‘critical analysis
and synthesis of the law’.127 That said, the choice to focus on doctrinal analysis without fieldwork
data means that this thesis does not overtly incorporate refugee voices, which can add an important
dimension and perspective. However, insofar as organizations and other scholars have
incorporated refugee perspectives in their analysis of non-refoulement risks, this thesis has taken
them into account.128
1.5

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has outlined the objectives, methodology, structure and limitations of this thesis. This
thesis is meant to contribute to the understanding of non-refoulement internationally and within
the EU by highlighting the gap between the statement of the law and the practice of that law and
proposing ways to bridge that gap. The principle of non-refoulement is absolutely central to
international refugee law. Described as the cornerstone of international refugee protection, access
to asylum has little meaning without corresponding protection from refoulement. This centrality
of the principle of non-refoulement requires that States do not send back claimants or refugees to
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frontiers of territories where they may face threats to life or freedom. This obligation is an active
duty upon the Member State and incorporates the essence of international refugee law: to provide
the widest protection available to those who deserve it. As well-respected international refugee
law experts acknowledge, non-refoulement has shaped the current system of international
protection by becoming the guiding principle for States to provide minimum protection for
claimants.129 This bare minimum protection offered for claimants in the form of the prohibition
against torture or the prevention of being sent back to face the death penalty or other gross, massive
or flagrant violation of human rights can mean the difference between life and death for some.
While international refugee law and European refugee law codifies the principle, practice from
Member States has shown that the domestic interpretation and implementation of this norm is far
from consistent. This thesis highlights the divergence between Member States and their courts in
applying the principle of non-refoulement through case law. The domestic law of the UK and
Germany demonstrate that there is still room for improvement.
The following chapter sets the stage for the focus of the thesis by providing the history and current
understanding of the principle of non-refoulement in international law. It illustrates the content of
the norm, and how it is recognized both in international refugee and international human rights
law. It is the fact of this dual recognition which provides the principle with its scope and wide
applicability within the international legal system.
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CHAPTER TWO
Non-Refoulement Protection under International and European Refugee Law
2. Introduction
The principle of non-refoulement plays a vital role in the international refugee law regime. The
principle is widely regarded as a cornerstone of international refugee law by the UNHCR,
academic commentators, and States Parties of the Refugee Convention.130 This doctrine protects
asylum claimants and refugees from being returned to territories where their lives or freedom
would be threatened.131
International and European law provide the standards that are to be implemented by national
asylum systems within the European Union (EU) through domestic asylum procedures. Therefore,
this chapter introduces the principle of non-refoulement as it is currently articulated in international
and European law, in order to set the stage for the next chapter, which discusses how EU Member
States interpret and apply the principle within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).
The first part of this chapter considers the history of the principle of non-refoulement. The second
part of the chapter discusses the principle of non-refoulement under international refugee law and
international human rights law. Next, the chapter situates the principle of non-refoulement in
European law.
This thesis is centered around the foundational legal norm of non-refoulement and the ways in
which it is meant to protect refugees and asylum seekers. Therefore, this chapter sketches out the
parameters of the principle and concludes that there is a crucial difference between the way in
which international and European refugee laws define the scope of the obligation of States not to
refoule individuals versus the manner in which international and European human rights law
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articulate the right of individuals not to be refouled. In particular, international and European
human rights laws are absolute in their prohibition, while international and European refugee laws
permit exceptions to non-refoulement. Some scholars therefore argue that the definition of nonrefoulement in human rights law must displace the definition in refugee law because it is broader
in nature (as it applies to all human being, regardless of their status) and bridges the gap that
refugee rights may not cover.132 However, others contend that human rights law and refugee law
do not interact in this manner; that they are intrinsically intertwined and one does not act as a
surrogate for the other.133 This discussion and others on the principle of non-refoulement in this
chapter sets the stage for the next chapter, which discusses how EU Member States interpret and
apply the principle within the CEAS.
2.1 History of Non-Refoulement
A discussion of the principle of non-refoulement involves examining the origins of the principle
in international refugee law. This section therefore provides the history of the principle of nonrefoulement, beginning with a discussion of the originating sources of international refugee law
and the development of non-refoulement through treaty law. In the 1920s, over one million Russian
refugees were forcibly displaced and removed along the border of the former Russian empire.134
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Some countries surrounding the former Russian empire opened up their borders to accept these
refugees but, generally, these refugees were not accepted by other countries.135 In 1922, the High
Commissioner for Russian Refugees appointed by the League of Nations, Fridtjof Nansen, was
given the task of securing the assistance and legal protection of these refugees.136 Governments
gathered together in Geneva to unanimously accept the issuance of certificates to grant legal status
to Russian refugees.137 This arrangement was referred to as the Arrangement with Respect to the
Issue of Certificates of Identity to Russian Refugees, also commonly known as the 1922
Arrangement.138 These certificates were later known as the ‘Nansen Passport’, which acted as
identity certificates for refugees to travel across international borders, and was the beginning of
the international refugee law system.139
Following this development, the principle of non-refoulement was developed and amended
through three significant treaties concerning refugee protection: the 1933 Convention Relating to
the International Status of Refugees (1933 Convention), the 1938 Convention Concerning the
Status of Refugees coming from Germany (1938 Convention), and the 1951 Refugee Convention.
The 1933 Convention represented the first explicit recognition of non-refoulement as a norm under
international treaty law.140 By the 1920s, the piecemeal approach of the Nansen Passport had
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become unreliable, which triggered the need for a more comprehensive approach to the issue of
refugees.141 The 1933 Convention formally codified the rights granted to refugees.142 It was drafted
as a result of the gathering of representatives from Belgium, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, and Norway
under the framework of the League of Nations in response to the situation of Russian and Armenian
refugees post World War I.143 Article 3 of the 1933 Convention provides that:
Each of the States Parties undertakes not to remove or keep from its territory by
application of police measures, such as expulsions or non-admittance at the
frontier (refoulement), refugees who have been authorized to reside there
regularly, unless the said measures are dictated by reasons of national security or
public order. It undertakes in any case not to refuse entry to refugees at the frontier
of their countries of origin […].144
The 1933 Convention was ratified by nine States, including France and the UK, which were the
most powerful States of that time.145 However, three of these States ratified the 1933 Convention
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with reservations and declarations: .146 Although the first of its kind and more comprehensive than
the piecemeal approach of the Nansen Passport of the 1920s, the 1933 Convention was limited in
its scope of application.147 For instance, the 1933 Convention did not apply to refugees outside of
the interwar period (1918-1939).148
From 1933 until the beginning of World War II, about 400,000 refugees fled from Germany.149
The 1938 Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany was created to
arrange ‘a system of legal protection’ for these refugees.150 This treaty incorporated key provisions
and elements from the Nansen Passport system and the 1933 Convention.151 Article 4(1) of the
draft 1938 Convention contained a provision which stipulated that, in all cases, if a refugee is
required to leave, ‘he [or she] shall be granted a suitable period to make the necessary
arrangements’ and for those refugees given authorization to be in the country, Article 4(2) states
that they should not be expelled unless required by ‘national security or public order’.152 Most
importantly, a form of the principle of non-refoulement was incorporated in Article 4(3), which
provided that even when expulsion or return at the frontier is warranted by reasons of national
security or public order, ‘refugees shall not be sent back across the frontier of the [Germanoccupied territory] unless they have been warned and have refused to make the arrangements
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necessary to proceed to another country’.153 Together, the 1933 Convention and the 1938
Convention formed the basis for the drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention.154
The aftermath of World War II produced over 30 million displaced persons, including refugees,
who were forced to leave their homes in Europe.155 By the end of the war, there were over 10
million refugees.156 The mass influx of refugees to neighbouring countries led to the need for the
creation of an international refugee convention which would solidify legal protections for
refugees.157 This situation prompted the process of drafting the 1951 Refugee Convention, which
began with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 8(I) of February 12, 1946, and
concluded with the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries adopting the treaty on July 28,
1951.158 (This treaty was later supplemented with the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1967 Protocol).159
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Most notably, the 1951 Refugee Convention defined the term ‘refugee’ as well as codified the
cardinal principle of non-refoulement.160 The principle of non-refoulement is defined under Article
33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.161 Article 33(1) is one of only two Articles within the
Refugee Convention to which States Parties are not permitted to make reservations.162 Article
33(1) of the Refugee Convention provides:
No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.163
The preparatory works, or the travaux préparatoires, to the 1951 Refugee Convention reveal States
Parties’ intentions during drafting negotiations.164 In 1946, the UN Ad Hoc Committee on
Statelessness and Related Problems (Ad Hoc Committee) was tasked with drafting a convention
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relating to the international status of refugees and stateless persons.165 It first proposed the
incorporation of Article 3 of the 1933 Convention on non-refoulement based on a working paper
drafted by the UN Secretary-General.166 The result was that the first iteration of the 1951 Refugee
Convention incorporated the principle in draft Article 24(3), which stated:
Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes in any case not to turn back
refugees to the frontiers of their country of origin, or to territories where their life
or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality or
political opinions.167
This absolute prohibition on refoulement was proposed in 1950.168 The provision, which was
slightly amended,169 became present-day Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention and was
adopted by a vote of 21 in favour and none against, with two abstentions.170
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During a meeting of the Ad Hoc committee, the representative from the UK suggested that an
exception be added on the grounds of national security.171 In the end, the Ad Hoc Committee
accepted the draft of Article 24(3) without the amendment suggested by the UK.172 Then, in 1951,
at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, the representative of the UK, Sir Leslie Brass, expressed
his concern over the potential absoluteness of the non-refoulement principle and again proposed
an amendment.173 This proposal was supported by Switzerland, with the United States, France and
Denmark arguing against.174 Despite the proposal not initially gaining traction, the representatives
from France and the UK suggested adding this new paragraph:
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he [or she] is residing, or who, having been lawfully convicted in
that country of particularly serious crimes or offences, constitutes a danger to the
community thereof.175
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This amendment, which was slightly changed,176 was adopted by 19 votes to none, with three
abstentions, and incorporated in the Refugee Convention as Article 33(2).177 Thus, the prohibition
against refoulement is not absolute under international refugee law.178 Note, however, that this
exception has since been interpreted even more narrowly than drafted in Article 33(2): in 2007,
the UNHCR issued an advisory opinion indicating that this exception must be read in conjunction
with international human rights law’s prohibition on refoulement to torture, discussed further
below.179
The Conference of Plenipotentiaries also discussed the concepts of ‘expel’ and ‘return’.180 The
representative from Switzerland opined that the text of the non-refoulement prohibition covered
only refugees who had already entered a country and States were accordingly not obliged to admit
large groups of persons claiming refugee status at the border.181 It argued that the word ‘expel’
seems to refer to refugees residing lawfully in the country, while the word ‘return’ seems to refer
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to refugees who had already entered the country but were not yet resident there.182 The
representatives from France, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Germany, and Belgium all agreed
with this interpretation, with France and Belgium stressing that situations of mass influx of
refugees were not covered by the provision.183 This debate shows that the text of the principle of
non-refoulement was not easily ascertained and brings the discussion to the present day dilemma
surrounding the question of lex specialis between international refugee and human rights law.
Another item that was debated during the drafting of Article 33 was the issue of non-admittance
of refugees at the border. The Secretariat of the League of Nations at the time of translating
(unofficially) the text of the 1933 Convention was quite clear that the prohibition against
refoulement did not cover ‘non-admittance at the frontier’ (meaning the ‘refusal of leave to land’,
and ‘exclusion’).184 Thus, during the negotiation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Swiss
representative was of the opinion that Article 33 ‘could not […] be applied to a refugee who had
not yet entered the territory of a country. The word ‘return’ used in the English text, gave that idea
exactly […] That Article 33 forbids return and not ‘non-admittance’ is also made clear by the
words ‘to the frontiers of territories’ in the English text and even more so by the words ‘sur les
frontiers des territories’ in the French text’.185 This controversy is still present today as the question
of whether non-refoulement applies extraterritorially has been a matter of debate among scholars.
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As can be seen in the historical development of non-refoulement, the development of Article 33 is
not without controversy and debate among the States. The next section discusses the current
understanding of the principle of non-refoulement.
2.2 The Current Conception of Non-Refoulement under International Refugee Law
The current meaning of Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention is best understood by
understanding the phrases used in that provision. A textual analysis of the provision - ‘No
Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion - reveals the
scope, temporal requirements and jurisdictional application of the principle of non-refoulement.
The first phrase in the article is ‘no Contracting State’, which refers to States Parties that have
ratified the Refugee Convention.186 The Refugee Convention is a widely-ratified international
human rights instrument, currently with 146 ratifications.187 States Parties to the 1967 Protocol188
that are not parties to the Refugee Convention (namely the United States, Cabo Verde, and
Venezuela) are also bound by the principle of non-refoulement, as paragraph 1 of the Protocol
requires all States Parties to the Protocol to apply Articles 2-34 of the Refugee Convention.189
Therefore, Article 33 binds the vast majority of States in the world. It should be mentioned that

admitted into a country of asylum […] Other countries have provisions in their aliens’ legislation that either explicitly
or de facto, as a result of the prohibition of refoulement, including rejection at the frontier, establish a right to asylum’.
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States that are not States Parties to either the Refugee Convention or the Protocol will nonetheless
be obliged not to refoule under customary international law, regional refugee law instruments,
other international human rights law instruments, international humanitarian law, and extradition
law.190 Thus, while they are not legally bound under the treaty phrase ‘no Contracting State’, they
cannot avoid the norm as a result.
The Refugee Convention uses the phrase ‘shall expel or return’ to explain ‘refouler’, but does not
otherwise define the term. The term ‘refouler’ is also not defined in any of the other treaties
discussed above. Therefore, the meaning of the term must be determined using the rules for the
interpretation of international treaties found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT).191 Under the VCLT, there are two ways of ascertaining the meaning of a treaty provision.
The general rules of interpreting the meaning of a treaty provision is by its ordinary meaning and
through the object and purpose of the provision as determined by the preamble and annexes of an
international treaty.192.
The term ‘refoulement’ is derived from the French word ‘refouler’ meaning, in its ordinary
meaning, ‘to drive back’ or ‘to repel’.193 In a number of jurisdictions such as the UK, the United
States, and Australia, dictionaries have been used to determine the plain meaning of certain terms
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within the Refugee Convention.194 For instance, the dictionary definition of the term ‘refouler’ as
used in Article 33(1) has been interpreted to mean ‘repulse’, ‘repel’, and ‘drive back’.195 The word
‘refouler’ has also been described to mean ‘the act of returning refugees to a place where they may
be persecuted’.196 . The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council Inc, held that the repatriation of Haitian asylum claimants back to Haiti by the United
States Coast Guard on the high seas was clearly prohibited by the ordinary understanding of the
term ‘return’ under Article 33(1).197 The case concerned vessels traveling with passengers from
Haiti to the United States that were intercepted on the high seas.198 The passengers were forced to
flee Haiti as a result of a military coup in 1991.199 The United States Coast Guard interdicted over
34,000 Haitians who were then sent to be detained at the Guantanamo Bay United States military
base.200 The Respondents in the case, an organization representing the interdicted Haitians, argued
that the word ‘return’ referred to the destination to which the refugee would be removed or sent
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back.201 However, the Supreme Court did not accept this approach, holding that that this definition
of the word ‘return’ was expansive and would make the word ‘deport’ redundant.202
The meaning of ‘refouler’ can also be ascertained pursuant to the object and purpose of the treaty
as found in the preamble.203 The preamble of the Refugee Convention states that:
considering that the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its
profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure refugees the widest
possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms (emphasis added).204
According to the preamble, the purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention is to ensure the widest
possible protection for refugees.205 The word ‘refouler’ refers to States’ obligation to protect
refugees from being returned to territories where they may experience persecution.206 Reading the
two together, ‘offering the widest possible’ protection may involve not only protection from being
sent back to persecution, but corresponding access to asylum procedures, including the right to
seek asylum as enshrined in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.207
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Thus, the ordinary meaning of the term ‘refouler’ includes ‘return’ (‘to send back’ or ‘to bring,
send, or put back to a former or proper place’), ‘repulse’, ‘repel’, and ‘drive back’.208 This
understanding is uncontroversial. An approach to defining ‘refouler’ based on the object and
purpose of the Refugee Convention is less well-developed, but indicates that non-refoulement may
include a negative obligation on States not to send individuals back to certain situations,209
logically coupled with a positive duty on States to determine whether the individual in question is
at risk of serious human rights violations on return, plus an additional positive duty to ensure access
of asylum seekers to asylum procedures.
In contrast to the widespread understanding of ‘return’ and ‘refouler’ as synonyms, there is some
debate over the meaning of the word ‘expel’. During treaty negotiations, the Swiss Government
was of the view that the term ‘expel’ applied to a refugee who had already been admitted to the
territory of a country, while the term ‘refouler’ could not be applied to a refugee who had not yet
entered the territory of a country.210 The French representative also agreed with the Swiss
Government’s view.211 While this view has been challenged, the Swiss and French interpretation
has since been revived in response to the mass influx of refugees into Europe prompted by the
Syrian armed conflict.212
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Article 33 uses the term ‘refugee’, which is defined in Article 1A of the Refugee Convention. As
described in Chapter One, this is an individual with a well-founded fear of persecution who, for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, ‘membership of a particular social group’ or political opinion
is outside of his or her country of nationality, is unable or unwilling to avail him or herself of State
protection, and owing to such fear is unable or unwilling to return to his or her country of origin.213
However, the definition of ‘refugee’ in Article 1A does not apply to those who have committed a
‘crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity’, ‘a serious non-political crime in
the country of refuge’, and/or ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’
under Article 1F.214 Additionally, the protection against refoulement also does not apply to
refugees who fall under the cessation clauses (Article 1C) (defining when protection is no longer
needed) , those who receive protection and assistance from United Nations organs and agencies
other than the UNHCR (Article 1D), and individuals who are recognized by the country of refuge
as its nationals (Article 1E).215 Therefore, under the Refugee Convention there is a specifically
delimited category of people who are endowed with non-refoulement protection. Despite these
restrictions, individuals falling outside of the protection scope of Article 33(1) may invoke human
rights law protection offered by the Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, as explained below.216 The human rights protection offered by these
instruments protect everyone - not only refugees - from being deprived of the right to life and
freedom from torture.217
The words ‘in any manner whatsoever’ clarify the breadth of the prohibition on refouling refugees:
Contracting States cannot use non-admittance at the frontier of territories or extradition as
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alternative means of sending refugees back to situations of serious personal danger.218 However,
the words ‘in any manner whatsoever’ do not translate to a right to be granted asylum for the
individual claiming asylum and do not preclude instances where the admitting State may decide
to expel the claimant to another State willing to accept him or her.219 The travaux préparatoires
are also clear in that the Refugee Convention provision supersedes any previous extradition
agreements concluded privately between States Parties to the Refugee Convention.220 Therefore,
non-refoulement protection entails protecting the asylum claimant or refugee from being returned
to territories where his or her life or freedom is threatened, regardless of any extradition agreements
previously agreed upon between States Parties of the Refugee Convention. Further, the phrase ‘to
expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever’ indicates that non-refoulement obligations
arise regardless of the State’s conduct or where the expelling or return occurs.221
The phrase ‘frontiers of territories’ means the territory of the country of origin or last habitual
residence.222 The term not only includes territories where the refugee may face a future risk of
refoulement but also the territory of a State where authorities of concern, such as security service
or military personnel, are present.223 An example of this is in the context of an occupation where
one part of the territory of a State may be occupied by enemy forces.224 Also, the legal status of
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the place to which the refugee may be sent is not material in considering whether Article 33(1)
protection applies, given that the word ‘territories’ was used by the drafters of the Refugee
Convention rather than ‘countries’ or ‘States’.225
The phrase ‘frontiers of territories’ also denotes territorial scope.226 There has been some debate
over the meaning of this phrase.227 Some States argue that non-refoulement obligations and
corresponding responsibility for the claimant only trigger when the individual concerned is within
the territory of the State deemed responsible (as mentioned above).228 However, academic
commentators interpret the phrase to mean that it is exercised wherever the State has ‘effective
authority and control’ over the individual, including on the high seas.229 The latter approach is
supported by a plain language reading of the term, as per the VCLT. 230 This idea is supported by
the ECtHR, the Human Rights Committee, the International Court of Justice, and the Committee
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Against Torture.231 Moreover, the UNHCR is of the view that the principle of non-refoulement
applies wherever a State exercises its jurisdiction.232
The words ‘where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened’ have the same meaning as the
phrase ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ under Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention.233 This
threat to life or freedom is an anticipation of a future threat, so that every time a State wishes to
remove a refugee, the removing State must evaluate the risk of the refugee being persecuted after
removal, by taking into account all relevant information including any new or previously
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unrecognized facts.234 The obligation of non-refoulement is designed to protect certain human
rights violations from occurring and is therefore prospective in nature, rather than an obligation to
right past wrongs.235 Further, the obligation on the prohibition against refoulement applies
regardless of whether or not the threat to life or freedom materializes.236 For instance, the
prohibition against refoulement applies regardless of whether or not certain human rights are
violated in actuality.237
In sum, the current understanding of the prohibition on refoulment under international refugee law
is multifaceted, and is reflected not only in treaty law, but also in customary international law.238
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Individuals cannot be refouled (returned) by Contracting States back to the territory of the country
or entity of origin or last habitual residence if they satisfy the definition of ‘refugee’ and do not
fall into any of the exceptions to that definition. Extradition or non-admittance cannot be used by
States in an attempt to avoid the duty not to refoule. The prohibition on refoulment applies to States
acting both within and outside of their own territory, where they exercise effective authority and
control. Finally, the evaluation of the threat to the refugee if returned is forward-looking in time.
2.3 The Current Conception of Non-Refoulement under International Human Rights Law
While the principle of non-refoulment originated in international refugee law, as outlined above,
it has since evolved to simultaneously have meaning within international human rights law. This
section explains this joint existence by explaining non-refoulement under international human
rights law.
Both the Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
codify non-refoulement protection in their respective treaties. For the CAT, the prohibition against
refoulement is formulated as the prohibition against torture under Article 3, while for the ICCPR,
the prohibition against refoulement is codified as both the prohibition against torture and the
prohibition on denying an individual his or her right to life respectively under Articles 6 and 7.239
Article 3 of the CAT states that:
1. No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger
of being subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent
authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.240
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Article 3 explicitly prohibits States from refouling an individual to another State when there is a
serious risk of torture in that State, and this prohibition has been confirmed by the Committee
Against Torture, the CAT treaty monitoring body.241 The definition of ‘torture’ for the purpose of
Article 3 is codified under Article 1 of the CAT.242 The prohibition against torture under Article 3
does not include an obligation upon States Parties of the CAT to prohibit other forms of cruel
treatment.243 Instead, the prohibition against cruel treatment is found under Article 16, which
obliges States ‘to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in Article 1’.244
The Committee Against Torture has indicated that the prohibition against torture is a right which
cannot be taken away or compromised.245 The Committee stated that the principle of non-
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refoulement is a core concept and fundamental principle of international refugee law, and, in the
form of human rights law, there is no derogation from such right as the prohibition against
torture.246 Further, the Committee is of the view that the principle of non-refoulement should not
be used as a loophole to circumvent international refugee law protection, especially in the instances
of diplomatic assurances.247 In such instances, sending States are cautioned against the use of
political undertakings from receiving States to guarantee the human rights of individuals being
received.248
Unlike the CAT’s explicit reference to non-refoulement, the ICCPR contains implicit references
to the principle. Article 6 of the ICCPR declares that “Every human being has the inherent right to
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”.249 In
similarly absolute language, Article 7 says “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation”.250 While both provisions do not refer
specifically to non-refoulment, they have been interpreted as prohibiting refoulement to situations
in which life may be deprived or in which torture may occur. For example, the United Nations
Human Rights Committee - the treaty-monitoring body of the ICCPR - commented on the jus
cogens nature of non-refoulement.251
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Some scholars argue that the principle of non-refoulement is a jus cogens norm, from which no
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within Latin America on the basis of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees.255 The
approach of the scholars suggesting that non-refoulement is progressing towards the status of jus
cogens is more persuasive as the status of the principle as a peremptory norm is still lacking
consensus among scholars and States.
In sum, international human rights law takes an activity-specific approach to defining who cannot
be refouled: anyone who faces torture or deprivation of life on return to another State where that
individual is under serious threat. In contrast, refugee law examines the rights of those forcibly
displaced by protecting asylum seekers or refugees from being returned to places where they may
be subjected to threats of death or persecution linked to a Convention ground. In other words,
while human rights law can be said to be activity-specific in setting the parameters for nonrefoulement, refugee law is concerned with the civil and political rights of the refugees. Further,
refugee law is limiting in that it applies to only asylum seekers and refugees.256 As well, nonrefoulement as interpreted under refugee law is narrower than human rights law as a result of
exceptions to the principle. For instance, the exception to non-refoulement found under Article
33(2) of the Refugee Convention provides that refugees who otherwise are protected from
refoulement cannot be granted such protection where they are deemed to have committed a serious
crime or would endanger the community of the country of refuge.257
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The dual existence of non-refoulement within international refugee and human rights law, and the
different levels of protection under each strand of law, raise the question of which approach to
non-refoulement applies and when. On this, there are differing views and no clear resolution.
McAdams argues that this lack of clarity is due to the ‘general reluctance by States, academics and
institutions to view human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law as branches of an
interconnected, holistic regime’.258 Some scholars have argued that the wider human rights law
definition of non-refoulement displaces the narrower refugee law definition of non-refoulement.259
In other words, they posit that the definition of non-refoulement in human rights law must set aside
or override the definition in refugee law because it is broader in nature (as it applies to all human
beings, regardless of their status, without exception) and bridges the gap that refugee rights may
not cover.260 Under this conception, the human rights version of the prohibition on refoulement is
the central version. However, others contend that human rights law and refugee law do not interact
in this manner; that they are intrinsically intertwined and one does not act as a surrogate for the
other.261 They maintain that the refugee and human rights law definitions of non-refoulement do
not displace one another, but instead work to complement the protection offered by the two
regimes.262 As one commentator indicates, the two regimes operate and develop together, with
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each area of the law informing the other: ‘The framers’ unambiguous reference in the Preamble of
the 1951 Convention to the UDHR indicates a desire for the refugee definition to evolve in tandem
with human rights principles’ (emphasis added).263 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem state that this coexistence means that international human rights law is ‘an essential part of [the Refugee
Convention’s] framework’.264 For the norm of non-refoulement, this means that the interpretation
in the Refugee Convention is accompanied by the human rights law interpretation, so they are
applied together when considering the risk to asylum claimants. A branch of this approach argues
for refugee law to be viewed as lex specialis.265 In this view, refugee law, as the specialized law
(lex specialis) applying to asylum claimants and refugees, normally prevails, taking priority over
the generalist rule (lex generalis). However, when there is a conflict of norms between
international refugee and human rights law, ‘such a conflict is resolved in favour of the most
protective treatment essentially provided by human rights law, without regard to the alleged
speciality of the prevailing norm’.266 This is because refugee law does not exist in a ‘normative
vacuum’ and ‘no legal regime is fully self-contained’.267
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The ambiguous nature of the roles of refugee law and human rights law means that privileging
certain interpretations may create a normative conflict or a normative gap in situations where an
individual’s protection is at stake. Norm conflicts arise when the same issues are governed by two
different set of rules, and there is a potential for different outcomes for the refugee claimant based
on how those different sets of rules are interpreted and applied by States. For instance, a norm
conflict can arise in the situation where the individual in question is being faced with a return to a
territory where the endangerment is greater than persecution but does not rise to the level of a
threat to life or a threat of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.268 In this situation, some
states may argue that refugee law is the primary law applicable because it is lex specialis over
human rights law, which is lex generalis.269 In this example, this refugee would not be able to be
refouled, but under a pure primacy approach for international human rights law, the same refugee
may be returned since the individual being contemplated for return is not facing a risk to life or of
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. On the other hand, normative gaps can
occur when a State interprets either refugee law or human rights law in a manner to exclude
protection, without resorting to the other area of law to see if protection might apply. Normative
conflicts and normative gaps can be eliminated by adopting an approach in which both areas of
law are considered to apply at all times. Under this approach, one set of rules complements and
adds onto the other such that return to persecution or threat of life or torture, inhumane or
degrading treatment or punishment are all considered to violate the norm of non-refoulement, an
approach considered in more detail in subsequent chapters.
Despite the fact that there is no single agreed approach on the interaction between international
refugee law and international human rights law on non-refoulement, this debate does not impact
upon the analysis in this thesis: this is because EU law adopts the approach that both forms of nonrefoulement exist together, and that the widest approach envelops the narrower approach, thus
avoiding both norm conflicts and gaps, as explained in the next section and more fully in Chapter
Three.

268

See CAT NR Comment supra note 245 at para 8.

269

See, Poon Cornell Article supra note 132 at 33.

63

2.4 Non-Refoulement in European Law
The principle of non-refoulement is also found in European law, namely EU law and European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) law. While Chapter Three provides a detailed explanation
of the European asylum system and its relation to non-refoulement, this section briefly describes
the presence of non-refoulement law within the EU, in order to compare it to the international law
explained above. Therefore, this section explains where the principle of non-refoulement is found
under EU law and ECHR law.
EU law is the corpus of law that binds EU Member States.270 The EU acquis is ‘the body of
common rights and obligations that are binding on all EU countries’.271 The EU acquis is
comprised of EU primary and secondary law.272 EU primary law consists of treaties, which form
the basis or ground rules for all EU action.273 EU secondary law includes regulations, directives,
and decisions, and are derived from the principles and objectives set out in the treaties.274 Examples
of EU primary law relevant to non-refoulement include the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
(TFEU) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (EU Charter).275 Examples of EU
secondary law relevant to non-refoulement include the Dublin III Regulation and its key directives,
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namely: the Qualification Directive, Asylum Procedures Directive, and the Reception Conditions
Directive.276 (Each of these secondary laws are discussed further in Chapter Three.)
Although the EU is itself not a State Party to the Refugee Convention, EU primary law - namely
Article 78 of the TFEU - requires that the EU establish a common asylum policy which is in
compliance with the Refugee Convention, including the principle of non-refoulement.277 As
primary law, all EU Member States are obliged to follow this treaty regardless of their pre-existing
domestic asylum procedures.278 The EU Charter is also primary law. It does not have an explicit
provision mentioning the term ‘non-refoulement’; instead, an iteration of the principle is
formulated as the right to life and the prohibition against torture under Articles 2 and 4 respectively
and Article 19 on protection from removal.279 Article 2 of the EU Charter states: ‘1. Everyone has
the right to life. 2. No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed’.280 Article 4 says:
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.281
Article 19 indicates that ‘[n]o one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there
is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment’.282 Further, Article 18 of the EU Charter guarantees the right
to asylum with ‘due respect for the rules of the [Refugee] Convention’, which includes non-
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refoulement.283 While the prohibition on refoulement is implicitly included in Articles 2, 4, and
19, both the UNHCR and the CJEU also view Article 18 as incorporating protection from
refoulement, and that this protection sets the common minimum standard which EU Member States
are to follow.284 Thus, both the international refugee law and international human rights law
conceptions of non-refoulement are included in EU primary law, through the TFEU and the EU
Charter. They co-exist, creating a combined - and therefore robust - legal norm.
Under EU secondary law, the recital of the Dublin III Regulation mentions the importance of
safeguarding the principle of non-refoulement.285 Recital 3 of the Reception Conditions Directive
mirrors this provision, reiterating that Member States are to follow and respect the principle of
non-refoulement.286 Additionally, Article 21(1) of the Qualification Directive has a specific
provision on the protection from refoulement.287 Article 21(1) states: ‘Member States shall respect
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the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with their international obligations’.288 Article
21(2) of the Qualification Directive mirrors Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, providing
an exception to the prohibition on refoulement.289 The Asylum Procedures Directive also addresses
an aspect of non-refoulement, particularly in Article 38, which provides for the ‘safe’ third country
concept.290 Under Article 38, the Directive indicates that procedural safeguards must be in place
for a non-EU (or ‘third’) country to be deemed ‘safe’, so that claimants who have demonstrated a
‘sufficient connection’ with the ‘safe’ third country may be returned without contravening the
principle of non-refoulement.291
The principle of non-refoulement as reflected in these primary and secondary laws has been
litigated before the Court of Justice of the EU, based in Luxembourg. The CJEU is tasked with
monitoring Member States’ application of EU law and to ensure that EU law has been applied
uniformly throughout the EU.292 The CJEU is comprised of two courts, namely the Court of Justice
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and the General Court.293 The Court of Justice handles requests for preliminary rulings from
domestic courts of EU Member States, and is therefore the tribunal handling non-refoulement cases
from individuals,294 while the General Court is tasked with ruling on actions dealing mainly with
competition law, State aid, trade, agriculture, and trademarks.295 The CJEU has indicated that the
CEAS is based on, inter alia, the guarantee that no one will be sent back to a territory where that
person is at risk of being persecuted.296 The CJEU has waded directly into the debate about how
the refugee and human rights law conceptions of non-refoulement fit together. The Court
recognized that the Refugee Convention permits States to derogate from the principle of nonrefoulement in cases in which a refugee has committed a serious crime and presents a threat to the
nation, or if the refugee presents a serious threat to society and that EU law transposed this,
therefore permitting refoulement in these circumstances.297 At the same time, the Court found that
EU law must conform with the EU Charter, which prohibits exposure to torture and inhuman or
degrading punishment or treatment.298 Therefore, Member States cannot return refugees to their
home States if there is a possibility that they will face such treatment.299 In this way, the CJEU has
reaffirmed the dual and simultaneous application of the refugee and human rights approaches
within the EU to non-refoulement, thereby providing claimants with the widest possible
protections.
ECHR law has two strands: the content of the ECHR itself, and the jurisprudence created by the
ECtHR in its interpretation and application of the ECHR. The ECHR does not contain a specific
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provision on non-refoulement. Like the ICCPR and the CAT, however, it contains the right to life
in Article 2 and a prohibition on torture in Article 3. The prohibition against torture under Article
3 of the ECHR is absolute and without derogation, exclusion, or exception, even if there are
concerns on national security grounds, unlike the Refugee Convention.300 The ECHR applies to
all persons falling under the jurisdiction of any State Party to the ECHR, regardless of the
nationality or legal status of the person in question.301 Therefore, unlike the Refugee Convention,
the ECHR also applies to persons who have not yet left their country of origin or habitual
residence.302 Thus, and perhaps not surprisingly, the conception of non-refoulement under the
ECHR reflects international human rights law.
The ECtHR is a court that monitors and scrutinizes the Council of Europe Member States’
implementation of the ECHR and is based in Strasbourg.303 The Council of Europe, an
international organization and a separate entity from the EU, is comprised of 47 Member States,
including the current 27 EU Member States that are a part of, and have acceded to, the ECHR.304
All 27 EU Member States are, as a result of their membership within the Council of Europe, also
members of the ECtHR.305 Parties to a case before the ECtHR must abide by the judgments of the
ECtHR and take necessary measures to comply with them.306
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The ECtHR has developed a significant body of non-refoulement case law based on the prohibition
of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR,307
which it has indicated is an absolute, non-derogable right.308 Broader than the non-refoulement
protection offered by the Refugee Convention, and in line with international human rights law, the
ECtHR has interpreted Article 3 of the ECHR to be applicable to both State and non-State actors,
to cover indirect refoulement, and to apply to all forms of removal from the host State to another
State (to countries inside and outside of the CEAS).309 Importantly, the returning State (and not
only the receiving State) are considered to be responsible for refoulement where there are
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substantial grounds for believing that the person concerned faces a real risk of torture or inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment upon return or extradition.310 In terms of evaluating the risk
of harm, the ECtHR has held that the harm may come from both State and non-State actors, and
that, while the risk is usually intentionally inflicted, it could also arise in other circumstances
(including in poor living conditions).311 The claimant only need be exposed to a ‘real risk’ of illtreatment, but it must be higher than a ‘mere possibility’ and lower than ‘more likely than not’.312
The Court noted the particular vulnerability of asylum claimants as a factor to be considered when
assessing the risk and severity of ill-treatment.313 Notably, the Court has indicated that assurances
by the third State that the claimant will not be ill-treated are not, on their own, sufficient to
demonstrate lack of risk: the quality and reliability of these assurances must be evaluated.314 The
Court has also held that non-refoulement applies in cases involving returns to countries in which a
substantial and foreseeable risk of the death penalty or execution exists.315 As well, the ECtHR has
also held in its decisions that the ECHR takes precedence over other EU law obligations for EU
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Member States,316 thus reinforcing the human rights lens of non-refoulement and essentially
confirming the widest protection approach of the CJEU.
The ECtHR has indicated that non-refoulement protections are incorporated into ECHR rights
other than Article 3. As mentioned above, the ECHR contains, in Article 2, a provision on the right
to life. Since applicants have often argued non-refoulement concerns under both Article 2 and 3,
the ECtHR has generally opted to examine the merits of the complaint under Article 3.317 However,
in recent years, the Court has pronounced itself on non-refoulement considerations under Article
2, finding that return to a serious risk of ‘a flagrant denial of a fair trial … the outcome of which
was or is likely to be the death penalty’ is a violation of that principle.318 Other cases have
considered the link between non-refoulement and Article 5, on the right to liberty and security of
person, finding that, in principle, ‘a flagrant breach of Article 5 would occur only if, for example,
the receiving State arbitrarily detained an applicant for many years without any intention of
bringing him or her to trial … or if an applicant would be at risk of being imprisoned for a
substantial period in the receiving State, having previously been convicted after a flagrantly unfair
trial’.319 Similarly, cases have found a link between non-refoulement and Article 6, on the right to
a fair trial for similar reasons: when there are ‘substantial grounds for believing that … [the
applicant] would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to a flagrant denial of justice’.320
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The full contours of the European understanding of non-refoulement are explored in Chapter
Three, but this summary indicates the extent to which the EU conception reflects the international
human rights law approach, and the intertwining of the principle as stated in the Refugee
Convention with that approach.
2.5 Conclusions on the Principle of Non-Refoulement
International and European refugee law protects asylum seekers and refugees against refoulement
while international and European human rights law protects all human beings regardless of their
legal or political status against refoulement.321 The activities that are prohibited under refugee law
include return to a place where persecution or death or where the asylum seeker or refugee’s life
or freedom would be threatened, while in human rights law, the individual is protected against
return to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.322 The obligation to protect
asylum seekers, refugees, and other individuals from refoulement triggers both within a State’s
territory and outside of the State’s territory. For example, the obligation of non-refoulement can
trigger when an individual has not yet arrived in the territory of a State and has not yet been
subjected to individual refugee status determination processes.323
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Despite the distinctive nature of refugee law and human rights law in their application to asylum
seekers, refugees, and individuals, the two branches of international law are clearly intrinsically
intertwined. However, the exact manner of that interaction is still ambiguous. Refugee law protects
a specific group of individuals, namely asylum seekers and refugees, and human rights law either
fills in the legal gap by protecting those who do not fall under the definition of a refugee or protects
everyone, including refugees. Some scholars argue that refugee law acts as a surrogate in the sense
that it protects refugees who are unable to obtain protection from their host State.324 Other scholars
argue that human rights law acts as complementary protection to refugee law instead of displacing
the latter.325 Yet others argue that the role of human rights law is not merely complementary to
refugee law, but is normatively superior to refugee law.326 While this debate has relevance at the
international level, it is of less concern at the EU level due to the simultaneous application of both
refugee law and human rights law conceptions of non-refoulement for asylum claimants and
refugees.
The principle of non-refoulement is a principle of central importance to refugee and human rights
law given that its role is to protect those who are at risk of being returned to situations where their
life or bodily integrity may be threatened. Given the complexity of the norm of non-refoulement
and its application within Europe, the next chapter therefore explores the CEAS, also referred to
as the Dublin System, in more detail. It highlights the history and challenges of the Dublin System,
in particular how EU Member States’ non-refoulement obligations are undermined as a result of
certain policies implemented within the EU to contain and control the flow of refugees.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Common European Asylum System and Non-Refoulement
3. Introduction
The European Union (EU) is a destination region for many asylum claimants, with over 600,000
asylum applicants arriving in EU Member States in 2019.327 Germany is currently the EU country
with the most asylum applicants, with roughly 473,000 first-time asylum applications filed
between January and September 2019.328 The mass influx of refugees into Europe began with the
Syrian conflict in 2011, peaked in 2015 to 2016, and has shifted over time, but the issue of mass
influx is still a European reality and a source of contention.329 This is evident in recent
developments at the EU-Turkey border, when Turkey announced that it will ‘no longer be
preventing refugees and migrants from crossing the border into Europe. [However] Greek
authorities have responded by announcing that they will not allow people to seek asylum and will
be sending people back to Turkey’.330
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The purpose of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is to harmonize asylum standards
across the EU and to create efficient access to asylum procedures.331 Despite established EU law
specifying the minimum standards of procedural safeguards for these applicants - including on
non-refoulement - the Dublin System332 has been critiqued by academic commentators, the
UNHCR, nongovernmental organizations, and Member States as ineffective and deficient.333
This chapter aims to explain the law - written law, case law, and procedural law - applied in the
EU regarding the refugee law principle of non-refoulement. It does so in order to illustrate the
obligations EU Member States are meant to implement with respect to non-refoulement, and the
gap that exists between obligations and actual practice. Therefore, this chapter begins by
examining the sources and hierarchy of EU law and ECHR law in order to provide a background
as to the where non-refoulement is derived under European law. Given the discussion in Chapter
Two of the relationship between international refugee law and international human rights law, the
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interrelationship between EU law and ECHR law is crucial and, as will be seen, results in a
relatively robust norm prohibiting refoulement. The chapter then discusses the asylum process
within the CEAS, followed by an exploration of gaps between the way the norm of nonrefoulement is articulated in EU legal documents and how it is observed in practice, particularly
as a result of the EU’s ‘margin of discretion’ when implementing refugee law at the domestic level
and the presumption of mutual trust between EU Member States.334 Finally, it ends with
concluding remarks on the meaning of these gaps.
3.1 The European Legal Order
EU law and ECHR law establish the obligations of EU Member States with respect to refugee law
and, more specifically, the principle of non-refoulement. This subsection therefore begins by
explaining the sources and hierarchy of EU law, before launching into a discussion of the scope
and content of EU law as it relates to non-refoulement. Next, it examines the sources, hierarchy,
scope and content of ECHR law in the same manner. Both discussions illustrate the multi-layered
nature of refugee law within Europe, particularly as it relates to non-refoulement.
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3.1.1

EU Law

EU law is comprised of both primary and secondary law.335 The EU was established by a number
of treaties, namely: The Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the Treaty of Lisbon.
The Treaty of Maastricht (or, formally, the Treaty on European Union) officially established the
EU, and subsequent treaty amendments, detailed below, expanded the powers of the EU in its
relations with Member States.336 The Treaty of Maastricht was adopted on February 7, 1992, which
also created a single European currency, the Euro.337 The Treaty of Amsterdam (or, formally, the
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties establishing the
European Communities and certain related acts) was signed on October 2, 1997 and made
substantive changes to the Treaty of Maastricht, in which EU Member States agreed to defer
certain powers under immigration, civil and criminal laws, and foreign security policies, to the
European Parliament.338 The Treaty of Lisbon (or, formally, the Treaty of Lisbon Amending the
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Treaty of
Lisbon) was signed on December 13, 2007. This treaty amended the Treaty of Maastricht and the
Treaty of Rome (the treaty which created the European Economic Community, the precursor to the
EU).339
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The sources of EU law are primary and secondary legislation. Examples of primary legislation are:
the Treaty of the EU (TEU), Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), and international
agreements.340 EU treaties and general principles of EU law are known as primary legislation and
are at the top of the legal EU hierarchy.341 Examples of primary EU treaties that are relevant to
this thesis include: the TEU, TFEU, and the EU Charter.342 Next in the legal hierarchy are
international agreements concluded by the EU, which are subordinate to primary legislation.343 At
the bottom of the legal hierarchy of the EU is secondary legislation.344 Primary legislation
supersedes secondary legislation, and secondary legislation is only valid if it is consistent with the
acts and agreements which have precedence over it.345
Secondary legislation is made up of legislative acts, delegated acts, and implementing acts.346
Legislative acts are ‘legal acts which are adopted through the ordinary or a special legislative
procedure’.347 Delegated acts are ‘non-legislative acts of general application which supplement or
amend certain non-essential elements of a legislative act’.348 Implementing acts are ‘generally
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adopted by the Commission […] Implementing acts are a matter for the Council only in specific
cases which are duly justified and in areas of common foreign and security policy’.349
Legislative acts include regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions.350
Regulations are binding legislative acts that must be applied in their entirety across the EU.351
Directives, on the other hand, are legislative acts that set out a goal that all EU Member States
must achieve, but it is up to the individual Member States to devise their own laws on how to
achieve these goals.352 Decisions are binding on only those to whom they are addressed, including
EU Member States and natural or legal persons, and are directly applicable.353 Recommendations
are not binding, but allow the EU institutions to make their views known and suggest a line of
action without imposing any legal obligation on EU Member States.354 Opinions are instruments
that allow EU institutions to make a statement in a non-binding fashion without imposing any legal
obligation on those to whom they are addressed.355
The EU is comprised of a number of institutions. The most important EU institutions are the EU
Parliament, the EU Commission, and the EU Council. The EU Parliament is a directly-elected EU
body with legislative, supervisory, and budgetary responsibilities.356 The EU Commission
promotes the general interests of the EU by proposing and enforcing legislation and implementing
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policies and the EU budget.357 The EU Council defines the general political direction and priorities
of the EU.358
Now that the general structure of EU law has been explained, it is important to explain EU law on
the principle of non-refoulement. The scope of EU law on non-refoulement is evident in the
relevant EU primary and secondary legislation on asylum, the legally-binding force of these pieces
of legislation, and the application of the Schengen Area in relation to the freedom of movement of
non-EU nationals.
Primary and secondary legislation such as the TFEU, EU Charter, and the Qualification Directive
(recast) define the scope of the application of non-refoulement in EU law. Although the EU is itself
not a States Party to the Refugee Convention or the Protocol, all of the EU Member States are
signatories to, and have ratified, both treaties and the EU itself is bound by the TFEU.359 Article
78 of the TFEU provides the legal basis for the EU to comply with the principle of nonrefoulement: this Article obliges EU Member States to establish a common European asylum
policy which complies with the Refugee Convention and the Protocol. Additionally, the principle
of non-refoulement articulated as the prohibition against return to torture is found under Article
19(2) of the EU Charter, which states that:
no one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious
risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.360
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The principle of non-refoulement is therefore violated when an EU Member State removes a
person if there is a real risk of ill-treatment in the receiving State, whether or not the removed
person is actually ill-treated in the receiving State.361 Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive
(recast) similarly recognizes the importance of the principle of non-refoulement and extends
‘subsidiary protection’ - in other words, complementary protection - for asylum claimants who do
not meet the definition of ‘refugee’ under Article 1A of the Refugee Convention.362 Under Article
15(b), ‘subsidiary protection’ may be provided to those facing ‘serious harm’, consisting of ‘torture
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin’.363
The legally-binding nature of EU primary and secondary legislation determines how this
legislation is applied in the EU. For example, EU Member States are automatically bound by EU
regulations and decisions on the date they take effect.364 Directives, however, must first be
incorporated into domestic legislation by EU Member States.365 The EU Commission monitors
whether EU Member States have correctly applied EU law and the CJEU ensures that EU laws are
interpreted and applied uniformly across all EU Member States.366 The clauses concerning nonrefoulement in both primary and secondary EU law all use the terms ‘no one’, ‘any person’, or ‘no
person’, so that asylum claimants, refugees and all Third-Country Nationals are protected under
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those provisions.367 (A ‘Third-Country National’ is an individual who is a non-EU citizen who is
also not a person enjoying the EU right to free movement).368
The Schengen Area and its application to freedom of movement define the scope of EU law as it
is applied to Third-Country Nationals. Under EU law, States have the sovereign right to control
the entry and presence of non-nationals in their territories.369 However, EU law and the ECHR
impose certain limitations on this sovereignty, namely, that rejections at the border of individuals
at risk of persecution or other serious harm in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement is
not permitted.370 The Schengen acquis establishes ‘a unified system for maintaining external
border controls and allows individuals to travel freely across borders within the Schengen Area’.371
The Schengen Area guarantees freedom of movement for EU nationals and those who are legally
present.372 The Schengen Area was established in 1985 when the Governments of the States of
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the French Republic signed the
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Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 1985.373 The Schengen Area ‘entitles every
EU citizen to travel, work and live in any EU country without special formalities’.374 The Schengen
Area encompasses the very idea of freedom of movement as guaranteed under Article 45 of the
EU Charter.375 The Schengen Area applies to most EU Member States except for Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.376 As a result of Brexit, the United Kingdom has reached
an agreement with the Council of the European Union and the EU Parliament to include the United
Kingdom in Part 1 Annex II of Regulation 2018/1806 on possession of visas for third country
nationals.377 This means that, although after Brexit, ‘the Treaties and Directive 2004/38/EC, along
with the right to enter the territory of the Member States without a visa or equivalent formalities,
will cease to apply to nationals of the United Kingdom who are British citizens’, including the
United Kingdom in the annex of Regulation 2018/1806, British citizens will be exempt from the
visa requirement.378 Article 21 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement provides
that Third-Country Nationals who hold ‘uniform visas and who have legally entered the territory
of a Schengen state may freely move within the whole Schengen Area while their visas are still
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valid’.379 The Schengen Area was at risk of collapse due to the mass influx of asylum claimants
into and across Europe since the beginning of the Syrian war in 2011, leading to the temporary
reinstatement of border controls by some EU Member States within the Schengen Area.380 This is
examined in more detail in the next chapter.
The content of EU law in the asylum context is found in the key instruments comprising the CEAS
and its procedures. The history of the CEAS began in 1999 when the European Commission started
working with Member States to create a common asylum policy.381 The central aim of the CEAS
is to establish a harmonized, fair, and effective asylum procedure to process asylum claims across
EU Member States, while complying with international law obligations to protect asylum
claimants fleeing from persecution.382 The CEAS was established under Article 78 of the TFEU,
which provides that the CEAS must respect EU Member States’ obligations under the Refugee
Convention and Protocol (which includes the prohibition on refoulement).383 The CEAS also has
related aims, expressed in different ways. For example, the European Council indicates that the
CEAS is meant to assist with the development of the EU as ‘an area of freedom, security and
justice’.384 Additionally, the European Commission’s Policy Plan on Asylum in 2008 stated that
the CEAS is meant to: harmonize the standards of protection by aligning EU Member States’
asylum legislation; enhance effectiveness and support practical cooperation among EU Member
States on matters relating to asylum; and increase solidarity and responsibility-sharing among EU
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Member States and between EU and non-EU Member States.385 With all of these goals in mind,
the instruments comprising the CEAS are meant to create clarity in determining the EU Member
State responsible for processing asylum applications, set common standards for a fair and efficient
asylum procedure, indicate common minimum conditions of reception of asylum applicants, and
establish the rules on recognition and granting of refugee status.386 They create a minimum
standard for EU Member States, although the instruments provide room for State interpretation as
to how substantive and procedural CEAS rules are implemented into domestic legislation.387
The CEAS has been reformed in three phases. Phase I of the CEAS, from 1999-2003, focused on
the adoption of legislation necessary to implement common minimum standards for asylum,388
including on the reception of asylum claimants, qualification of claimants for international
protection, the content of the protection granted, and procedures for granting and withdrawing
refugee status.389 The first phase involved the drafting and adoption of the Qualification Directive,
the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive, the Dublin Convention, the
Eurodac Regulation, the Temporary Protection Directive and the Family Reunification
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Directive.390 The second phase took place from 2004-2013.391 Phase II reformed Phase I of the
CEAS and involved five main measures: recasting the Qualification Directive from 2004 to
2011/95/EU, recasting the Asylum Procedures Directive from 2005 to 2013/32/EU, recasting the
Reception Conditions Directive from 2003 to 2013/33/EU, recasting the Dublin II Regulation from
2003 to Dublin III Regulation (604/2013), and recasting the Eurodac Regulation from 2000 to
2013.392 The CEAS is currently in its third phase, and is now being discussed before the European
Council.393 The first package of the third phase to reform the CEAS was presented in May 2018,
which included a proposal to recast the Qualification Directive and the Asylum Procedures
Directive from directives into binding regulations, a recast of the Reception Conditions Directive,
and a ‘Dublin IV’ Proposal.394 This work is still ongoing.
Of all of the instruments mentioned, the central instruments of the CEAS are the Dublin
Convention (1990), the Dublin II Regulation (2003), the Dublin III Regulation (2013), and three
key directives: Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU), the Asylum Procedures Directive
(2013/32/EU), and the Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU), which together are known
as the ‘Dublin System’.395 The Dublin III Regulation is an instrument which sets out the criteria
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which determines the Member State responsible for determining asylum applications for ThirdCountry Nationals and stateless persons.396 Under the Dublin III Regulation, Article 3(2) allows
Member States to send the asylum claimant back to the Member State responsible as determined
by the Regulation based on a set criterion (termed ‘Dublin transfer’).397 For instance, the practice
in some Member States such as Germany is that, a ‘personal conversation’ takes place to allow the
asylum claimant to explain to the asylum official any reasons why a deportation to another Dublin
State could be impeded, such as the existence of relatives in Germany. The Qualification Directive
sets out the procedures for determining Third-Country Nationals and stateless persons who qualify
for international protection and for subsidiary protection.398 The Asylum Procedures Directive sets
out the standards which Member States are to follow in the granting and withdrawing of
international protection.399 Finally, the Reception Conditions Directive sets out the standards
which Member States are to follow for the reception conditions - the conditions under which
applicants for international protection live within the host state.400
Of these CEAS documents, as mentioned earlier, Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive
(recast) directly recognizes the importance of the principle of non-refoulement. As well, nonrefoulement is also formulated under Articles 28(2), 35(b), 39(4), 41, and Annex I (c) of the
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Asylum Procedures Directive.401 The recitals of the three key directives of the CEAS, although
non-binding as they are not the operative provisions of the directive, also reiterate some form of
non-refoulement.402 Apart from these explicit references to non-refoulement, the common
procedures created by the Dublin System are meant to provide a shared framework which fulfills
EU Member States’ obligations under the Refugee Convention and protect claimants against
violations of their rights, including the right not to be refouled.
The above-mentioned ongoing negotiations for Phase III of the reforms of the CEAS include
proposals to recast the Qualification Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive from
directives into regulations; this phase also includes the proposal to reform the Dublin III
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Regulation into ‘Dublin IV’.403 Both proposals could be a positive step towards deeper respect for
the principle of non-refoulement. A ‘directive’ of the EU is a legislative act establishing a goal that
all EU countries must achieve, but requires domestic legislation in order to transpose the provisions
within each EU country.404 A ‘regulation’ of the EU, on the other hand, is a binding legislative act,
which must be applied in its entirety across the EU.405 Recasting the key instruments of the CEAS
from directives to regulations results in directly imposing asylum policies of the EU upon Member
States, rather than requiring Member States to transpose them into domestic legislation. Requiring
Member States to transpose their EU law obligations into domestic law through directives
potentially leaves each country a wide ‘margin of appreciation’ or ‘margin of discretion’ in the
transposition of such provisions and could lead to the circumvention of international law, including
non-refoulement obligations, in instances when a Member State’s interpretation of nonrefoulement obligations are overly narrow.406 Thus, the Phase III reforms could help to eliminate
the variability in EU Member States’ interpretations of the prohibition against refoulement.
The proposal to improve the Dublin III Regulation, termed ‘Dublin IV’, is currently underway, but
the proposal has already received criticism from various academic commentators and
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nongovernmental organizations.407 Among the critiques is the claim that the ‘Dublin IV’ proposal,
in contrast with the Dublin III Regulation, intends to determine responsibility for examining
asylum applications based on a formula calculated using the Member States’ population size as
well as Gross Domestic Product.408 The problem with this formula is that the uneven ‘burden’
faced by Member States geographically situated near the external borders of the EU, including the
burden of ensuring individuals are not refouled, is not considered.409
In sum, EU law contains several important protections against refoulment of individuals. Article
78 of the TFEU obliges EU Member States to establish a common European asylum policy which
complies with the Refugee Convention and the Protocol, including the prohibition on refoulement.
Article 19(2) of the EU Charter prohibits an individual being sent to a country where there is a
serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive (recast) also
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recognizes the importance of the principle of non-refoulement. Another direct mention of nonrefoulement within the EU Directives is found in paragraph 3 of the recital of the Reception
Conditions Directive (recast).410 The CEAS itself also creates the framework of agreed rules which
establish common procedures for asylum across the EU - procedures which are meant to more
generally assist EU Member States in meeting their refugee law obligations, including protection
against non-refoulement.411 Although heavily referenced within key EU directives of the CEAS,
the practice of EU law often reveals procedural and substantive gaps within the interpretation and
implementation of non-refoulement in reality. Given the centrality of the principle of nonrefoulement in international refugee law, it is important that the interpretation and implementation
of non-refoulement in EU law is in line with the minimum international standards set by the
Refugee Convention.
EU law and the CEAS framework co-exist with ECHR law, described in the next subsection. When
considering the content of the principle of non-refoulement within Europe, it is important to
consider both EU law and ECHR law together.
3.1.2

ECHR Law

The Council of Europe is a separate entity from the EU and is an international organization focused
on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, comprised of the 47 Member States that acceded
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to the ECHR.412 All current 27 EU Member States are members of the Council of Europe.413 A
main body of the Council of Europe is the ECtHR, located in Strasbourg, which is tasked with
monitoring Council of Europe Member States’ compliance with the ECHR.414
The ECtHR creates jurisprudence stemming from interpretations of the ECHR. Article 3 of the
ECHR is important in the asylum context because it codifies non-refoulement protection in the
form of the prohibition against torture in ECHR law.415 Article 3 states: ‘no one shall be subjected
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.416 The ECtHR has been
‘characterized as the vanguard institution on non-refoulement […] substantively leading the
development of international law’ on this principle.417 A foundational case in this respect is
Soering v. the United Kingdom, in which the Strasbourg court decided that, although States Parties
to the ECHR have the right to control the entry, residence, and expulsion of aliens through
domestic legislation, this right is not absolute and is restricted by their obligations under the ECHR,
such as the requirement to comply with the prohibition against torture under Article 3.418 This
prohibition against torture is an absolute prohibition, as indicated by the ECtHR in other cases
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such as Ireland v. the United Kingdom.419 It has also been held by the ECtHR that the obligation
of non-refoulement under Article 3 of the ECHR extends to cases where there is a real risk of cruel
treatment in the receiving State.420 The ECtHR has interpreted Article 3 to include acts that may
give rise to potential future breaches of the principle upon removal to another country.421
As determined by the case law of the ECtHR, Article 3 involves interpreting two prohibited acts,
namely: ‘torture’ and ‘inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment’.422 In The Greek Case,
the European Commission on Human Rights held that:
All torture must be inhuman and degrading treatment, and inhuman treatment [is]
also degrading. The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as
deliberately [causing] severe suffering, mental or physical, which, in the particular
situation, is [unjustifiable. Torture] has a purpose, such as the obtaining of
information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment, and it is generally an
aggravated form of inhuman treatment. Treatment or punishment of an individual
may be said to be degrading if it grossly humiliates him [or her] before others or
drives him [or her] to act against his [or her] will or conscience.423
According to The Greek Case, therefore, the distinction between ‘torture’ and ‘inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment’ is that the former is ‘an aggravated form of inhuman
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treatment’, while the latter would involve deliberately causing treatment that may not amount to
‘torture’ but is nonetheless unjustifiable in the particular situation.424
The judgments from the ECtHR are binding upon the States Parties concerned.425 Some EU
Member States have directly incorporated provisions of the ECHR within their domestic law or
have added provisions within their domestic law to enforce rights provided under the ECHR.426
The scope of ECHR law, especially Article 3 on non-refoulement protection in the form of the
prohibition against return to torture, includes the application of the provision both territorially and
extraterritorially. The obligation of non-refoulement arises at the moment in time when an asylum
claimant is at the border of an EU Member State, which includes both territorial waters and transit
zones.427 However, this obligation does not arise unless the State exercises jurisdiction.428 A State
may exercise its jurisdiction over a person or a territory.429 With respect to exercising jurisdiction
over a person, Article 1 of the ECHR guarantees its rights and freedoms to ‘everyone’.430 The
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protection against refoulement therefore is guaranteed to all individuals regardless of their status
under the law, in contrast with Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention, which protects only
asylum claimants and refugees.431 ECHR case law and the UN Committee Against Torture both
apply the principle to protect those without status under the law, including refused asylum
claimants and those deprived of protection under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention.432
Extraterritorial application of non-refoulement under Article 3 of the ECHR has been affirmed by
ECHR case law, particularly in Bankovic et al v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States.433 In
that case, the ECtHR held that there are two grounds for extraterritorial application of nonrefoulement, namely: the State, through its agents, over an individual outside of its territory, and
the State over an area outside of its national territory.434 The jurisdiction clause under Article 1 of
the ECHR is the norm, which states that ‘the High States Parties shall secure to everyone within
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention’ (emphasis
added).435 There are three exceptions to the norm as interpreted by the ECtHR. First, a State
exercises jurisdiction extraterritorially through its diplomatic and consular agents.436 Where a
State’s diplomatic and consular agents exercise authority and control over individuals, that State
then has jurisdiction over those individuals, through the acts or omissions of the State’s agents.437
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Whether the act or omission of a State’s agent constitutes effective control is a matter of fact,
determined in light of the circumstances of each case.438 Second, in some cases, the use of force
by a State’s agents outside of the State’s territory may bring an individual under the control of
these agents into the State’s jurisdiction.439 For instance, where an individual is in the custody of
a State’s agent extraterritorially, the State’s jurisdiction extends to the acts of the State’s agent, so
that the State is under an obligation not to refoule the individual in custody to torture or other cruel
treatment.440 Third, through consent, invitation or acquiescence of a foreign State’s government, a
State may exercise all or some of the public powers normally exercised by that foreign State’s
government.441 For example, the jurisdiction of the State will extend to the acts or omissions of
immigration border officers checking travel documents for asylum claimants outside the State’s
territory.442
Relevant to the consideration of jurisdiction as envisioned by Article 1 of the ECHR, are three
conceptual models examined by scholars.443 First, scholars contend that the first such conceptual
model is the Spatial Model, which sees the exercise of ‘public powers’ as, in its entirety, amounting
to jurisdiction. For example, where there is exercise of ‘public powers’, the State exercises
jurisdiction. The exercise of ‘public powers’ is not a factor to consider nor is it a prerequisite to
State jurisdiction - rather, it is automatic in that, once it can be established that ‘public powers’ are
exercised by the Government of a Member State, such Member State has jurisdiction over the
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territory and individuals in question.444 The second conceptual model regarding State jurisdiction
pondered by Article 1 of the ECHR is the Personal Model. In this model, scholars maintain that
the exercise of ‘public powers’ is relevant to the consideration of State jurisdiction. For instance,
the exercise of ‘public powers’ is a factor to consider when determining jurisdiction and is not in
itself conclusive. Even in situations where an official or State agent exercises ‘public powers’, the
State may or may not exercise jurisdiction.445 In the third conceptual model when considering State
jurisdiction as contemplated by Article 1 of the ECHR, scholars suggest that the exercise of ‘public
powers’ is a prerequisite to the consideration of State jurisdiction. As a requirement, there must
be an exercise of ‘public powers’ before a determination can be made with regards to jurisdiction.
Hence, if the official or State agent does not exercise ‘public powers’ over the individual or
territory, the State does not exercise jurisdiction.446
The protection against refoulement under Article 3 of the ECHR as developed by Strasbourg case
law is wider than that provided by Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention.447 Subsequent
expulsion cases by the ECtHR have reaffirmed this position.448 The protection from refoulement
guaranteed under Article 3 of the ECHR is also wider than the protection against torture as required
under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, in that Article 3 of the ECHR not only protects
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individuals from being returned where a real risk of torture exists, but also offers individuals
protection from being expelled where there is a real risk of cruel treatment.449
Additionally, the ECtHR has recognized that non-refoulement applies in a wider number of
circumstances than identified in the Refugee Convention. For instance, the return of claimants to
situations where they may not be able to access the right to fair trial, situations where the return
would cause material deprivations due to scarce resources, or situations in which the claimants
will suffer from severe and targeted discrimination (for example, against persons with disabilities),
all constitute a violation of non-refoulement under EU law and ECHR law.450 Where a low
recognition rate means a lesser likelihood for an individual claimant to be recognized as a refugee,
the result may lead to unfairness rising to the level of a ‘flagrant denial of justice’.451 Although the
phrase ‘flagrant denial of justice’ has not been precisely defined by the ECtHR, the ECtHR has
indicated that certain forms of unfairness could amount to a ‘flagrant denial of justice’.452 These
forms of unfairness include conviction in absentia with no subsequent possibility of a fresh
determination of the merits of the charge, detention without any access to an independent and
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impartial tribunal to have the legality of the detention reviewed, and deliberate and systematic
refusal of access to a lawyer.453
A discussion of the content of ECHR law includes examining the burden and standard of proof of
establishing treatment that is contrary to Article 3. The burden of proof is upon the individual
asylum claimant to establish individualized or particularized risk of treatment contrary to the
prohibition against torture upon expulsion.454 The standard of proof for the individual asylum
claimant to prove is substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be exposed to a real risk
of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on return, contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.455
The nature of ‘risk’ to be proven by the asylum claimant is that of ‘risk of inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment’.456 As mentioned earlier, non-refoulement in the form of the prohibition
against torture is an absolute prohibition, so that even where the individual claimant is found to
have been guilty of committing any of the remunerated crimes under Article 1F of the Refugee
Convention, the claimant cannot be returned to face torture.457 Under the ECHR, any individual
who wishes to make a claim for protection under Article 3 of the ECHR can do so at the ECtHR,
regardless of that individual’s legal status, which means the individual need not be seeking asylum
or be recognized as a refugee to benefit from this protection.458
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In sum, the principle of non-refoulement under EU law and ECHR law, formulated as the
prohibition against return to torture, is absolute in nature such that no derogation from the principle
is permitted. The principle of non-refoulement is also applicable both within the territory of the
sending State, as well as extraterritorially, as an exception to the general rule provided for under
Article 1 of the ECHR.
3.2 Claiming Asylum in the EU
The above subsections examined the structure and content of EU law and ECHR law as well as
the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR courts relevant to the principle of non-refoulement.
In order to understand the context in which the principle of non-refoulement arises in the EU
context, it is vital to understand the procedures involved in claiming asylum within the EU. This
section therefore details the procedures for claiming asylum within the EU. It begins by
introducing the Dublin III Regulation, the current instrument for determining the Member State
responsible for processing asylum applications. It then discusses the process for qualifying for
international protection. Next, it explains the procedures and standards for the granting and
withdrawing of international protection. Finally, it ends by exploring the standards for reception
conditions for applicants of international protection. The application of the principle of nonrefoulement is discussed at each stage.
3.2.1

Dublin III Regulation and the Determination of the Member State Responsible

The Dublin III Regulation (604/2013) is the current CEAS instrument determining the Member
State responsible for the processing of asylum applications.459 It sets out the criteria and
mechanisms for making such a determination.460 It provides that a single Member State is
responsible for processing an asylum application when it is deemed responsible.461 Where no
Member State is designated as responsible for the processing of the asylum application on the basis
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of the criteria listed in the Dublin III Regulation, the Member State responsible shall be the first
Member State in which the application for international protection has been lodged.462
The criteria for determining the Member State responsible for the processing of asylum
applications are set out based on a hierarchy.463 First, where the applicant is an unaccompanied
minor, the Member State responsible shall be the Member State where a family member or a
sibling of the unaccompanied minor is legally present.464 In the absence of a family member or a
sibling or relative, the Member State responsible shall be the Member State where the
unaccompanied minor has lodged his or her application for international protection, provided that
it is in the best interests of the child.465 Second, where the applicant is in possession of a valid
residence document, the Member State which issued the residency document shall be responsible
for the examination of the asylum application.466 Where the applicant is in possession of a valid
visa, the Member State responsible for the processing of the asylum application shall be the
Member State which issued the visa.467 Where the applicant is in possession of more than one valid
residence document or visa issued by more than one Member State, the Member State responsible
shall be the Member State which issued the residence document or visa having the latest expiry
date.468 Third, where the applicant has irregularly crossed the border into a Member State by land,
sea or air having come from a third country, the Member State deemed responsible for the
processing of the asylum application shall be the Member State he or she first entered.469 Fourth,
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where the applicant made the application for international protection in the international transit
area of an airport of a Member State, that Member State where the application was made shall be
responsible for the processing of the asylum application.470 The responsible EU Member State
identified through this process is the Member State bearing the responsibility to enforce the
principle of non-refoulement.
The following flowchart depicts the above description of the Dublin III process for determining
the Member State responsible for processing asylum applications:

Figure 3.1 Determining the Member State responsible under Dublin III
The section below examines the process for qualifying for international protection and the asylum
procedures involved.
3.2.2

Qualifying for International Protection and Relevant Asylum Procedures

Once the responsible Member State is designated, the Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU)
requires that Member State to ensure minimum common standards for applicants of international
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protection to qualify for refugee and subsidiary protection.471 The Asylum Procedures Directive
(2013/32/EU) also determines the common minimum standards and procedures for the granting
and - crucially for the principle of non-refoulement - withdrawing of international protection.472
The minimum common standards referenced in the Qualification Directive and the Asylum
Procedures Directive are the bare minimum standards which EU Member States are to follow when
they implement relevant EU law in domestic practice.473 Therefore, it is important to first ascertain
what the common minimum standards are before turning to the core non-refoulement rights
granted by both directives under EU law.
In order to understand the points at which the principle of non-refoulement may become an issue,
it is important to first ascertain the different stages from registration to appeal for an asylum
application under the Asylum Procedures Directive (recast). These are illustrated in the following
flowchart:474
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Figure 3.2 Asylum Procedures Directive (recast)
At the first stage of the asylum process, EU Member States are obliged to assess the relevant
elements of each application for international protection, which consists of: ‘documentation
regarding the applicant’s age, background including relatives, identity, nationality(ies),
country(ies) and place(s) of previous residence, previous asylum applications, travel routes, travel
documents and the reasons for applying for international protection’.475 At the second stage of the
asylum process, applicants are triaged into caseload streams, and analysis is begun based on
country of origin information.476 As the application of these processes at Stages 1 and 2 do not
contemplate return of the individuals, the principle of non-refoulement is not engaged. However,
proper fulfilment of information collection at both stages is crucial, as incorrect information

475

Ibid at art 4(2).

476

European Asylum Support Office, “EASO Report on Asylum Procedures Directive and Non-Refoulement” at 23,

which states: ‘The first stage relates to the Dublin procedure for determining the Member State responsible for
examining an application which may, if applicable, be a precondition for access to asylum procedures at the
administrative level’, https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/asylum-procedures-ja_en.pdf [EASO Report].

105

collection can heighten the chances of an applicant later being denied protection and therefore the
risk of being refouled based on flawed assumptions. The standardized process within the CEAS is
therefore designed with the aim of ensuring adequate information collection.
Stages 3 and 4 are central to the asylum determination process. During Stage 3, an initial
assessment is conducted to determine whether the asylum claimant is admissible. During this stage,
and depending on the specific situation of where the asylum claimant has applied for asylum (i.e.
at the border or in the territory), a specific procedure will be used.477 During Stage 4, the asylum
application is assessed and a decision is made with a list of possible outcomes.478 In order for an
applicant to qualify for refugee status, an act of persecution must ‘be sufficiently serious by its
nature or repetition as to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights’ and ‘be an
accumulation of various measures, including violations of human rights which is sufficiently
severe as to affect an individual’.479 If an applicant does not meet that test, the individual may
instead qualify for subsidiary protection if serious harm is present.480 Serious harm consists of: ‘(a)
the death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of
an applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person
by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict’.481 If
a person is found not to qualify for refugee status and is not granted subsidiary protection, whether
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at an accelerated border procedure or through a regular procedure, the potential for refoulement
arises, because the applicant does not have a legal right to remain.
Applicants who are unsuccessful at Stage 4 may appeal at Stage 5. The appeal process concerns
applications that have been denied at the procedural stage. Once an appeal process has begun,
suspensive effect takes place, meaning that the asylum claimant has a right under EU law to stay
in the territory of the EU pending the results of the appeal proceedings without being subjected to
removal.482 Again, if they are unsuccessful on appeal, the potential for refoulement arises as the
individuals are usually deported. This is why ‘most of the non-refoulement cases [brought under
EU and human rights tribunals] are brought by rejected asylum-seekers’:483 The risk of refoulement
crystallizes at the point of exhaustion of domestic decision-making and appeals. However, nonrefoulement is considered as a result of the automatic suspensive effect as discussed above
requiring Member States to permit asylum claimants to remain in their territory pending the results
of the appeal.484
In sum, consideration of the potential for, and steps to avoid, refoulement are intended to be built
into all stages of the standardized CEAS asylum process. However, the adequacy of these
safeguards has been questions, as explained in the next section.
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3.3 Gaps Between Law and Practice with Respect to Non-Refoulement within the EU
The ‘compliance pull of norms [such as non-refoulement] depends in some measure on their
coherence and clarity’.485 Despite clear statements of the applicable EU law on non-refoulement such as in Article 19(2) of the EU Charter and Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive - many
EU Member States interpret the principle differently, including very narrowly, thus affecting
compliance. This section will provide two overarching and interlinked examples of how the
‘compliance pull’ of non-refoulement is weakened through practice within the EU that undermines
the norm: first, through negative exercise of the ‘margin of discretion’ within EU asylum processes
and, second, through the presumption of mutual trust relied upon by the EU Member States.
3.3.1

The ‘Margin of Discretion’ and Non-Refoulement

In the application of EU law in the context of asylum policies in the CEAS, EU Member States
are given a wide ‘margin of discretion’ by the regional courts, such as the CJEU, when
implementing EU law norms.486 Application of this ‘margin of discretion’ by EU Member States
has resulted in disparate practices in the national implementation of EU asylum policies, resulting
in widely varying interpretations of the non-refoulement obligation. One significant reason for
these differing practices stems from the difference within the EU between ‘regulations’ and
‘directives’. When a piece of EU legislation is in the form of a regulation, such as the Dublin III
Regulation, the Member State must directly apply the regulation in its entirety at the domestic
level without change or re-interpretation. On the other hand, an EU directive, such as the
Qualification Directive (recast) (which recognizes the importance of the principle of nonrefoulement in Article 15b), only becomes effective when transposed into domestic law. EU
Member States exercise their margin of discretion when they conduct domestic transpositions of
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EU law.487 The transposing process has resulted in different EU Member States adopting widely
varying understandings of directives or failing to transpose at all. Where the domestic transposition
of directives does not take place, or does not adequately take place, the procedural safeguards
required by the directives may not be effective in providing protection for asylum claimants and
refugees against refoulement.488 The problem of ineffective transposition has been recognized by
the European Commission.489
The reality is that the ‘margin of discretion’ has led some countries to bend the principle of nonrefoulement “to their will and choose the more convenient interpretation”.490 EU Member States
have done so in a number of ways, often by creating various barriers to successfully claiming
asylum. One such barrier results from external border and immigration controls, which may
involve a combination of strict visa regimes, carrier sanctions, ‘pushback’ operations at sea, and
cooperation with third countries through bilateral or multilateral agreements (jointly referred to as
‘migration controls’).491 These State practices, which will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4,
prevent asylum claimants and refugees from reaching the shores of the EU in search of safety, thus
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disallowing these individuals from accessing territorial asylum - the principle that asylum may be
sought and granted when the claimant is on the territory of the asylum-granting State.492 These EU
migration control mechanisms have been critiqued because they have resulted in refoulement.493
Some Member States create legally unwarranted barriers for asylum claimants and refugees
seeking international protection by enacting certain procedural requirements.494 For example,
some countries add a procedural requirement to require the asylum claimant to rebut the
presumption of mutual trust - the presumption that EU Member States are ‘safe’ destinations to
which claimants can return simply because they are Member States of the EU - that is above and
beyond the onus to prove a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’.495 This additional procedural
requirement increases the burden placed upon individual claimants to bear the onus of proof,
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making the recognition of refugee status a more onerous process.496 Unnecessarily onerous
processes result in more unnecessarily rejected applicants and therefore an increased potential for
returns and refoulement. It is therefore concerning that a proposed addition in the ‘Dublin IV’
proposal allows such an additional procedural requirement.497
A second example of a legally unwarranted barrier is the expectation that an asylum claimant
possesses proper documentation to establish identity.498 This requirement is not realistic for
individuals fleeing from a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’, and also potentially permits Member
States to evade their responsibility to process asylum applications by rejecting applications on the
basis of insufficient documentation.499 Moreover, Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention
precludes asylum claimants from being penalized for their irregular entry such as through means
other than at regular border crossings.500 The UNHCR’s position regarding asylum claimants
without proper documentation is that claimants need not prove every element of their case and
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they are to be given the ‘benefit of the doubt’ when officers assess their asylum applications.501
When asylum applications are rejected on technical grounds, such as on the basis of insufficient
identity documentation, this raises the risk that they will be returned to their country of origin
without a proper evaluation of their claim or the potential for refoulement.
In a similar vein, some countries create barriers to asylum claimants by removing (as opposed to
adding) procedural safeguards. For example, prior to being transferred from one EU country to
another under the Dublin procedure (also known as ‘Dublin transfers’), some claimants are not
provided with an opportunity to be heard, even though an interview would allow the claimant to
provide reasons for why a deportation should be impeded.502 This is despite the fact that the
UNHCR’s Handbook on Refugee Status Determination states that an individual interview
is required for the asylum officer to properly assess the applicant’s eligibility for refugee status.503
This barrier is particularly of concern where claimants are subjected to transfer to EU countries
with less developed asylum systems lacking fundamental safeguards for claimants or extremely
high rejection rates.504 Where the asylum claimant is not given an opportunity to be heard, the
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claimant may be prevented from challenging a transfer decision, contrary to established EU case
law, potentially resulting in refoulement.505 These Dublin transfer practices evidence EU Member
States’ strategy to ‘contain’ unruly migrants and refugees in an attempt to shift responsibility
outward, away from the EU, and to third countries deemed ‘safe’.
An additional concern is that, in these transfer cases, EU Member States often rely upon diplomatic
assurances from the receiving country (the ‘responsible’ EU Member State) that the individual will
not be subject to refoulement.506 This is particular worrisome when EU Member States rely upon
blanket assurances that third countries are ‘safe’, even when these countries do not have procedural
safeguards to ensure that claimants are able to access international protection for refugee status.507
status may also be due to a lack of harmonization in decision-making practices among Member States, which may be
a result of differences in the assessment of country of origin situations, differences in interpretation of legal concepts,
and/or differences in national jurisprudence: Ibid. Since low recognition rates of refugee status in any given Member
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The UN Committee Against Torture is ‘highly resistant’ to the acceptance of diplomatic
assurances, and does not ‘accept them as effective risk mitigation’ against refoulement.508 The
Committee has warned against relying on diplomatic assurances:
diplomatic assurances from a State party to the Convention to which a person is to
be deported should not be used as a loophole to undermine the principle of nonrefoulement as set out in Article 3 of the Convention, where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he/she would be in danger of being subjected to torture
in that State (emphasis added).509
Both the UK and Germany have been warned against the usage of and reliance upon diplomatic
assurances in their practice of returning claimants to another EU Member State. For the UK, the
Committee Against Torture ‘notes with concern the [UK’s] reliance on diplomatic assurances to
justify the deportation of foreign nationals suspected of terrorism related offences to countries in
which the widespread practice of torture is alleged’ contrary to Articles 3 and 13 of the CAT’.510
The Committee Against Torture further cautioned the UK that:
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The more widespread the practice of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment is, the less likely it will be that a real risk of such treatment can be avoided
by diplomatic assurances, however stringent any agreed follow-up procedure may
be. Therefore, the Committee considers that diplomatic assurances are unreliable
and ineffective and should not be used as an instrument to modify the determination
of the Convention.511
The Committee Against Torture recommends that the UK ‘recognize that diplomatic assurances
and monitoring arrangements will not be relied upon to justify transfers when such substantial risk
of torture exists’.512 For Germany, the Committee Against Torture specifically requested Germany
to ‘clarify to the Committee [the] steps taken to ensure that the use of diplomatic assurances is
only employed in exceptional cases’.513 In contrast, the UN Human Rights Committee accepts that
EU Member States might use diplomatic assurances, but must ensure a thorough assessment of
their quality and reliability, coupled with a robust monitoring mechanism within both states.514
The issue has been that not all EU Member States undertake thorough assessments of the quality
and reliability of the diplomatic assurances and do not possess robust monitoring mechanisms,
thereby increasing the risk of refoulement resulting from the Dublin transfers.515 Thus, they rely
on diplomatic assurances to solve their asylum issues, without ensuring adequate protection against
refoulement.
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In sum, the ‘margin of discretion’ afforded to EU Member States has resulted in differing
approaches to asylum procedures. That margin has been used in some cases to limit the ability of
individuals to make asylum claims, or to limit procedures with the outcome of reducing successful
asylum cases. The different approaches not only undermine the CEAS’ goal of harmonization,
they also widen the possibility of refoulement. Interlinked with this outcome is another EU policy,
the presumption of mutual trust.
3.3.2

The Presumption of Mutual Trust within the EU

The presumption of mutual trust is a well-recognized principle in EU law which presumes that all
EU Member States comply with relevant EU and international law obligations in their exercise of
EU law obligations, particularly concerning fundamental rights.516 The Dublin System is founded
on the presumption of mutual trust, where the system is ‘grounded on the presumption that all
Member States and the States bound by the regulation by virtue of bilateral agreements observe
EU law, particularly EU fundamental rights and freedoms’.517 As a fundamental right, this
presumption applies to the principle of non-refoulement: the Dublin III Regulation prevents the
transfer of an individual back to the responsible Member State where there are ‘substantial grounds
for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions’
of the Member State, resulting in a risk of that individual being exposed to inhuman or degrading
treatment. 518 The presumption of mutual trust assumes that EU Member States will or have already
complied with relevant EU and international law norms without requiring a sending State to
examine the merits of an individual’s application before returning that individual.519
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The ECtHR and the CJEU have both examined the presumption of mutual trust in the context of
Dublin transfers and the principle of non-refoulement. This has resulted in contradictory
interpretations of the principle, in particular regarding when the presumption might be rebutted
and the consequences of this rebuttal.520 These contradictions are important. When an EU Member
State does not respect or ensure the fundamental guarantee to non-refoulement, ‘Member States
cannot safely return an asylum seeker to its territory’.521 In other words, the ‘return cannot be
executed even though the Dublin regulation designates such State as the only Member State
competent to assess his/her asylum claim’.522 While the ECtHR and the CJEU agree that this is the
outcome, they differ in how to evaluate whether or not a Member State does not respect or ensure
the fundamental principle.
The CJEU has adopted a test of ‘systemic deficiencies’ as a precondition for opposing a Dublin
transfer, or, in other words, a precondition for rebutting the presumption of mutual trust.523 The
CJEU requires claimants to prove that there are ‘systemic deficiencies’ existing in the asylum
procedures and reception conditions of the Member State in order to rebut the presumption of
mutual trust to prevent a removal under the Dublin transfer procedures. In the case of N.S., it held
that a Member State should be aware of the ‘systemic deficiencies’ before transferring an
individual asylum claimant to the Member State responsible under the Dublin transfer procedure:
Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be
interpreted as meaning that the Member States, including the national courts, may
not transfer an asylum seeker to the ‘Member State responsible’ within the meaning
of Regulation No 343/2003 where they cannot be unaware that systemic
deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum
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seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the
asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading
treatment within the meaning of that provision (emphasis added).524
Although the case of N.S. introduced the concept of ‘systemic deficiencies’, the concept was not
further elaborated upon in that judgment. However, ‘systemic deficiencies’ may imply that
‘various flaws that cause an individual risk to a human being within the asylum process have to
reach a point of becoming conceptually one flaw that makes the whole system deficient’.525 Other
proposals have suggested that ‘systemic flaw’ may mean ‘a lack of a structure, a structural void that, for cases passing through this part of the system, leads to an error’.526 Alternatively, ‘systemic
flaws’ may mean flaws which are produced regularly and can be ‘averted by changes in the regular
procedures of the system’.527
The ECtHR, on the other hand, requires claimants to rebut the presumption of mutual trust on the
threshold of ‘individual assessments’, so that the applicant’s claim in view of the specific situation
of the applicant is considered rather than the existence of deficiencies in the system. The ECtHR
formulated the test of ‘individual assessments’ in the case of Tarakhel v. Switzerland. The case
concerned eight Afghan nationals, who alleged that, if they were returned to Italy, they would be
exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment which would violate, inter alia, Article 3 of the
ECHR.528 In citing the decision by the CJEU in the case of N.S., which established the criterion
for ‘systemic deficiencies’, the ECtHR held that:
In the present case the Court must therefore ascertain whether, in view of the overall
situation with regard to the reception arrangements for asylum seekers in Italy and
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the applicants’ specific situation, substantial grounds have been shown for
believing that the applicants would be at risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 if
they were returned to Italy (emphasis added).529
Therefore, the ECtHR has deviated from the approach taken by the CJEU to consider the
applicant’s claim in view of the specific situation of the applicant, rather than the presence of
‘systemic deficiencies’ within Italy’s asylum as the primary consideration. The ECtHR decision
in Tarakhal was referred to in another case, A.M.E. v. the Netherlands, in which the ECtHR held
that the applicant was not able to establish ‘a sufficiently real and imminent risk of hardship severe
enough to fall within the scope of Article 3’, which concluded in the applicant’s claim being held
to be unfounded.530
The difference between the CJEU and ECtHR approaches to the rebuttal of the presumption of
mutual trust in non-refoulement cases is important: The CJEU approach gives more prominence
to systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedures and reception conditions of the asylum-receiving
Member State, while the ECtHR approach considers the individual’s circumstances as having more
importance.531 This difference illustrates a gap between the law on non-refoulement and the actual
practice within the EU.
The UK courts have adopted a compromise between the two different approaches of the
Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts. In E.M. and M.A., the UK Court of Appeal held that: ‘the
assessment of risk on return is seen by the Strasbourg court as depending on a combination of
personal experience and systemic shortcomings which in total may suffice to rebut the presumption
of compliance’.532 The compromise of the UK Court of Appeal may be a way to reconcile the
different approaches taken by the CJEU and the ECtHR on the threshold to rebut the presumption
of mutual trust, and still adequately ensure protection against refoulement.
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3.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has explained the EU law applicable to the principle of non-refoulement, including
its multi-layered aspects. It has also examined how the ECHR and two European courts - the
ECtHR and the CJEU - interpret and apply the prohibition against refoulement. The legislative and
jurisprudential picture that emerges is of a relatively robust norm. Under EU law, non-refoulement
applies within the EU Charter, as well as within the framework of the CEAS, specifically within
the key directives: the Qualification Directive, Asylum Procedures Directive, and Reception
Conditions Directive. Under ECHR law, non-refoulement applies extraterritorially as reaffirmed
by case law from the ECtHR. The prohibition against non-refoulement under EU law is applicable
based on the territorial scope of the EU Charter, which is governed by Article 51(1).533 The EU
Charter applies ‘whenever the institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies of the Union exercise their
powers’.534
However, this chapter has also indicated that the actual practice of some EU Member States has
been to adopt a narrower understanding of non-refoulement, one that is limited through domestic
interpretation as a result of the ‘margin of discretion’ allowed to Member States when transposing
directives, and limited through the presumption of mutual trust when transferring asylum claimants
to other (‘responsible’) States. Shortcomings of relying upon the presumption of mutual trust in
Dublin transfers include the assumption that all EU Member States are in compliance with relevant
international and European law obligations, including the protection against refoulement. Often,
State practice has shown that the reliance upon diplomatic assurances and the presumption of
mutual trust do not translate into actual protection for claimants, but instead have the countereffect
of permitting EU Member States to shift their responsibility for processing asylum applications
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elsewhere - outside of the EU to third countries deemed ‘safe’, or to another Member State within
the EU. The shifting of responsibility outside of the EU to third States deemed ‘safe’ as a
destination for the asylum claimant is not in itself a violation of international law.535 However, the
curtailment of human rights of the claimants when adequate procedural safeguards such as access
to individual assessments prior to being transferred is a violation.
Unfortunately, these gaps between law and practice are likely to continue for the foreseeable
future: the use of the words ‘should’ instead of ‘shall’ in the ‘Dublin IV’ Proposal may result in
the implementation of minimum procedural guarantees, or less.536 For example, one key recital
provides that there should be personal interviews for the asylum claimants (recital 23), while
another recital provides that there should be legal safeguards and the right to effective remedy
(recital 24).537 This approach arguably leave too much room for Member States to interpret the
clauses as they wish, basing their discretion on State interests.538 This wide ‘margin of discretion’
is likely to translate into more difficulties for asylum claimants to have their applications properly
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processed on their merits, resulting in a higher likelihood of rejection, and potentially increasing
the possibility of refoulement.539
The next chapter considers an explanation for the actions of EU Member States in limiting, in
practice, the principle of non-refoulement: the theory of containment.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Containment in Europe
4. Introduction
Chapters Two and Three outlined the international and regional law governing non-refoulement
within the European Union (EU). They demonstrated that the principle prohibiting refoulement is
quite robust, particularly when one considers the norm in a complementary manner taking into
account its meaning and application under international refugee law and international human rights
law. At the same time, Chapter Three indicated that the full content of the principle is not always
respected in practice within the EU. For example, some EU Member States restrict procedural
safeguards, add procedural barriers, or adopt overly narrow interpretations of non-refoulement in
domestic law when exercising the ‘margin of discretion’ they are permitted under EU law, thereby
weakening the underlying safeguards that help to protect against refoulement. Some EU Member
States rely upon the presumption of mutual trust to transfer responsibility for asylum seekers
without ensuring adequate processes exist in the other Member States to prevent refoulement.
These actions result in a gap between the written and customary international and regional law of
non-refoulement and actual practices regarding the norm. This Chapter proposes an explanation of
why this gap exists: the theory of containment and the adoption of containment policies. The goal
of examining the theory of containment is to provide crucial context for the recommendations
articulated in Chapter Seven.
The theory of containment is exactly what it sounds like: a theory on how States contain or control
the mobility or immobility of migrants within or outside of their borders.540 The theory of
containment is not exclusive to the field of international, regional and domestic refugee law or to
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the field of international human rights law. In fact, this theory originated outside of the legal
sphere, and in recent years has been applied within the fields of spatial and human geography and
migration studies. This chapter begins by explaining containment theories in these two fields.
Next, it demonstrates that the theory of containment is applicable to certain policies and practices
within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), such as Dublin transfers and ‘safe’ third
country agreements. The chapter turns to a discussion of how containment policies and practices
in the EU affect the protection of asylum seekers from refoulement. Finally, the chapter ends with
concluding remarks on the place of containment theory within the field of refugee law and
international law. This chapter shows that, while the law of containment itself is not a violation of
international law, the policies and practices surrounding the application of that law are of concern:
containment arises not because of the law itself, but in the misuse and misapplication of that law.
4.1 Theories of Containment
There is not one single unified theory of containment, as the theory has emerged from a number
of different disciplines. Rather, there are multiple theories of containment. For example, in the
field of political science, the term ‘containment’ or ‘strategies of containment’ was used in the past
to describe ‘the appropriate American strategy to counter the threat of Soviet expansionism in the
aftermath of World War II and the advent of the Cold War’.541 This chapter focuses on theories of
containment in two specific areas: geography and migration studies.542 Migration studies can be
categorized - at least in part - as a subset of the field of human and spatial geography, and therefore
the theories of containment in both geography and migration studies intersect.
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The field of spatial and human geography involves the study of human populations and their
interactions with spaces and the environment.543 For example, the geography of migration has been
described as ‘a spatio-temporal process that evolves over space and time[;] [it] involves the
continual reshaping of places as persons move between various origins and destinations’.544 In the
field of spatial and human geography, the term ‘containment’ is used to refer to ‘discourse[s], laws
or policies, and technologies of control – such as detention – […] as global disciplinary strategies
attempting to differentially shape migrant mobility’.545 The theory of containment, as expressed in
the field of spatial and human geography, has two main characteristics. First, the theory of
containment suggests that migrants are kept on the move.546 Mobility of migrants is restricted,
contained, and confined to a specific sphere of movement. This can be done through refugee
camps, transfers between detention facilities, and regulating the movement of asylum claimants
and refugees through biometric data collection by border authorities.547 Second, the theory
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suggests that migratory movements are contained.548 Scholars have also asserted that ‘the borders
of the European Union are conceptualized as both tightening and filtering, employing biometric
and passport technologies to select individuals to be detained or deported.549 In other words,
containment is possible where migrants are simultaneously kept on the move and contained outside
of the countries where they are seeking asylum, rather than being contained within a specific,
confined area.550 Scholars have maintained that mobility can also be highly regulated through the
transfers of those detained to and from detention centres, which is also a method of regulating,
restricting, and controlling migratory movement through containment strategies.551 ‘Containment’
can also be achieved through detention of migrants.552 For instance, scholars have argued that
containment may ‘also be a consequence of other restrictions on refugees’ movement (including,
but by no means limited to, border security, visa controls, and immigration detention), or a failure
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to facilitate lasting durable solutions that enable refugees and [internally displaced persons] to
escape their conditions’.553 Scholars have also contended that containment refers to:
any effort to localize or internalize forced migration in countries or regions of
origin. Visa requirements, carrier sanctions, return of asylum seekers to ‘countries
of first asylum’, the creation of ‘safe havens’, and ‘humanitarian’ intervention are
among the methods of containment.554
Containment, therefore, is a practice of control of the movement, or lack of movement, of migrants
- of the geographic spaces in which they reside.
Strategies of geographic containment are often facilitated by law. One example of this is through
the use of national deterrence laws.555 National deterrence laws include laws that create barriers,
whether politically or legally, which reduce, restrict, or deter the movement of asylum claimants
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and refugees into and across that State’s territory.556 Another example can be seen in ‘refugees in
orbit’ situations, where refugees find themselves in legal limbo: rejected from the country where
they are seeking refuge, yet not able to or unwilling to return to their country of origin.557 While
laws - or, specifically, narrow or self-serving interpretations of law by States - can create ‘refugees
in orbit’ situations, it should be noted that such situations are against the established intention of
the drafters of the Refugee Convention and contrary to the purpose of the institution of asylum,
which seeks to safeguard the right to seek asylum from persecution and non-refoulement
protection.558 This is explored further below.
Migration studies examines the movement of people, including the study of both mobility and
immobility, and therefore uses a somewhat different lens than the one described above for the field
of spatial and human geography.559 Geographers who study migration question the containment
efforts by the EU in their research. For example, scholars have argued that the EU has utilized
geographies of exclusion as a method of containing asylum claimants and refugees including by:
isolating migrants in remote locations, States restrict access to territories where they
might make refugee claims or take up residency illegally. Articulated sequentially,
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these trends suggest an exclusionary series of maneuvers on the part of nation-states
to exercise control (emphasis added).560
Experts on the Common European Asylum System have also cited to the practices and policies of
refugee containment. For instance, some scholars have contended that the CEAS is ‘destined to
remain a policy failure, an ethical sore, and political tinderbox’ if refugee containment is not
properly addressed.561 However, these studies have focused mainly on the costs of containment
rather than on the causes of containment and the sources and origin of the concept in refugee
law.562 Other experts have asserted the role of containment theories in public emergencies which
threaten the life of the nation.563 The main arguments of these scholars suggest that a theory of
containment can explain the extent of the powers, and its limits, of a nation in a state of emergency
to constrain and contain external threats.564
Within migration studies, one area of containment theory focus is on European ‘hotspots’: places
at the external borders of Europe where large numbers of migrants arrive, such as the islands of
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Greece and Italy.565 The geographical position of these hotspots along the Mediterranean Sea route
serves to control the entry of migrants and to contain them away from the mainland.566 Within
these hotspots, a so-called EU ‘hotspot approach’ has evolved,
where the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the European Border and
Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol and Eurojust work on the ground with the
authorities of frontline EU Member States which are facing disproportionate
migratory pressures at the EU’s external borders to help to fulfill their obligations
under EU law and swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants.567
The EU’s hotspot approach on the islands of Greece and Italy has been described as ‘the
‘immediate response’ to increased arrivals into Europe of refugees crossing the Mediterranean
Sea’.568 Frontline EU Member States assume a heavier share of responsibility to process asylum
applications and use island hotspot infrastructures in order to enforce migration containment.569
This very fact of hotspots as places where containment approaches are put under strain results in
frontline EU Member States bearing the heaviest responsibility, contrary to the legally-binding
principle of responsibility sharing among EU Member States.570 The European Commission
emphasized that:
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the experience of recent years has shown that, especially in situations of mass influx
along specific migratory routes, the current system places responsibility, in law, for
the vast majority of asylum seekers on a limited number of individual Member
States, a situation which would stretch the capacities of any Member State.571
Amnesty International has critiqued the use of island hotspots because these areas also are areas
where multiple abuses of force take place and maltreatment of asylum claimants occurs.572 Since
these island hotspots are part of the EU’s strategy of containing migratory movement away from
the mainland, some scholars have labeled the EU’s hotspot approach as ‘shrinking spaces of
asylum’.573 They do so because migration is essentially funnelled to these hotspots, such as on the
Lesbos Islands in Greece, where the movements of asylum seekers are restricted due to
geography.574 Further, island hotspots function as isolated mechanisms to exclude those who are
‘unwanted’, while allowing only those who are considered eligible for asylum claims into the
system.575 The ‘unwanted’ are often individuals who are deemed to be ‘outsiders’ or ‘the other’:
those who do not have legal documentation or who otherwise arrived on the territories of the
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overcrowding’,

Member State through irregular means.576 Those labeled ‘unwanted’ are often coerced to stay
behind in detention or worse - deported to third country destinations deemed ‘safe’ but that often
do not have adequate procedural safeguards for claimants to access international protection.577 The
hotspot approach is also a method of migration control, whereby entry to the mainland (as opposed
to island hotspots) to claim asylum is obstructed.578 The movements of these claimants are often
obstructed through administrative detention, or through highly regularized travel restraints such as
police checkpoints where identity papers are sought.579
As observed above in the field of spatial and human geography, there is also a link between law
and containment in migration studies. Scholars have observed that strategies related to making and
keeping migrants mobile or immobile are often facilitated by laws: for example, Tazzioli observes
that States take legal terrain away from migrants in the same way they restrict access to physical
terrain.580 Sometimes the legal and physical terrains coincide, such as with laws restricting the
movements of migrants into, within, and from a State.581 Containment through law can occur
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through administrative or legislative measures by the government to regulate and create barriers
for migratory movements.582
Together, spatial and human geography and migration studies explore the interactions and
movements of human populations with spaces and places - both in the form of mobility and
immobility. The theories of containment expressed in both spatial and human geography and
migration studies are clearly interlinked. That said, Tazzioli notes that: ‘the notion of
“containment” has surprisingly remained quite under-theorised both in the field of migration
studies and in geography scholarship’, requiring further conceptualization.583 Given the linkages
to law, it can also be said that containment theory in legal analysis is also under-theorized, though
there has been some recognition by scholars such as Costello.584
As a type of control theory which explicates spatial confinement, the containment theory applied
in the migration context is an explanatory theory: it explains exclusion or inclusion of migrants
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through tactics to keep them out (migration control policies) or lock them in (detention policies).585
However, the theory of containment need not be binary in nature, explaining only exclusion and
inclusion, or mobility and immobility.586 Containment policies may also involve tactics to keep
migrants on the move, creating the ‘refugees in orbit’ situation. A warning, however: as an
explanatory theory, containment theory should not be viewed ‘as an overarching analytical grid’
toward which countries should aim.587 Rather, it is a geographical concept with spatial effects
(physical, social, economic, and legal) that States generally try to avoid admitting they fulfill.
Instead, they use obfuscatory language to indicate otherwise, such as when the EU justifies its
secondary policies and laws as having the ultimate goal of ‘containing migratory flows and
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tackling irregular migration through enhanced border management and the fight against smuggling
and trafficking’ (emphasis added).588 At its core, containment is a theory about control.589
Having explained containment theory as developed in the fields of spatial and human geography
and migration studies, the next section will examine how containment in the broadest sense - not
only limited to confinement or detention, but also including calculated movement of migrants - is
evident in the CEAS in a legal and policy sense.
4.2 Containment in the Common European Asylum System
The aims of the CEAS are to harmonize the standards of protection by aligning the EU Member
States’ asylum legislation, support cooperation among EU Member States on the implementation
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of asylum policies, and to increase solidarity and responsibility among EU Member States.590
These aims exist uneasily beside certain practices within the CEAS that amount to forms of
containment of migrants, including asylum seekers. The EU’s asylum policies have been described
as:
actions directed at both attenuating causes of departure and reducing cross-border
movements [including the use of] ‘source control’ measures, such as conflict
prevention, development assistance, trade partnerships and political dialogue[,]
increasingly deployed in order to lessen the migration pressure towards the EU.591
In other words, the EU actively endeavours to prevent the departure of individuals wishing to
migrate to Europe, and to reduce cross-border movements toward Europe through actions in the
countries or regions of origin for migrants. The activities of the EU’s High Level Working Group
on Asylum and Migration (Working Group) are crucial in this regard. The Working Group is a
central forum set up in 1998 for strategic discussions with the aim of ‘[establishing] a common,
integrated, cross-pillar approach targeted at the situation in the most important countries of origin
of asylum-seekers and migrants’.592 The significance of this High Level Working Group is that it
marks the ‘most concrete manifestation of the attempt to institutionalize centralized responsibility
and a concerted framework of action for all relevant EU institutions dealing with asylum and
migration policies’.593 The usage of the term ‘containment’ to describe or explain the EU’s asylum
policies is therefore not new.594
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Key CEAS containment policies include the use of Dublin transfers, ‘safe’ third country
agreements, the interception of asylum seekers prior to reaching Europe, migrant tracking, narrow
interpretations of the Refugee Convention, and deterrence policies. Each of these approaches will
be discussed in turn.
As explained in Chapter Three, Dublin transfers are transfers of asylum seekers from one EU
country to another EU country deemed ‘responsible’ for those asylum seekers. Responsibility is
determined based on a hierarchy of considerations summarized in that chapter. The goal of the
Dublin transfer regime ‘not to spread refugees equitably among Contracting Parties, but to
introduce a set of criteria to swiftly assign responsibility among them’ (emphasis added).595 These
transfers take place on the presumption of mutual trust, also explained in Chapter Three:
The system is based on the fundamental assumption that member states may be
considered ‘safe’ countries for asylum seekers, and for that reason, it is presumed
that transfers from one member state to another do not violate the principle of nonrefoulement.596
This approach reduces the ‘refugees in orbit’ problem, but it also reinforces the control and
containment of migrants at the external borders of the EU, particularly in the hotspots described
above. As well, as described in Chapter Three, Dublin transfers based on the presumption of
mutual trust can also return asylum seekers to EU countries that do not have, in actuality, adequate
refugee processing systems and therefore adequate protections against refoulement.597
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A related strategy with the aim of restricting migratory movements is related to registration and
the notion of ‘first country of asylum’. The Dublin III Regulation restricts movements of claimants
and refugees who are in search of international protection by requiring them to register at the first
EU Member State of arrival.598 Where the claimant is found to have already registered in an EU
Member State in which international protection for claiming refugee status is sought, but
subsequently moved onward to another Member State, the individual will be sent back to the
Member State responsible for processing the asylum application through the Dublin III
Regulation.599 This shifts the responsibility for processing the asylum application from one EU
Member State to another Member State (via Dublin transfers).600
EU Member States’ use of ‘safe’ third country agreements provides another example of
containment policies in action. Like Dublin transfers, ‘safe’ third country agreements are diversion
policies ‘designed to shift to other States the responsibility for those asylum-seekers who manage
to arrive at the borders of the European Union’.601 ‘Safe’ third country are agreements in which an
EU Member State provides another country (outside of the EU) with an overarching, or blanket,
recognition of that country as a safe place to which to send asylum claimants. ‘The safe third
country notion rests on the assumption that an asylum applicant could have obtained international
protection in another country and therefore the receiving state is entitled to reject responsibility for
the protection claim’.602 If the responsible country is deemed ‘safe’, then the transfer can happen
efficiently without an inquiry into the specific situation of each asylum claimant. Where the
claimant or refugee is found to have passed through a ‘safe’ non-EU country, that individual will
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be returned to that third country, as the country deemed to be responsible for processing the asylum
application.603 ‘Safe’ third country recognition and Dublin transfers are provided for under the
Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) and the Dublin III Regulation respectively.604
EU Member States use the ‘safe’ third country concept to shift the responsibility for processing
asylum applications elsewhere, that is, from the Member State deemed responsible for examining
the application based on the Dublin III Regulation, to a non-EU country deemed ‘safe’.605 At the
same time, claimants who have been sent back to non-EU countries deemed ‘safe’ pursuant to the
Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) are not allowed to re-enter the Member State that returned
the claimant to the third country.606 This approach keeps claimants from returning to the EU, and
therefore contains migrants outside of the EU. For example, under Article 46(5) of the Asylum
Procedures Directive (recast), EU Member States are allowed to not grant suspensive recourse (the
right to remain in the country of asylum pending outcome of appeal) to persons whose application
was initially considered unfounded or manifestly unfounded.607 An ‘unfounded’ application for
international protection means that the applicant does not qualify for international protection, while
a ‘manifestly unfounded’ application means that the applicant for international protection does not
qualify for refugee status due to reasons including fraud or deception during the application
process.608 This means that asylum claimants whose applications were initially considered
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unfounded or manifestly unfounded may be forced to return to their country of origin or forced to
leave the territory of the Member State, without the possibility of return. One result of ‘safe’ third
country policies is an increased chance of refoulement: in the event of an unfounded or manifestly
unfounded asylum application, the claimant will be without any recourse against a rejected asylum
application, thus the claimant’s non-refoulement protection may be violated if he or she is returned
without the ability to appeal against a wrongful determination.609
EU Member States also facilitate the use of ‘safe’ third country lists, which are lists of countries
which the EU has predetermined to be ‘safe’ for claimants.610 The use of predetermined ‘safe’
third country lists is problematic because it may potentially increase instances of refoulement.
First, predetermined ‘safe’ third country lists do not take into account the changing political
situation and human rights record in the third country.611 Therefore, the use of predetermined ‘safe’
third country lists may increase the potential for refoulement in situations where claimants are
returned to territories with unstable or rapidly-changing political or human rights situations, where
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their lives or freedom would be threatened.612 Second, predetermined ‘safe’ third country lists
accelerate the asylum procedure for the claimant by sending him or her back to the third country
deemed responsible for processing the claimant’s application.613 In practice, access to asylum
procedures in the third country may not be adequate and may not meet international law standards,
including the requirement to provide the claimant with fair and efficient access to those
procedures.614 As the UNHCR stated, non-refoulement is violated when the country of asylum
denies the claimant’s access to fair and efficient asylum procedures, for example, by not examining
his or her particular circumstances and refusing the claimant an opportunity to rebut the
presumption of safety.615 The UNHCR has cautioned against the use of predetermined ‘safe’ third
country lists and has requested that ‘procedures in such cases should explicitly provide for return
to be effected only if the individual will be readmitted to the [‘safe’ third] country, will be able to
access fair asylum procedures and, if recognized, will be able to enjoy effective protection
there’.616
Another containment strategy adopted by the EU is the prevention of certain migrants from
reaching Europe’s external borders, albeit often with State discourse ‘about protecting migrants
from traffickers and from dangerous crossing’.617 These are termed ‘non-arrival policies’: policies
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‘aimed at preventing, interrupting or stopping improperly documented aliens, including potential
asylum-seekers, from ever reaching Europe’.618 In 2015, the European Commission to the
European Parliament, the European Council, and the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions tabled a report that initiated the use of the language of
securitization and reliance on efforts to reduce irregular migration, including through the increase
of border management.619 Titled ‘A European Agenda on Migration’, the 22-page document
details the EU’s efforts to respond to the increase in the number of individuals crossing the
Mediterranean Sea in search of safety and a better life.620 This Agenda was presented by the
European Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, and the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions to ‘address immediate
challenges and equip the EU with the tools to better manage migration’.621 This policy was later
adopted by European heads of State and governments in the European Council on June 25-26,
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2015, and since then has become the basis for the European policy on irregular migration.622 The
term ‘irregular migration’ refers to migration through routes that are not at authorized checkpoints
such as border crossings by boat, on foot, or through other means.623
Some nongovernmental organizations such as Oxfam asserted that the European Agenda on
Migration’s main aim is to curtail or deter irregular migration into Europe, so that individuals
arriving irregularly by boat or on foot are prevented from entering into EU Member State
territories.624 Scholars have contended that the underlying rationale and belief of deterrence
paradigms - that is, policies to deter migrants from entering sovereign territories to claim asylum
- such as the European Agenda on Migration is to allow ‘developing states can successfully
insulate themselves from taking on a substantive and proportional responsibility in regard to
refugee protection’, in essence, permitting ‘wealthy states to have their cake and eat it too:
maintaining a formal commitment to international refugee law, while at the same time largely
being spared the associated burdens’.625 The UNHCR is worried that the use of ‘non-arrival’

622

Oxfam supra note 620 at 2.

623

The term irregular migration has no universal definition, but one definition is formulated by the International

Organization for Migration as: ‘Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and
receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective
of destination countries it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required
under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in
cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not
fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country. There is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the
term "illegal migration" to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons’ in International Organization
for Migration, “Key Migration Terms”, https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms.
624

Ibid; See, also: Human Rights Watch, “Towards an Effective and Principled EU Migration Policy:

Recommendations for Reform”, June 2018,
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/hrw_eu_migration_policy_memo_0.pdf.
625

Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nikolas Feith Tan, “The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for

Global Refugee Policy” (2017) 5(1) Journal on Migration and Human Security 28-56 at 31, which states: ‘It allows
wealthy states to have their cake and eat it too: maintaining a formal commitment to international refugee law, while
at the same time largely being spared the associated burdens’ [Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan].

143

policies by EU Member States may lead to a general practice of not distinguishing between forced
migrants (i.e. refugees and asylum claimants) and other migrants (i.e. economic migrants).626 Such
policies may ‘inhibit the entry and access to asylum procedures of persons who would otherwise
seek and enjoy asylum from persecution in their country’.627 In sum, the European Commission’s
European Agenda on Migration aims to curtail migration into and across Europe, while the
UNHCR and other nongovernmental organizations are concerned that the continuing trend with
migration control in the EU can potentially infringe on the human rights of those seeking to gain
access to international protection in EU Member States.
Non arrival strategies include shifting of the national borders outward, so that migrants are kept
out of national territories of the EU.628 One example of this is ‘pushback’ operations on the high
seas to prevent claimants from reaching the territories of Member States.629 For instance, on the
Mediterranean Sea route, migrants on boats (including asylum claimants and refugees) are
intercepted on the high seas by Libyan coastguard officials and pushed back toward their place of
origin or otherwise are sent to Libyan detention facilities for further processing.630 Another
example of a non arrival strategy used by EU Member States is the use of offshore processing
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facilities to contain migrants outside of the EU.631 Offshore detention facilities have been used by
the EU in which ‘thousands of migrants are languishing in detention centers in Libya, nominally
run by the government there. Many of them were intercepted by Libya’s EU-backed coast guard
while attempting to cross the Mediterranean’.632 Another example of externalization of migration
control is the use of ‘consensual containment’, which is a practice by third countries on behalf of,
or for the benefit of, EU Member States to reduce the number of arrivals to Europe.633 These types
of ‘consensual containment’ practices include collaborations between the third country and the EU
to discourage departures, carry out effective exit controls, and halt new arrivals on EU Member
State territory.634 Examples of the collaboration between the EU and a third country to deter
migrants include the Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding and the EU-Turkey statement.635
The former agreement between Italy and Libya involves the collaboration between Italy and Libya
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in order to ‘ensure the reduction of illegal migratory flows.636 The latter agreement is a statement
of collaboration between the EU and Turkey, a non-EU country, which aims to take back a Syrian
from Turkey for every Syrian Turkey admits from the Greek Islands (termed the 1:1 scheme).637
It should be noted that non arrival strategies have had unintended consequences. Although one aim
of the CEAS is to reduce secondary movements such as smuggling activities, non arrival strategies
make access to international protection for claiming refugee status more difficult and actually
incentivize human smuggling in the absence of safe and regular pathways.638 This is because such
policies make access to crossing borders contingent upon resources and means, and push more
people to use covert and more dangerous routes in the search for protection.639
Another way in which EU Member States attempt to control migrant access to EU countries is
through the restrictive application of the Refugee Convention. In particular, some countries ‘define
away’ from the scope of the refugee definition certain categories of refugee claimants, such as
victims of non-State agents of persecution, gender-related persecution, or localised persecution.640
Scholars have argued that containment policies have ‘in effect contributed to further blurring the
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March

2016,

distinction between refugee and economic migrant, a phenomenon for which the terms “asylummigration nexus” or “mixed migration” have been coined’.641
Control of migrants is also enforced through infrastructures or systems designed to contain,
partition, and discipline mobility.642 The implementation of the Eurodac Regulation established
new and enhanced measures to monitor and track claimants and refugees who have entered the EU
through irregular means as a method of containment.643 First, claimants and refugees are required
to be fingerprinted through the Eurodac Regulation.644 Second, the Eurodac database which stores
fingerprint information is connected with local law enforcement authorities and EUROPOL, which
share data with each other.645 These methods and practices of fingerprint collection forced upon
claimants and refugees lead to instances of criminalizing irregular migration as well as penalizing
irregular entry, which is against the protection standards codified under international law.646
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One final example of containment theory in action in the EU is the use by some EU Member States
of post-arrival dissuasion policies. These are policies ‘such as detention, denial of or [provision
of] inadequate means of subsistence, and restrictions on family reunification even after granting
refugee status’.647 In practice, the UK Home Office uses detention to ‘effect removal; initially to
establish a person’s identity or basis of claim; or where there are reasons to believe that the person
will fail to comply with any condition attached to the grant of temporary admission or release’.648
Despite these reasons for detaining asylum claimants and refugees, there are ‘problems with age
assessment or identification of specific groups such as victims of trafficking or torture’.649 For
example, women who are pregnant and those who have severe mental health problems have been
detained by the UK despite being identified as part of a vulnerable group.650
The UNHCR has expressed concern over the EU’s use of non-arrival policies, diversion policies,
restrictive applications of the Refugee Convention, and deterrence policies.651 It has warned that
the use of these strategies of containment has ‘served to seriously undermine the foundations of
the refugee protection regime’.652 It is concerned that the EU’s containment policies circumvent
international law obligations such as non-refoulement and evade responsibilities owed to refugees
pursuant to treaty and customary international law.653 Filippo Grandi, the United Nations High
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“Asylum
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the

Industrialized

World”,

Commissioner for Refugees, stated in a speech to an audience at the European Policy Centre in
Brussels that:
The failure of [the EU] to implement a humane, organised, collective response to
the large-scale arrivals in 2015, and the resort to policies of containment rather than
shared responsibility, with even the relevance of the 1951 Convention being called
into question by some, has already set a negative example – there is certainly a link
between recent policies by industrialised states and more restrictive refugee policies
in the developing world (emphasis added).654
More specifically, Grandi commented on the EU’s ‘narrowing of access to Europe […] with
measures restricting entry by Syrians, for example, to neighbouring countries, leaving them
displaced and trapped inside Syria as conflict intensifies’.655 The UNHCR’s concerns, therefore,
illustrate the consequences of containment policies within Europe as well as the importance of
addressing these policies at the macro-level, with European governments working together in
solidarity to adopt a proper strategy to address refugee flows.656
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In sum, EU containment policies not only exclude, deter, dissuade and contain, they also keep
migrants on the move.657 Moving migrants back and moving refugees around seem to be the two
main methods which the EU is employing in order to retain control over migrants.658 Another way
to conceive of containment strategies is as a way for the EU to physically try to confine migrants
to spaces that are beyond official detention facilities.659 These strategies of containment are
imposed upon claimants and refugees in the name of fighting against smuggling and trafficking.660
4.3 Containment and Non-Refoulement
International refugee law is premised upon the protection against refoulement.661 Non-refoulement
is the bare minimum standard with which States Parties to the Refugee Convention must comply
in order to fulfill their international law obligations.662 Although relevant international human
rights law norms such as the prohibition against torture and the prohibition against ill-treatment
are also relevant customary and jus cogens norms with which States Parties must comply, nonrefoulement is the most crucial standard of international protection under refugee law.663 The
UNHCR has confirmed the principle’s status as the minimum standard for the treatment of
refugees and thus constitutes the cornerstone of international protection for claiming refugee
status.664 The explanatory theory of containment is closely linked with the principle of non-
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refoulement and this link is a significant one with important implications for asylum claimants and
refugees. This section describes how the theory of containment is related to the principle of nonrefoulement by using the examples of the ‘safe’ third country concept and the use of the Eurodac
Regulation to contain and to enforce migrant entries and exits.
As described above, ‘safe’ third country agreements are used by EU Member States to send
migrants back to those countries in certain circumstances. This is also knowns as a ‘protection
elsewhere’ regime.665 Under international refugee law, countries to which claimants are sent
should permit them to have adequate access to international protection for claiming refugee status,
including having access to fair and efficient asylum procedures as well as access to the asylum
country’s territory.666 The access to the asylum country’s territory may be temporary, but
nonetheless must be available under international law, so that the process of claiming and
examining one’s asylum application is possible.667 In practice, however, claimants sent back to
third States to access international protection for claiming refugee status there often cannot do so
for a number of reasons.668 These reasons may include poor asylum systems in the third States,
such as not having fair and timely access to asylum procedures.669 As well, when claimants are
screened through accelerated procedures which do not consider the merits of their applications
before they are returned to a third country deemed ‘safe’, they are not provided the chance to argue
that return to their originating state will amount to refoulement.670 In third States with poor human
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rights records, claimants are especially vulnerable to having their human rights curtailed, and,
without due process, to being sent onward to countries in which they may be persecuted or
tortured.671
The ‘safe’ third country concept under Article 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive (recast)
works in the following way: first, there are procedural safeguards which seek to ensure that the
competent authorities are satisfied that a person seeking international protection for claiming
refugee status will be treated in accordance with those procedures. Second, the Asylum Procedures
Directive (recast) requires a connection between the person seeking asylum and the third country
to which this claimant is to be sent on the basis that it would be reasonable for that person to go to
that third country.672 In the view of the UNHCR, this connection means a ‘meaningful link’ based
on having ‘comparable asylum systems and standards’ as the sending State.673 Links that would
be considered to fulfill the requirement of a ‘meaningful link’ would include family links or links
to the broader community, previous residence such as previous long-term visits or studies, and
linguistic or cultural links, in addition to simple transit through the country.674 Additionally, the
Danish Refugee Council calls for the use of ‘safe’ third country concepts to be based on ‘a genuine
assessment of the capacity and willingness of receiving countries to adhere to international and
European human rights safeguards’.675 Amnesty International makes a similar point, specifically
warning that the application of Article 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive:
requires an individual assessment of whether the previous state will readmit the
person, grant the person access to a fair and efficient procedure, and accord the
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person standards of treatment commensurate with the Refugee Convention and
international human rights standards, including protection from non-refoulement.676
Moreover, Amnesty International is of the view that the individual being considered for return
through ‘safe’ third country agreements should be given the right to be heard and the ability to
rebut the presumption that he or she will be treated with relevant international human rights
standards of protection upon return.677
The establishment of rules pursuant to the Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) is subject to
national legislation and ‘on the methodology by which the competent authorities satisfy
themselves that the safe third country concept may be applied to a particular country or particular
applicant’ on a case-by-case basis consideration ‘of the safety of the country for a particular
applicant and/or national designation of countries considered to be generally safe’.678 Despite these
procedural safeguards codified within the Asylum Procedures Directive (recast), in practice,
Member States may not comply with these provisions when they are not transposed into domestic
legislation.679
The sending State’s reliance upon the diplomatic assurances which the receiving third State
undertakes to commit is sometimes based on erroneous assurances, leading to instances where
there is no guarantee that the undertaking in the form of diplomatic assurances is in fact complied
with by the receiving State.680 Where such undertaking has not been complied with, there is a
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potential that non-refoulement may be breached, especially when the receiving third State does not
have proper asylum procedures in place or has a poor human rights record.681 The UNHCR has
specifically stated that the onus is upon the sending State:
to establish, prior to implementing any removal measure, that the person whom it
intends to remove from its territory or jurisdiction would not be exposed to a danger
of serious human rights violations […] Where the receiving State has given
diplomatic assurances with regard to a particular individual […] [s]uch assurances
do not, however, affect the sending State’s obligations under customary
international law as well as international and regional human rights treaties to which
it is party.682
When Member States do not heed the UNHCR’s direction on diplomatic assurances, the risk of
violating non-refoulement upon return of the claimant rises.
Additionally, specific ‘safe’ third country agreements raise concern, particularly the agreement
with Turkey described above. The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) critiqued
the EU-Turkey statement on its adoption as an example of ‘the approach taken [by the EU] which,
if implemented, risks violating international refugee law, EU asylum law and the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, and would lead to a policy of containment and chain refoulement of persons
in need of protection’.683 First, the ECRE cautioned that the policy put in place vis-à-vis the EU-
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Turkey statement involving the return of all ‘irregular migrants arriving in Greece’ is incompatible
with established international and EU law and is in complete dereliction of the principle of nonrefoulement.684 Further, its expressed concern that the EU-Turkey statement does not comply with
the procedural safeguards laid down in Article 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, which
requires that applicants must be protected from refoulement in the ‘safe’ third country and that the
possibility exists to request and receive protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention.685
The ECRE warns that the Joint EU-Turkey Action Plan reveals ‘a policy of containment in Turkey
on behalf of the EU, which can trigger the complicity of Member States in chain refoulement’.686
While the practice of containment itself is not a violation of non-refoulement, the curtailment of
the human rights of those seeking refuge through the use of these containment policies can lead to
refoulement, for the reasons outlined above.687 In addition, Article 3(2) of the Convention Against
Torture states that the consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights would
constitute a breach of the prohibition of torture and the principle of non-refoulement.688 Therefore,
as demonstrated, the use of containment policies within the CEAS by EU Member States lead to
human rights concerns, including the potential for non-refoulement obligations to be violated by
these countries. First, the obligation of non-refoulement is the bare minimum safeguard for which
all asylum claimants and refugees should be protected under international human rights law.
Second, the misuse or abuse of the ‘safe’ third country concept by sending claimants to third
countries outside of the EU to contain or constrain their movements has the potential to violate
non-refoulement where adequate procedural mechanisms are not in place to ensure their safety.
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The use of the Eurodac Regulation to force irregular migrants to provide their fingerprints
wherever they enter an EU Member State may potentially increase the risk of refoulement when
the claimant refuses to be fingerprinted and thus faces a removal order.689 Some nongovernmental
organizations and human rights organizations in Europe are concerned with the mandatory
requirement imposed by the Eurodac Regulation on asylum seekers and refugees to provide their
fingerprints or risk removal.690 Fundamental rights are implicated when asylum seekers and
refugees are forced to either provide fingerprints or risk removal: in particular, their nonrefoulement protection and their right against being deprived of their liberty.691 On the protection
against being refouled, the European Agency for Fundamental Rights is concerned that the actions
taken by EU Member States to require and to enforce the taking of fingerprints at the border to
identify asylum seekers and refugees may interfere with a number of rights guaranteed under the
EU Charter.692 Regarding the deprivation of liberty, EU Member States’ use of detention as a tool
to force asylum claimants and refugees to provide fingerprints at the border is a major interference
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with the right to liberty set forth in Article 6 of the EU Charter and Article 5 of the ECHR.693 Most
importantly, the ECHR warrants that an individual cannot be punished for refusing to provide their
fingerprints at the border nor can the person be coerced in giving their fingerprints to authorities
as enumerated under Article 5(1)(b) of the ECHR.694
The UNHCR is concerned that the requirement laid down under the Eurodac Regulation, which
obliges EU Member States to collect and store fingerprint data from all irregular migrants
including asylum claimants, creates significant pressure among the Member States.695 These
Member States may face challenges of a technical nature to collect, store, and remit fingerprint
data in the Eurodac database while complying with fundamental rights obligations such as the ‘best
interests of the child’ international standard.696 The UNHCR cautions that the requirement to
register the fingerprint of all irregular arrivals, including children, through the Eurodac database
should ‘be coupled with sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure compliance with fundamental
rights and international protection obligations, including respect of the principle of nonrefoulement’.697
The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights also cautions that EU Member States’ patrolling vessels
do not, in principle, have jurisdiction to ‘stop other vessels in third-country territorial waters or to
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intercept migrants who want to leave the third state’.698 Where an EU Member State knows, or
should have known, that the intercepted migrants face a real risk of ill-treatment once they are
returned to the third country or are handed over to third-country authorities, it would result in a
violation of the principle of non-refoulement.699 The requirement of non-refoulement is such that
it places a positive duty upon the sending EU Member State to ‘be aware of the situation in the
host country and [must] assess the risks the intercepted people face in the host country’.700 In
assessing that future-oriented risk posed to the returnee, the EU Member State must ascertain
whether such a risk may consist of the absence of a well-functioning asylum system in the third
State and whether there is a real risk of ill-treatment or onward removal in the third State upon
return.701
The principle of non-refoulement is a cornerstone of international refugee law. The principle is
also safeguarded under international human rights law as the prohibition against torture, inhuman
or cruel treatment or punishment, and is codified in a number of European law instruments such
as the EU Charter and the ECHR. This principle must be rigorously observed by EU Member
States including in their interpretation and implementation of European obligations within the
CEAS. This chapter has demonstrated that several concerns have been raised by leading scholars
and nongovernmental organizations in the asylum law field, including the use of ‘safe’ third
country concepts and the Eurodac Regulation to enforce fingerprints against claimants as a policy
of containment. The use of containment strategies to contain, restrict, and prevent the movement
of asylum claimants and refugees has been shown to heighten breaches of the principle of nonrefoulement. In particular, under international law, non-refoulement can be circumvented when
‘safe’ third country concepts are misused or abused by EU Member States to deflect their
responsibility to process asylum applicants to third countries where procedural safeguards are not
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necessarily in place to permit claimants to access procedures and international protection. Finally,
enforcement of the Eurodac Regulation requiring fingerprints from claimants and refugees at the
border cannot also be used as a non-refoulement ‘loophole’ through forcible removal of those who
refuse.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
Containment through migration control seeks to control, divide, and discipline ‘unruly’
migration.702 ‘Unruly’ migration, as perceived by States, occurs when migrants try to manage
where they seek asylum, including by irregular means to evade the requirement to register their
fingerprints under the Eurodac Regulation.703 Techniques to identify and select migrants by
categorizing, partitioning, and channeling them serve as methods to dominate and constrain the
‘disobedience’ of migrants.704
While rarely applied within public international law and specifically international refugee law, the
theory of containment holds particular significance as an explanatory theory for these fields today.
First, the theory suggests that policies of containment are methods used by EU Member States to
elude their international refugee law and human rights law obligations. Second, the theory suggests
that containment provides the underlying rationale for violations of non-refoulement by EU
Member States. Thus, containment theory highlights the gaps between the law, such as the robust
conception of the principle of non-refoulement under international and regional refugee and human
rights law, and the interpretation and application of that law through policies within the EU.
This chapter explained the relevance of the theory of containment as an explanatory theory of EU
migration policies and practices. The first part of this chapter outlined the contours of the theory
of containment, particularly as it is articulated in the fields of human and spatial geography and
migration studies. It explained that containment theory is a theory of control: control of mobility
and immobility within a particular space, and that this space could be legal as well as being
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physical. The second section of the chapter explained containment theory in action within the
CEAS, through several means: use of Dublin transfers, ‘safe’ third country agreements, the
interception of asylum seekers prior to reaching Europe, migrant tracking, narrow interpretations
of the Refugee Convention, and deterrence policies. The third part of this chapter considered the
connection between CEAS containment policies as the principle of non-refoulement. All together,
these explanations show that, while containment may be facilitated by law, containment occurs
not because of the law itself, but because of the policies and practices around the application of
that law.
The theory of containment provides a framework of explanation for the rest of the thesis, including
the doctrinal analysis that takes place in the following chapters. In particular, it provides crucial
context for the recommendations articulated in Chapter Seven. The following chapter details the
evidence for containment policies within the CEAS as demonstrated by practice within the United
Kingdom. Chapter Five explains the UK’s domestic asylum system and shows how certain aspects
of that asylum system are premised upon policies of containment, leading to negative implications
for the principle of non-refoulement and its compliance.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The United Kingdom and Non-Refoulement
5. Introduction
The previous chapters detailed how international law is standard-setting, while regional asylum
systems such as the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in the EU implement those
international law norms and have their own regional variations in qualification standards, asylum
procedures, and reception conditions for applicants claiming international protection for refugee
status. Domestic asylum systems interpret and implement these international and European law
standards according to applicable national law. In the United Kingdom (UK), the interpretation
and implementation of important norms such as the principle of non-refoulement greatly affect the
lives of those who are in search of refuge within the country. Despite common minimum standards
set by both international and European law, a worrying trend has developed: a narrower
interpretation of non-refoulement, revealing policies of containment.
In 2018, the UK received 37,730 asylum applications for international protection. Around 15% of
this number (5,510) constituted Dublin transfers.705 That means, in at least 15% of the cases when
transfers outside of the UK take place, there may be non-refoulement concerns, depending on the
destination country. This chapter therefore considers the UK’s law and practice with respect to the
principle of non-refoulement. The UK exited the EU on January 31, 2020. While it is no longer
officially a part of the EU, the UK is currently in a transition period until December 31, 2020,
during which time the CEAS rules and Dublin transfers still apply.706 As well, the UK remains
part of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the ECHR, which addresses nonrefoulement. Until it left the EU, the UK was one of the top recipients of asylum applicants in the
EU. Among EU countries in 2018, Germany received the most asylum seekers: 184,180 applicants
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or 29% of the EU total.707 France (120,425, 19%), Greece (66,965, 10%), Italy (59,950, 9%), Spain
(54,050, 8%) and the United Kingdom (37,730, 6%) followed.708 Together, these countries
received 81% of all asylum applications across the EU.709 By examining Germany in the next
chapter, and the UK in this chapter, it is possible to identify domestic trends on the law and practice
of non-refoulement within two powerful countries with significant refugee inflows - that is, the
highest and the sixth highest refugee-receiving countries in Europe and the highest civil and
common law refugee-receiving countries.710 These trends are important: even though they come
from two different legal systems, common and civil law, both countries have adopted
interpretations of the principle of non-refoulement that narrow the protections available to asylum
claimants.
The table below illustrates the data gathered by EuroStat on the number of Dublin transfers under
the Dublin III Regulation in 2018 by the top six countries in the order of outgoing transfers (Table
5.1):
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Dublin Transfers by Country (2018)
Incoming Implemented
Requests
Germany
25,005
7,580
France
8,744
1,837
Netherlands 5,042
835
Belgium
3,871
678
Switzerland 6,054
1,292
United
1,940
1,215
Kingdom

Percentage
Accepted
30%
21%
17%
18%
21%
63%

Outgoing
Requests
54,906
45,358
8,619
8,384
5,941
5,510

Implemented Percentage
Returned
9,209
17%
3,533
8%
1,849
21%
897
11%
1,313
22%
209
4%

Table 5.1: Dublin transfers by country in the order of outgoing requests (2018).711
As Table 5.1 shows, the outgoing requests in the United Kingdom totaled 5,510 in 2018, which is
the sixth highest total number of requests in the EU plus Switzerland for transfers outside of the
EU to another EU country. This data suggests that non-refoulement is still a concern, as all
outgoing requests (5,510) should require a non-refoulement assessment prior to transfer while all
implemented transfers (209) should require a post-transfer monitoring mechanism to prevent
further onward refoulement.712
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to explain the UK’s domestic asylum system, particularly
how it addresses non-refoulement of individuals. This chapter evaluates the UK’s interpretation of
non-refoulement in light of its obligations under EU law, ECHR law, and international law.713 It
demonstrates that the UK’s domestic application of the principle of non-refoulement evidences a
concerning trend: that policies of containment are at work within the UK and, by extension, the
CEAS. This chapter begins by explaining the UK’s domestic asylum laws, including the status of
non-refoulement in the UK and the UK’s obligations under EU law and ECHR law. This is done
in order to provide the context for the UK’s asylum system, which is examined in the next section.
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Finally, this chapter considers how the UK’s interpretation of non-refoulement through its
domestic practice is demonstrative of containment theory in action.
5.1

UK Refugee Law

As international and European law set the standards upon which UK domestic law interprets and
applies its non-refoulement obligations, it is vital to consider the relationship between each type
of law.714 The interplay between international, EU, ECHR, and UK national law is complex, as
they have a push and pull effect on each other. For example, international law standards inform
the minimum standards for EU, ECHR, and UK national law standards: they are considered to
exert a ‘pull’ factor, in that both the EU and Member States are pulled towards compliance with
international law standards.715 At the same time, international law is influenced by State practice
and national consensus on issues of asylum: this is considered a ‘push’ factor, in that Member
State practice and consensus in turn pushes reform of international standards.716 While the UK has
exited the EU, it is still currently bound to EU law on asylum through the Withdrawal Agreement
until the end of 2020. The end of the UK’s transition period will clearly affect the interaction
between international, European and UK refugee law. However, its influence with respect to nonrefoulement will still echo through the EU for some time, since it remains part of the ECHR and
will likely continue to contribute jurisprudence on non-refoulement within the ECtHR.
It is important to begin by first considering the EU and ECHR law applicable to the UK, and then
the UK’s domestic law on non-refoulement, because both the EU and ECHR law have informed
the UK’s law in the past. EU law will continue inform the UK’s understanding of the content of
its own domestic law until its exit from the CEAS at the end of 2020, and ECHR law will continue
to bind the UK past that time.
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As described in Chapter 3, the starting point for EU law on non-refoulement is Article 78(1) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which imposes legally binding obligations upon EU Member
States to comply with international standards set by the Refugee Convention, including the nonrefoulement obligation found under Article 33(1). Since the international law standard established
by the Refugee Convention and other international human rights instruments provides the bare
minimum standard with which States must comply, if EU law and ECHR law provide broader
protection than the international standard, that is relevant to UK national law.717
EU asylum law holds primacy under UK national asylum law when the UK judicial system is
applying EU asylum law provisions.718 The ‘principle of primacy’ states that UK national law is
secondary to EU law when UK national law is applying EU law provisions, which is also known
as ‘direct effect’ under EU law.719 However, when the protection standard granted by UK national
law is broader than that granted under EU law, the UK can apply the broader standard pursuant to
its national law (rather than the narrower EU law standard).720
While the ‘principle of primacy’ governs the EU-UK law relationship at the moment, the ‘principle
of subsidiarity’ governs the relationship between ECHR law and UK national law.721 Even though
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the UK will exit the CEAS at the end of 2020, it remains a State Party to the ECHR. Therefore, it
is bound to this principle, which states that ‘[the] machinery of protection established by the
[ECHR] is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights […] [The EU institutions]
become involved only through contentious proceedings and once all domestic remedies have been
exhausted’.722 This means that the UK is expected to implement and respect ECHR law, including
the provisions of the ECHR applicable to non-refoulement.723 If it does not, however, then affected
parties may pursue domestic remedies, failing which a complaint can be laid before the ECtHR.
That said, ECtHR Judge Villiger, in his concurring opinion in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, held
that, despite the ‘principle of subsidiarity’, the ECtHR should play a more restrictive role ‘in light
of the cardinal provision such as Article 3 [of the ECHR] in view of the central importance of the
applicant’s refoulement for this case’.724 In other words, cardinal principles such as nonrefoulement should be respected and protected at the international level, and are not to be
undermined by domestic judicial interpretations of UK national courts where such interpretation
may limit the scope of protection available to individuals the principle aims to protect.
The UK’s non-refoulement obligations under EU law are affected by the EU law instruments that
the UK has ratified, including the Qualification Directive of 2004/83 and Protocol 21, until the
UK’s exit from the CEAS. The UK has opted-out of the Qualification Directive (recast) of 13
December 2011, but currently remains bound by the Qualification Directive of 2004/83 of 29 April
2004, and Protocol 21 annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU.725 The UK did
not accept the Qualification Directive (recast) and therefore is not bound by it or subject to its
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application.726 On non-refoulement, although not bound by Article 21 of the Qualification
Directive (recast) on ‘protection from refoulement’ under EU law, the UK is bound by the same
Article under the Qualification Directive of 2004/83 containing the exact same text.727
The UK is also currently bound by the non-refoulement requirements of the post-Treaty of
Amsterdam asylum directives (known as Phase I of the CEAS).728 Phase I of the CEAS includes
several key directives, namely the: Eurodac Regulation (2000); Temporary Protection Directive
(2001); Dublin II Regulation (2003); Reception Conditions Directive (2003); Qualification
Directive (2004); and Asylum Procedures Directive (2005).729 The UK is also currently bound by
non-refoulement obligations found (or inherent) in certain of the Phase II CEAS instruments,
namely the Dublin III Regulation and the Eurodac Regulation (recast).730 The UK has additionally
opted into the Dublin III Regulation, which governs Dublin transfers.731

726

Qualification Directive recast supra note 276 at recital 50.

727

Ibid at art 21; For a description of the United Kingdom’s duties under international law and customary international

law norm of non-refoulement, please see Chapter 2; See also: Qualification Directive recast supra note 276 at art 21:
‘1. Member States shall respect the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with their international obligations. 2.
Where not prohibited by the international obligations mentioned in paragraph 1, Member States may refoule a refugee,
whether formally recognised or not, when: (a) there are reasonable grounds for considering him or her as a danger to
the security of the Member State in which he or she is present; or (b) he or she, having been convicted by a final
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that Member State. 3. Member
States may revoke, end or refuse to renew or to grant the residence permit of (or to) a refugee to whom paragraph 2
applies’.
728

Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European

Communities and Related Acts OJ C340/1, 10 November 1997, http://www.refworld.org/docid/51c009ec4.html.
729

European Asylum Support Office, “An Introduction to the Common European Asylum System for Courts and

Tribunals: A Judicial Analysis”, August 2016
https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/BZ0216138ENN.PDF at 15.
730

Ibid at 19; See also: Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at arts 8, 9, 10; For a discussion of the implications of

first and second phase instruments on Member States’ compliance with non-refoulement, see Chapter Three.
731

Costello Policy Primer supra note 396 at 5.

167

The UK’s obligations under EU law to prohibit refoulement are complemented by its obligations
under ECHR law. As a Member State of the Council of Europe, the UK is automatically a States
Party to the ECHR, meaning that it is bound by ECHR provisions.732 The UK’s non-refoulement
obligations under ECHR law are articulated through Article 3 of the ECHR on the prohibition
against torture, which prohibits torture, including returning an individual to a situation in which
he or she is at risk of torture or cruel treatment.733
The ECtHR has interpreted the Article 3 prohibition against torture in various cases, including in
cases in which the UK was implicated. For instance, in the case of Chahal v. the United Kingdom,
the ECtHR held that the UK violated Article 3 of the ECHR in that there were substantial grounds
for believing that there was a real risk that the return of the claimant would have exposed him to
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.734 Therefore, the court held that the UK violated the
principle of non-refoulement as defined under international human rights law, despite arguing that
the claimant posed a national security threat to the country if he remained.735 Similarly, in UK
cases the ECtHR confirmed the absolute nature of the Article 3 right, indicated that the harm can
be inflicted by the State or non-State actors, and outlined the meaning of terms such as ‘inhuman’
or ‘degrading’ treatment or punishment.736 On the question of the risk to the claimant, the ECtHR
stressed in UK cases that a ‘mere possibility’ of ill-treatment in another country does not meet the
threshold of ‘real risk’, and that the risk is future-oriented.737 The Court has also specified in UKrelated cases Soering v. the United Kingdom, Vilvarajah and Others v. The United Kingdom and
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Babar Ahmed and Others v. The United Kingdom that the non-refoulement norm applies to all
forms of removal of an individual to another state: it does not matter whether the removal is done
by deportation, expulsion or extradition.738 Sometimes, the Court found, the UK might not be able
to remove any person to a particular state without risking refoulement due to the general situation
of violence in that country.739 Additionally, UK-related jurisprudence has found that indirect
refoulement is not permitted, and that the UK could be held responsible for the subsequent
treatment of the claimant after that person is sent to a third state.740 This is true even if the third
state is a fellow EU Member State.741
Having described the EU and ECtHR legislation and jurisprudence which inform the UK’s
domestic interpretation of non-refoulement, it is important to examine how the principle is
understood in UK domestic legislation and case law, as it is this law which is applied on a day-today basis within the UK’s asylum system. The UK is a dualist legal system, meaning that
international treaties must be transformed into domestic law in order to have domestic legal effect.
The UK ratified the Refugee Convention in 1954 and acceded to the Protocol in 1968.742 The UK
transformed the obligation on non-refoulement under Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention into
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domestic law through paragraph 334 of the Immigration Rules.743
Apart from the Immigration Rules, here are several key pieces of legislation governing UK
immigration and asylum processes and soft law instruments that provide guidance to asylum
officials.744 These are: the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002); the Asylum and
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act (2004); and guidance instruments - Revocation of
Refugee Status (2016); Exclusion Article 1F and Article 33 of the Refugee Convention (2016);
Restricted Leave and Discretionary Leave (2015 & 2016), and Humanitarian Protection (2017).
The purpose of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act is to ‘make provision about
nationality, immigration and asylum; to create offences in connection with international traffic in
prostitution; to make provision about international projects connected with migration; and for
connected purposes’.745 For the purpose of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, an
‘asylum seeker’ means ‘a person a) who is at least 18 years old, b) who is in the United Kingdom,
c) who has made a claim for asylum at a place designated by the Secretary of State, d) whose claim
has been recorded by the Secretary of State, and e) whose claim has not been determined’.746
According to this definition, therefore, an individual claiming asylum outside of the territory of
the UK or someone who has not yet reached the territory of the UK is not deemed an ‘asylum
seeker’ for the purpose of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act. However, Section 8(3) of
the same Act is a saving provision.
Section 8(3) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act states that:
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Immigration

Office,

(3) A claim for asylum is a claim by a person that to remove him from or require
him to leave the United Kingdom would be contrary to the United Kingdom’s
obligations under (a) the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at
Geneva on 28th July 1951 and its Protocol, or (b) Article 3 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms agreed by the Council
of Europe at Rome on 4th November 1950.747
In other words, even where an individual claiming asylum does not fall under the definition
provided by Section 8(1), such as an individual who has not yet entered the territory of UK or such
claim has not yet formally commenced, where that individual’s return may constitute refoulement
as per Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention or Article 3 of the ECHR, then such a claim will
constitute a claim for asylum for the purpose of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act.748
Section 8(3) is also important because it indicates the UK’s intention to be bound by the Refugee
Convention and the ECHR as per the words ‘would be contrary to the United Kingdom’s
obligations under […]’.749
Curiously, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act does not have a provision which deals
with the situation of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum, despite this scenario becoming
increasingly common. Instead, the term ‘dependent child’ is used, and the provisions which
concern the ‘dependent child’ are used not as the primary rights holder, but as a dependent of an
asylum seeker, i.e. ‘failed asylum-seeker with dependent child’.750
Other important provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act are Sections 72 to 80,
regarding removal. The most important of these is Section 72. It should be noted at the outset that
not all removals amount to refoulement. It is only when removals are to persecution, death, torture
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or other cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment, or other massive violations of human
rights, that a violation of refoulement will take place.751 Section 72, relating to ‘serious criminals’,
provides for the construction and application of Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention where
the refugee is excluded from non-refoulement protection. It should be noted that Section 72 must
be read in conjunction with Section 8(3) above. Section 72 permits the return of a refugee to
refoulement where he or she is deemed to be a danger to the UK community or a national security
threat to UK but only where that return does not breach the Section 8(3) prohibition of return to
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights.752
The purpose of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act is to ‘make
provision about asylum and immigration.753 Sections 33 to 35 are important to a consideration of
non-refoulement because they focus on the ‘removal and detention’ of asylum claimants. In
particular, Section 33 concerns removal of asylum claimants to ‘safe third countries’ and therefore
invokes the ‘safe third country’ concept as it is currently understood in EU law. The ‘safe third
country’ concept creates a duty on the sending State: the duty to ensure that the recipient State has
adequate asylum procedures - including procedures prohibiting onward refoulement to other
countries - for claimants to initiate their asylum applications. It is debatable whether the safe third
country concept has any foundation in international law.754 Schedule 3 of the Asylum and
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act lists ‘safe third countries’ to which asylum
claimants are permitted under UK national law to be sent where it is considered ‘safe’ for these
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claimants to commence formal asylum procedures.755 The list of countries designated as ‘safe’
under this Schedule are:
Austria, Belgium, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.756
This list contains countries – such as Greece - with inadequate asylum procedures as deemed by
ECHR case law – and they remain on the list despite the ECtHR’s rulings.757 Part 2 of Schedule 3
also specifies that any person who has made an asylum claim or human rights claim may be
removed from the UK ‘to a State of which he is not a national or citizen’.758 Under the Act, that
State (the ‘safe third country’) shall be treated as a place ‘from which a person will not be sent to
another State in contravention of his Convention rights’ (i.e. refoulement).759
Part 11 of the Immigration Rules concerns asylum and also contains relevant provisions which
implicates the UK’s obligation of non-refoulement.760 For instance, paragraph 334 outlines the
requirements for an individual to be granted refugee status in the UK, including that ‘they are in
the United Kingdom or have arrived at a port of entry in the United Kingdom’.761 According to
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nongovernmental organizations, this is concerning: it seems to require presence in the UK, even
though non-refoulement can potentially occur where the individual can be shown to be under the
‘effective authority and control’ of the UK, but nonetheless outside of the physical territory of the
UK, such as in transit zones.762 This interpretation of the UK’s international law obligations is
narrower than what is provided for under international law, as international law prohibits the
refoulement of any individual to territories where they may face ill-treatment or threats of life
regardless of whether the person has access to the territory of a State.763
Additionally, paragraph 345A to 345D of the Immigration Rules allows asylum claims to be
declared inadmissible as a result of the claimant having made an earlier asylum claim in another
country (a first country of asylum) or a ‘safe’ third country.764 If these circumstances apply, the
stories of asylum claimants themselves will not be substantively considered.765 Although there are
specific provisions precluding the asylum claimant’s removal to his or her first country of asylum
or ‘safe’ third country where non-refoulement obligations are not followed by those countries,
permitting caseworkers to dismiss an application without having first substantively considered the
application itself is already a breach of UK’s international and European law obligations.766 The
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Immigration Rules also permit caseworkers to ‘decline to substantively consider an asylum claim
if the applicant is transferable to another country in accordance with the Dublin Regulation’.767
Preventing caseworkers from considering the merits of a claim by dismissing the application where
Dublin Transfers may take place increases the risk of rejecting an asylum application at face value,
without seriously considering the potential refoulement consequences if an asylum claimant is sent
back.768
Although UK legislation does not have specific protection or provisions for unaccompanied
minors seeking asylum, the Immigration Rules clearly address this group and obliges caseworkers
to give ‘particular priority and care […] to the handling of their cases’.769 It is useful to note,
however, that the international and European standard of using the ‘best interests of the child’ test
is not used in UK domestic legislation.770 Further, there is no mention of using the ‘best interests
of the child’ test to assess the asylum application of an unaccompanied child in the Immigration
Rules.771
The Immigration Rules’ prohibition on refoulement is supposed to be applied at the various stages

see Chapter Three. Further, permitting the transfer of asylum claimants to their first country of asylum or a ‘safe’ third
country is a way for the UK to evade its responsibility for processing the asylum applicant. This method of
responsibility shifting within the EU is inherently dangerous because it encourages asylum claimants who are
otherwise not able to have their applications processed through legal channels to attempt illegal methods of getting to
safety, including attempting perilous journeys across the Mediterranean Sea.
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of the asylum process outlined below.772 However, this does not always occur. For example, when
an asylum claimant is rejected at first instance, there is a potential for refoulement to occur and
therefore this potential should be assessed.773 The guidance provided to asylum officers, or
‘caseworkers’, by the Home Office, reinforces this as an overarching approach, stating that ‘the
consideration of asylum claims deserves the greatest care - ‘anxious scrutiny’ as the UK courts
express it - so that just and fair decisions are made and protection granted to those who need it’.774
In other words, the Home Office recognizes that the core principal obligation for signatory States
of the Refugee Convention is not to return (‘refoule’) refugees. Even so, the UK has repeatedly
been found to be in violation of the non-refoulement prohibition.775
There is a possibility that non-refoulement may be breached at each stage of the five different
asylum procedures detailed below, which evidences containment practices of the UK. For
example, during the accelerated procedure, the applicant’s claim may be deemed by the asylum
officer as either unfounded or manifestly unfounded. Where the claimant’s application is deemed
to be inadmissible as a result of being either unfounded or manifestly unfounded, non-refoulement
considerations may arise. The Home Office’s guidance towards deportation considers refoulement
risks.776 Another procedure where non-refoulement is implicated is the admissibility procedure.
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As guaranteed by Rule 345A(i) of the Immigration Rules, ‘asylum inadmissibility decisions
already made or being made in respect of removal to the EU, Iceland, Norway or Switzerland’
must be certified against ‘any human rights claim that relates to the risk of refoulement from the
proposed country of removal under Part 2 Schedule 3 (paragraph 5(1) and 5(3))’.777 Rules 345B
and 345C, on the other hand, concern decisions ‘already made or being made in respect of removal
to any other country’.778 In order to be removed, the caseworker must consider ‘the human rights
claim, including any protection issues regarding the country of removal and the risk of refoulement
with specific reference to objective information regarding the conditions of removal’.779 While
these explicit protections against refoulement at these stages of the asylum process are positive,
the actual application of the principle has been mixed and, at times, restrictive.
The case law of the UK interprets the principle of non-refoulement in a manner that is illustrative
of a concerning trend: the narrowing of the norm to indicate that the room for protecting vulnerable
asylum claimants is shrinking. This trend of a narrow interpretation of non-refoulement suggests
that containment policies are at work in the UK. It has been held by the UK courts that the focus
on determining whether there is a chance of the claimant being refouled should be based on
‘systemic risks’ rather than examining the individual’s actual circumstances. For example, in the
case of Pour et al, the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court) held
that there is no real risk that the applicants, if returned to Iran from Cyprus, would be refouled by
the UK.780 The Court found that the inclusion of Cyprus on the list of ‘safe’ third countries involved
no incompatibility with the ECHR and, unlike the ECtHR, the Court sided with the CJEU in
holding that non-refoulement claims should be evaluated based wholly on systemic risks, rather
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than particular individual circumstances.781 Another case, Medhanye R, considered the proposed
removal of an applicant from the UK to Italy under the Dublin II Regulation.782 The UK High
Court applied the judgments of both M.S.S. and K.R.S. and held that the evidence used by the
claimant to rebut the presumption of mutual trust when contemplating removal must reveal a
‘systemic failure on a significant scale’ for that presumption to be rebutted.783 The High Court held
that particular weight will be given to the UNHCR and other intergovernmental bodies with
appropriate mandates, while little or no weight would usually be given to expert reports in such
cases.784 As explained in Chapter Three, this focus on systemic issues in the transfer country raises
serious concerns as to whether claimants’ individual circumstances will be adequately evaluated
against the potential for refoulement (as opposed to a blanket evaluation of general risk of
refoulement of everyone sent to that country). As described in Chapter Two, under international
law, an evaluation of the risk for refoulement is meant to be individualized.
Another example of a constricted understanding of the principle of non-refoulement can be seen
in generous considerations of the presumption of mutual trust. This practice of restrictive
interpretation of non-refoulement again demonstrates that containment policies are at work in the
UK. In the case of Tabrizagh et al, the claimant was being contemplated for removal from the UK
to Italy. The UK High Court of Queen’s Bench (Administrative Court) considered the Secretary
of State’s denial of the claimants’ right of appeal against removal to Italy under the Dublin II
Regulation.785 The claimants argued that removal to Italy would expose them to real risk of a
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breach of Article 3 of the ECHR on the prohibition against torture.786 The Court held that there
was no evidence to rebut the presumption that Italy would comply with its obligations under EU
laws or of special vulnerability in personal circumstances of any of the claimants.787 This was
despite the widespread breach by Italy of its obligations under EU laws at that time. In the case of
MS, NA, SG, the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court) ruled that
the presumption that Italy remains in compliance with its EU and international law obligations
related to reception and integration of the asylum claimant and beneficiaries of international
protection had not been rebutted.788 Thus, the Court found, the asylum claimant and beneficiaries
of international protection suffering from severe psychological trauma could be returned to Italy
with no real risk of breaching Article 3 of the ECHR or Article 4 of the EU Charter, due to the
presumption that Italy’s reception capabilities has not been exceeded, and that while effective
medical treatment is available under the same terms as Italian nationals.789 Again, this ruling,
which was also in 2015 - the height of the influx of migrants into Italy - was contrary to the actual
conditions on the ground in Italy, where refugee systems were virtually inoperative.790
The UK courts’ interpretation of non-refoulement also considered the usage of ‘safe’ third country
concepts by the Home Office as well as the UK’s interpretation of EU secondary law provisions
such as the Qualification Directive. The case of Ex Parte Adan R considered the case of asylum
claimants originally from Somalia and Algeria who were concerned that, if they were transferred
to another EU country, they would be refouled to their originating state: the UK argued that, in
assessing whether a State is a ‘safe’ third country, it may determine whether the foreign State’s
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interpretation of the Refugee Convention is reasonable.791 It was held by the UK Court of Appeal
that the Secretary of State for the Home Department had to be satisfied that the foreign State
applied the ‘one true interpretation’ of the Refugee Convention decided by UK Courts rather than
a narrower interpretation which could lead to refoulement.792 This understanding of the principle
of non-refoulement as having a fixed international meaning that cannot be undermined by other
states’ restrictive interpretations seems positive on its face. However, the approach of ‘one true
interpretation’ of the Refugee Convention makes UK courts more likely to find a violation of nonrefoulement can take place only within specific parameters that are predefined by the court, rather
than allowing for potential new cases such as those related to health, which can also potentially
violate the norm.
In another case, EN (Serbia), the UK Court of Appeal considered the exception to non-refoulement
under Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, where ‘there are reasonable grounds for regarding
[the claimant] as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community of that country’, as implemented in the Qualification Directive Article 14.4(a).793 The
Court rejected the view that Article 33(2) must be interpreted narrowly and restrictively so as to
give maximum effect to non-refoulement: such an interpretation adds an ‘unjustified gloss’ to
Article 33(2), and the imposition of a rebuttable presumption that the claimant is a danger to the
community is acceptable,794 Similarly, the case of Dudaev et al concerned the removal of a
Chechnyan claimants from the UK to Sweden under the Dublin II Regulation, where the claimants
argued that there was a real risk that they would be refouled to Russia if returned to Sweden.795
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The UK High Court of Queen’s Bench Division found that the presumption of mutual trust in
Sweden - the presumption that Sweden would comply with its international legal obligations
(including not to refoule) - was not rebutted and that ‘judicial comity between the courts of two
democratic states’ supported this, even though it recognized a lack of legal assistance for the
claimants in Sweden.796 In other words, in cases involving claims of risk of refoulement, the
presumption of mutual trust is wide, involving judicial deference to the courts of another
democratic EU State.
As considered above, certain case law of the UK suggests a concerning narrowing of the
interpretation of the UK’s non-refoulement obligations, thus evidencing containment policies.
First, the cases of Pour et al and Medhanye R (citing MSS and KRS) examined how UK courts’
interpretation of the presumption of mutual trust focused on ‘systemic risks’ rather than ‘individual
assessments’. This suggests that UK courts are predominately concerned with whether a given
Member State has adequate procedures rather than considering the individual’s circumstances to
see if they may be more prone to non-refoulement risks. This is concerning because refugee status
involves an individualized assessment of subjective fear of risk and therefore any assessment
involving non-refoulement risks should include an assessment of the individual circumstances
experienced by the claimant. The cases of EN (Serbia), MS, NA & SG, Tabrizagh, and Dudaev
also indicate a restrictive interpretation of non-refoulement. For example, the case of MS, NA &
SG reveals that Dublin transfers can occur even where the individual claimant is exposed to severe
psychological trauma if transferred to a Member State. According to the UK court, such a transfer
would not be considered a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR. This reasoning is problematic as it
strengthens the European concept of the presumption of mutual trust among Member States
without due regard to the individual’s exposure to risk that can rise to the level of ill-treatment or
torture, constituting a violation of non-refoulement in human rights law. As a result, these cases
have demonstrated the UK courts’ concerning trend towards a more restrictive interpretation of
non-refoulement.
Finally, the case of Ex Parte Adan R suggests that UK courts are accustomed to a ‘one true
interpretation’ of the Refugee Convention, including restrictive interpretations of what fits within
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that interpretation. By restricting non-refoulement to a specific ‘true’ interpretation, the UK courts
may be less likely to recognize novel breaches of non-refoulement where these violations have not
been previously recognized by UK case law.
5.2

The UK Domestic Asylum System: Institutional Structure

International and European law both set the standards upon which the UK’s domestic asylum
system is based. Those standards are applied through asylum procedures: these procedures are
essentially the manner in which the law becomes operationalized. This section therefore examines
the different roles played by various actors - namely the government, courts, tribunals, and
immigration officers - and the interaction of these roles within the UK domestic asylum system.
The UK Visas and Immigration division is part of the Home Office and is responsible for ‘making
millions of decisions each year about who has the right to visit or stay in the country, with a firm
emphasis on national security and a culture of customer satisfaction for people who come here
legally’.797 The UK Visas and Immigration division prioritizes securing borders and reducing
immigration, cutting crime and protecting citizens from terrorism.798 The division is also
responsible for issuing ‘soft law’ guidance instruments, such as instructions for asylum officials
in their day-to-day decision-making.799 The immigration officers responsible for examining
asylum claims are termed ‘caseworkers’ by the UK Visas and Immigration division.800 The
Asylum Intake and Casework unit is housed under a department of the UK Visas and Immigration
division and is responsible for ‘all aspects of immigration and asylum: entry, in-country
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applications for leave to remain, monitoring compliance with immigration conditions, and
enforcement including detention and removal’.801
The administrative and judicial system addressing asylum issues is multifaceted. The First-Tier
Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum) is responsible for handling appeals made by the Home Office
in relation to permission to stay in the UK, deportation from the UK, and entry clearance to the
UK, as well as immigration bail from individuals held in custody by the Home Office relating to
immigration matters.802 The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) handles appeals
by the First-Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum) which relate to visa applications, asylum
applications, and the right to enter or stay in the UK.803 The Upper Tribunal also hears judicial
review cases referred by the Home Office relevant to immigration, asylum and human rights
claims.804 Decisions of the Upper Tribunal may be appealed to the relevant higher court: the Court
of Appeal in England and Wales, the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland or the Court of Session
in Scotland.805 Decisions of the Court of Appeal may be appealed to the UK Supreme Court with
leave from the lower court which handed down the judgment.806 The UK Supreme Court hears
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appeals against certain decisions by the Court of Appeal where it concerns the greatest public and
constitutional importance.807
As the above has shown, the asylum procedure in the UK involves multiple actors, including the
UK Visas and Immigration division, various levels of courts and tribunals, and immigration
officers. The importance of interpreting and applying international and European law accurately
therefore is clear from the top of the hierarchy to the bottom; from the decision-making of the UK
Visas and Immigration division offering directions through guidance instruments for immigration
officers adjudicating individual asylum cases, to the interpretation of the actions taken by the State
by the relevant courts and tribunals.
5.3

Claiming Asylum in the UK

The UK’s asylum system is under constant strain ever since the onset of the Syrian civil war in
2011. Between 2018 and 2019, UK has, on average, 7,860 asylum applications per quarter, which
is over 30,000 asylum applications per year.808 This picture suggests that examining the asylum
procedure as well as safeguards within the UK is important, given the large number of asylum
claimants affected.
This section therefore details the procedures involved in claiming asylum in the UK. It explains
the UK’s Immigration Rules, followed by the administrative process for numerous stages of the
asylum determination process. The process itself is multi-layered and complex, which is why this
section also includes a flowchart providing a visual representation of the system.
The UK’s Immigration Rules create the foundation of the UK asylum system. They represent
directions issued by the UK Home Office for immigration officers to follow when adjudicating
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asylum applications.809 These Rules specify the criteria to determine whether an asylum claimant
may be granted refugee status in the UK.810 Mirroring the provisions under international and
European law, paragraph 334 of the Immigration Rules provides the criteria for determining the
grant of refugee status in the UK.811 This paragraph in the Immigration Rules incorporates the
definition of refugee from the Refugee Convention as incorporated into the Qualification
regulations, as well as other aspects of the Refugee Convention, such as the ‘danger to security’
issue, and, most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, the prohibition on non-refoulement
in (v).812
Most of the rules within the Immigration Rules concern procedure rather than substance of the
asylum determination decision process,813 but they do provide some guidance to decision-makers.
For example, the Rules include factors immigration officers should consider when determining the
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credibility of the claimant, such as age, gender, and variations in the capacity of human memory.814
Also, the claimant is expected to ‘demonstrate a reasonable depth of personal experience and
knowledge, allowing for any underlying factors’.815 As well, the Rules indicate the timeline
required for the Secretary of State for the Home Department to make a decision on a claimant’s
application for international protection for refugee status: the decision must be issued within six
months from the date it was recorded.816
The asylum procedures in the UK determine the methods for granting and withdrawing of
international protection for refugee status.817 Responsibility for the asylum process in the UK rests
with the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who allocates asylum decision-making to
the UK Visas and Immigration division and the Asylum Intake and Casework Directorate.818
At first instance, an interview takes place where biometric data is collected, and information
regarding health and family, details of the travel route, as well as a broad outline of the reasons for
claiming asylum are collected from the claimant.819 After the initial screening stage where the
claimant’s fingerprint and health information is gathered by the Home Office, the claimant is then
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directed into one of five different possible procedures: the regular procedure, accelerated
procedure, admissibility procedure, Dublin procedure, or border procedure.820
In general, an individual’s asylum application will go through the regular procedure. This involves
prioritizing the asylum claimant if he or she belongs to a vulnerable group of individuals such as
unaccompanied minors, pregnant women, or individuals who are disabled.821 The regular
procedure involves ‘straightforward’ and ‘non-straightforward’ cases where the former would
have a time-sensitive deadline of six months, or 182 days, while the latter is designated as ‘nonstraightforward’ by the Home Office simply on the basis that the 182-day deadline was not met.822
Vulnerable groups such as unaccompanied minors are referred to a specialized group of decisionmakers.823 Where the asylum claimant does not belong to a vulnerable group, the asylum officer
considers – based on the information collected at this stage - whether to apply the accelerated
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procedure, under which where the application may be deemed to be unfounded or manifestly
unfounded.824
During the admissibility procedure, the claimant will be sent to the Third Country Unit if he or she
has passed through a ‘safe’ third country on the way to claiming asylum in the UK.825 The asylum
application will be declared inadmissible where:
the applicant has been granted a refugee status from another EU Member State,
comes from a first country of asylum, comes from a ‘safe’ third country, has been
granted a status equivalent to refugee status in the UK; or is allowed to remain in
the UK and is protected from refoulement pending the outcome of a safe third
country procedure.826
There are two procedures related to transfers during the admissibility procedure: Dublin transfers
and ‘safe’ third country transfers. The Dublin procedure initiates where the Member State
responsible for examining the asylum application is not ascertained.827 The Home Office then
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Convention’, see: Home Office, “Certification of protection and human rights claim under section 94 of the
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applies the Dublin criteria to determine the EU Member State responsible for processing the
asylum application.828 Based on the hierarchy of responsibility criteria laid down in Article 7 of
the Dublin III Regulation, the UK may deem itself as the responsible Member State, in which case
no transfer takes place.829 The Dublin III Regulation specifies that the Dublin State where the claim
for asylum is first lodged will send a request to the Dublin State it deems responsible according to
certain criteria.830 Thus, the UK will send a request to the country it identifies as responsible and,
upon acceptance (provided actively or by default), the Home Office will initiate a ‘take back’
request, wherein the Member State responsible for processing the asylum application will be
requested to ‘take charge’ of the claimant pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation.831
Individuals being contemplated for return to a ‘safe’ third country will undergo the ‘safe’ third
country procedure under UK domestic law and their files will be assigned to the Third Country
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Unit within the UK Visas and Immigration division.832 Where the Third Country Unit has certified
that the individual claiming asylum came from a ‘safe’ third country on the way to claiming asylum
in the UK, his or her asylum application will not be decided in the UK.833 Instead, the individual
will be returned to the ‘safe’ third country that he or she has passed through, where a connection
may be established between the applicant and the third country deemed ‘safe’.834 The Immigration
Rules specify the connection criteria necessary in order to remove an individual back to the ‘safe’
third country through which he or she has passed.835 The Immigration Rules set out a list of nonexhaustive criteria for establishing such a connection, these include:
a. Time spent in the country; b. Relations with persons in that country, who may be
nationals of that country, habitually resident non-nationals, or family members
seeking protection there; c. Family lineage, regardless of whether family is present
in that country; and d. Any cultural or ethnic connections.836
If an individual has made an asylum claim upon arriving at the UK border, as opposed to within
the UK, the substance of the claim is not examined – this is because, in the UK, ‘there is no
provision for asylum decisions to be taken at the border’.837 During the border procedure,
immigration officers may carry out the screening interview, but then refer the claim to the regular
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procedure; the officers have the power to grant temporary admission to territory or immigration
bail to permit the claim to be made.838
The following flowchart reproduces the asylum procedure that takes place in the UK from
registration to appeal:839

Figure 5.1 UK Asylum Procedures
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As the above description and flowchart show, the asylum procedure within the UK is a complex
one which involves different stages and procedures depending on the situation of the claimant. The
principle of non-refoulement is to be applied at each of these stages.
5.4

Containment by the UK through Procedural Methods and Evidentiary
Thresholds

Apart from the restricted understanding of non-refoulement in UK case law discussed above, nonrefoulement protection is also constricted through procedural and evidentiary means. For example,
although there are provisions within the Dublin III Regulation which require asylum claimants to
be interviewed so they can tell their stories to decision-makers, in practice, the merits of the
applications of claimants being contemplated for transfer are often not examined.840 Steps where
interviews are not permitted in the UK’s asylum procedure were outlined above. These practices
not only raise the risk that a claimant will be refouled without being able to raise the argument of
fear of persecution on return, they also run counter to the case of M.S.S. In that case, the ECtHR
noted that Belgium did not give M.S.S. the chance to say why he should not be sent to Greece (due
to no personal interview), and this was a contributing factor in finding that Belgium did not fulfill
its responsibilities to M.S.S. under the ECHR.841
The gap between the non-refoulement principle and practice in UK asylum practice is also evident
in the requirement that asylum claimants who wish to challenge transfer cases must present an
‘arguable case’ in which they must meet a high burden of proof. This is an issue, first, when asylum
claimants are being contemplated for a Dublin transfer to another EU Member State, and second,
when an asylum claimant is being contemplated for transfer under a ‘safe’ third country agreement.
The UK requires asylum claimants to satisfy a higher evidentiary threshold than is expected under
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841
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international law.842 As a consequence, the high evidentiary threshold acts as a form of control
under the containment theory described in Chapter Four.
If asylum claimants are being considered for Dublin transfers to other EU Member States, these
claimants can only challenge the transfer if they successfully rebut the presumption of mutual
trust.843 As described in Chapter Three, this presumption assumes that all EU Member States
comply with their international and European law obligations. Case law from both the ECtHR and
the CJEU - particularly a trilogy of cases from 2009-2013 - establishes the requisite threshold
necessary to determine whether the asylum claimant has satisfactorily rebutted the presumption of
mutual trust, so that they are not subjected to Dublin transfers.844 This case law was described in
detail in Chapter Three’s discussion of the presumption of mutual trust, and will be briefly
reviewed here in order to provide context for the discussion of the UK. These cases indicated that
the initial onus, or burden of proof, is placed upon the claimant to satisfy the Member State that
the presumption of mutual trust permitting a Dublin transfer has been rebutted by presenting an
‘arguable case’ that his or her return to a country deemed ‘safe’ will place the claimant at risk of
threats to life or liberty on any ECHR ground.845 Where the claimant is unable to discharge the
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burden of proof on a standard of an ‘arguable case’, then paragraph 6, Schedule 3 of the UK’s
2004 Treatment of Claimants Act will apply, without qualification.846 Paragraph 6 states:
A person who is outside the United Kingdom may not bring an immigration appeal
on any ground that is inconsistent with treating a State to which this Part applies as
a place - (a) where a person’s life and liberty are not threatened by reason of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, (b) from which a person will not be sent to another State in contravention
of his Convention rights, and (c) from which a person will not be sent to another
State otherwise than in accordance with the Refugee Convention (emphasis added).
Where the claimant is unable to discharge his or her burden of proof, he or she will be ordered
returned to the country without the possibility of appeal, thereby potentially raising the same
refoulement risks enumerated under this provision.847 If the claimant presents an ‘arguable case’,
then the burden of proof is then reversed to the Member State applying the Dublin transfer
procedure to ‘dispel any doubts’.848
The first case in the trilogy was the 2008 ECtHR judgment in K.R.S. v. United Kingdom.849 In that
case, the asylum claimant from Iran had travelled through Greece before making an asylum claim
in the UK.850 The UK made a request for Greece to accept responsibility for considering the
applicant’s asylum claim under the Dublin II Regulation, which Greece accepted.851 The UK

paragraph 6, Schedule 3 of 2004 Act. See also Treatment of Claimants Act supra note 753 at para 6, schedule 3, and
Battjes supra note 842 at 16.
846

Ibid at 2 para 4.

847

Treatment of Claimants Act supra note 753 at para 6(a), schedule 3.
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declared the asylum claim inadmissible and directed his transfer to Greece.852 The claimant
challenged his Dublin transfer back to Greece before the ECtHR on the basis that he would likely
be refouled to Iran from there.853 The claimant relied upon several reports that had raised serious
concerns with the situation of asylum seekers in Greece, including documents from Amnesty
International, the Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers, the Norwegian Helsinki
Committee, Greek Helsinki Monitor and notably, the UNHCR.854 The UNHCR had issued a
position paper advising EU Member States to refrain from returning asylum seekers to Greece
under the Dublin Regulation until further notice.855 The ECtHR found that, while the UNHCR’s
‘reliability and objectivity are […] beyond doubt’, the reports of all of the organizations listed did
not help the claimant to satisfy his burden of proof.856 This is because Greece was not sending
individuals back to Iran and therefore the claimant could not be refouled to Iran, and, in the absence
of any proof to the contrary, it was to be presumed that Greece would comply with its other EU
obligations to asylum seekers on its territory (including not to mistreat such individuals).857 Thus,
the claimant did not have an ‘arguable claim’ that he would be subjected to torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.858 Many commentators, including the UNHCR, have critiqued
the presumption made in this case that Greece would not mistreat the claimant (in other words that
refoulement could not happen from the UK to Greece).859 As well, many expressed concerns at the
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high bar the claimant must meet in order to make an ‘arguable claim’ that an EU Member State
could subject an asylum claimant to the sort of treatment prohibited by the principle of nonrefoulement.860
The second case was the 2011 judgment of the ECtHR in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.861 In that
case, an Afghan asylum seeker entered the EU through Greece and continued on to Belgium, where
he applied for asylum.862 Belgium undertook a Dublin transfer to send the asylum claimant back
to Greece.863 The claimant was detained in Greece.864 He put forward reports by international
organizations, including the UNHCR, and numerous nongovernmental organizations to support
his claim that the detention was in degrading conditions, and that there was a real risk of him being
refouled to Afghanistan.865 In this case, the ECtHR accepted that the claimant had made an
‘arguable claim’ on both counts.866 Additionally, Belgium could not rely on Greece’s diplomatic
assurances, which did not relate to this specific claimant.867 The ECtHR held that:
seeking assurances from the Greek government that the applicant faced no risk of
treatment contrary to ECHR was not sufficient to ensure adequate protection against

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Court was confident that, as an EU member state, Greece
would respect all relevant rules, including those pursuant to the ECHR. The Human Rights Court declared the
application inadmissible, finding that were any claim to arise under the Convention, it should be pursued first with the
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the risk where reliable sources had reported practices that were tolerated by the
authorities and which were manifestly contrary to the principles of the Convention
(emphasis added).868
The ECtHR therefore considered that the diplomatic assurances did not displace the evidence put
forward by the claimant. In particular, the ECtHR found that the Belgian authorities knew or ought
to have known that the claimant had no guarantee that the Greek authorities would seriously
examine his asylum application, and therefore could not presume that the applicant would be
treated in conformity with ECHR obligations, including the prohibition on refoulement.869 This
judgment is positive for claimants: the ECtHR decided that ‘reliable sources’ could include, for
example, UNHCR reports, and that the presumption of mutual trust in Greece was not automatic
in the face of the transferring state being aware of serious violations of the rights of asylum
claimants in Greece. This approach is consistent with the views of the Committee Against Torture,
expressed in a complaint against the UK, in which the Committee expressed concern about the
UK’s reliance on diplomatic assurances in cases involving transfers of claimants to third
countries.870

868

Ibid at para 353; See, also: Saadi supra note 300 at para 147.

869

MSS supra note 308 at para 358.

870

Ibid at paras 18-20; The Committee Against Torture has warned States Parties against the misuse of diplomatic

assurances. In its 2013 country report on the UK, the Committee stated that it: ‘[…] notes with concern the [UK’s]
reliance on diplomatic assurances to justify the deportation of foreign nationals suspected of terrorism related offences
to countries in which the widespread practice of torture is alleged’, see: Committee Against Torture, ‘Concluding
observations on the fifth periodic report of the United Kingdom, adopted by the Committee at its fiftieth session (631 May 2013): Advanced Unedited Version” at para 18; The Committee urged the UK to ‘refrain from seeking and
relying on diplomatic assurances ‘where there are substantial grounds [to believe] that [the person] would be in danger
of being subjected to torture’’, see: CAT supra note 9 at art 3; In the situation of transfers of detainees to another
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when there are substantial grounds for believing that [the detainee] would be in danger of being subjected to torture’,
see: Ibid at para 19; The Committee further recommended that the UK ‘recognize that diplomatic assurances and
monitoring arrangements will not be relied upon to justify transfers when such substantial risk of torture exists’.
Moreover, the Committee was of the view that the UK should ‘observe safeguards ensuring respect for the principle
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M.S.S. is a significant judgment of the ECtHR. The Court clearly affirms that EU Member States,
in undertaking Dublin transfers, cannot simply presume that the claimant will be treated in line
with ECHR obligations.871 Rather, ‘States must make sure that the intermediary country’s asylum
procedure affords sufficient guarantees to avoid an asylum seeker being removed, directly or
indirectly, to his country of origin’ in a manner risking refoulement.872 In other words, the sending
Member State must ensure an individual assessment of the claimant’s situation if the claimant is
subjected to the Dublin transfer.873 This judgment assisted in countering the negative implications
of K.R.S. on the burden of proof in Dublin transfer cases by requiring an individualized evaluation

of non-refoulement […] indicating that the asylum-seeker might be in danger of torture or ill-treatment upon
deportation’, see: Ibid at para 20; The Committee called upon the UK to ‘submit situations covered by article 3 of the
[CAT] to a thorough risk assessment, notably by taking into consideration evidence from [the country of destination]
whose post removal torture claim were found credible, and revise its country guidance accordingly’, see: Ibid;
Therefore, the Committee was of the view that the UK should not rely upon diplomatic assurances when contemplating
returns of claimants to third countries.
871

MSS supra note 308; See, also: European Database of Asylum Law, “ECtHR – M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece

[GC], Application No. 30696/09”, 21 January 2011, https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/ecthr-mss-vbelgium-and-greece-gc-application-no-3069609.
872

Ibid at para 342.

873

Ibid at 91 (Concurring Opinion of Judge Rozakis), which states: ‘The existence of those international obligations

of Greece –and notably, vis-à-vis the European Union – to treat asylum seekers in conformity with these requirements
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advanced level of protection’.
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of each Dublin transfer.874 The M.S.S. case was also relied upon by the CJEU in the next case of
concern, N.S.
The third case in the trilogy is the joint case of N.S. & M.E., which involved an Afghan asylum
claimant seeking to resist his removal from the UK to Greece under the Dublin II Regulation.875
Under Article 17 of the Dublin II Regulation, UK authorities informed Greece to ‘take charge’ of
the applicant, N.S., as the responsible Member State.876 N.S. challenged the decision by the UK to
have him sent back to Greece before the UK courts by arguing that the return to Greece would
expose him to risks that infringe his fundamental rights.877 The applicants in M.E. were five asylum
claimants from Afghanistan, Iran and Algeria, and involved the examination of the legal
responsibilities of the transferring Member States under the Dublin II Regulation, EU Charter,
and the Asylum Procedures Directive.878 The five asylum claimants entered the EU through Greece
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and traveled to Ireland, where they claimed asylum.879 Both the UK courts and the High Court of
Ireland separately referred the case to the CJEU, which heard the case jointly.880
The legal issues examined by the CJEU for the joint case of N.S. & M.E. were: a) whether the
exercise of the ‘sovereignty clause’ falls within the scope of EU law and b) whether the transfer
under the Dublin II Regulation was prohibited.881 The CJEU stated that:
Member states may not transfer an asylum seeker to the responsible member state
where they ‘cannot be unaware’ that systemic deficiencies in that country’s asylum
procedure provide substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would
face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the
meaning of Charter Article 4.882
The CJEU also found that that ‘systemic flaws’ in the asylum procedure and reception conditions
for asylum applicants in the Member State responsible resulted in inhuman or degrading treatment
and raised the risk of refoulement, and therefore a Dublin transfer should not occur.883 This
confirmed the approach in M.S.S. and indicated that the claimant can bring evidence of the
‘systemic flaws’ in order to rebut the presumption of mutual trust between EU Member States.
The CJEU’s judgment has significance for the interpretation of fundamental rights for EU Member
States as well as the threshold to rebut the presumption of mutual trust. For example, in considering
the threshold to rebut the presumption of mutual trust, the CJEU placed heavy emphasis on

879

Orakhelashvili supra note 859 at 618.

880

Ibid.

881

Ibid at 87.

882

NS/ME supra note 296 at para 106; See, also: Orakhelashvili supra note 859 at 619.

883

NS/ME supra note 296 at para 86.

200

M.S.S.884 Furthermore, as stated in M.S.S., the ECtHR asserted the importance of human rights
protection for asylum claimants the need for EU Member States to safeguard the fundamental
principle of non-refoulement.885 Scholars have argued that the test created by N.S. on the threshold
for rebutting the presumption of mutual trust is a more difficult threshold for the asylum claimant
to meet if it is an additional requirement for the claimant to be met.886 Further, there is reason to
suggest that the N.S. judgment ‘only deals with treatment contrary to Article 4 EUCFR [on the
prohibition of torture]. The extent to which breaches of other EU fundamental rights should
prevent removal remains to be seen’.887
According to the UK Court of Appeal in Eritrea in 2008, it was the N.S. case which set the test for
establishing the necessary threshold for claimants to rebut the presumption of mutual trust, ‘which
exists nowhere else in refugee law’.888 On appeal, the Supreme Court was of the view that Member
States should be presumed to be complying with their international and EU law obligations, but
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that presumption may be rebutted in one of two ways.889 One way is if the claimant presents
‘sufficient evidence of substantial operational difficulties’ in the receiving State. Another way is
where ‘on the individual facts of the case viewed against the overall situation […] there were
substantial grounds for believing that there would be a real risk [to the claimant of refoulement]
on return’.890 At the same time, the Court reaffirmed the ECtHR’s position that the UK, like all
EU Member States, must make an individualized assessment of a claimant’s situation prior to
being subjected to a Dublin transfer, rather than relying on a blanket assessment.891
In 2013, the UK Court of Appeal reconsidered the issue of the burden of proof on asylum claimants
wishing to argue against Dublin transfers, in the case of E.M. & MA.892 In that case, the Court of
Appeal considered the question of whether it is arguable that the return of any claimants to Italy
would entail a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.893
The Court of Appeal held that: ‘the assessment of risk on return is seen by the Strasbourg court as
depending on a combination of personal experience and systemic shortcomings which in total may
suffice to rebut the presumption of compliance’.894 It then formulated a new test. This new test
seems to be a compromise between the approaches of the ECtHR and the CJEU. Unfortunately, a
mixed approach combining both the ECtHR’s ‘individual assessments’ test in M.S.S. and the
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CJEU’s ‘systemic deficiencies’ test in N.S. does not reconcile the inherent differences between the
two thresholds and may, in fact, be more difficult for UK adjudicators to implement.
The N.S. case demonstrated that, of the interveners to the case before the CJEU, the views
regarding the burden of proof to rebut the presumption of mutual trust are divergent: on the one
hand, the applicants, Amnesty International, and the AIRE Centre argued that ‘the transferring
state was obliged to assess compliance with Article 18 EUCFR [European Union Charter of
Fundamental Rights], the Asylum Directives, and DR and indeed, all the EUCFR provisions’, on
the other hand, Member States including Belgium, Germany, France, the European Commission,
and the UNHCR all argued that ‘there was a presumption of compliance with EU law, although it
was rebuttable’.895 This divergence in views show that there is a lack of consensus among EU
Member States themselves as to how high or low the threshold to rebut the presumption of mutual
trust should be, and the case law provided by the ECtHR and the CJEU on this point is unclear.896
The Advocate General of the CJEU was of the view that there is a ‘wide gulf’ between the legal
standards of EU law on the one hand, and the actual practice of EU law, on the other hand.897
Another important impact of N.S. on asylum law in Europe is that it reveals what the ECtHR and
the CJEU both agreed upon: ‘Blind trust between governments is incompatible with fundamental
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rights’.898 In other words, to protect asylum claimants and their fundamental rights, EU Member
States cannot rely on blind trust in the transfer of applicants from Member State to Member State
through Dublin transfers.899 Despite the potential significance of N.S. to EU refugee law, the CJEU
failed to resolve the most important issue at bar, namely that the standard for rebutting the
presumption of compliance or mutual trust is not ascertained.900 Scholars have rightly pointed out
that the premise of the Dublin system should not be based on the presumption of blind trust
between Member States, but that the ‘trust between Member States would be better sustained by
ensuring checks for fundamental rights protection, rather than permitting governments to turn a
blind eye to the others’ shortcomings’.901
The UK High Court suggested in a subsequent judgment, Tabrizagh, that the UK Supreme Court’s
decision was consistent with N.S.902 In the relevant paragraph, and citing reasons of judicial
dialogue between the CJEU and ECtHR, the UK High Court proceeded to ‘assume that the
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decision of the Supreme Court is consistent with the decision of CJEU in NS’.903 The case concerns
the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department in refusing the asylum claimant’s
appeal against being removed to Italy under the Dublin Regulation.904 Tabrizagh is an Iranian
national who fled Iran and entered the UK through Italy.905 He was fingerprinted in Italy through
the Eurodac system but did not claim asylum there.906 The issue before the UK High Court of
Justice, Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative) Court was whether: a) the claimants have an
arguable claim pursuant to Article 3 of the ECHR as a result of the Secretary of State’s intention
to return them to Italy; and b) whether the evidence which the claimants have relied upon satisfy
the test envisioned by Article 3 of the ECHR.907 The UK court noted that there is a presumption
of mutual trust in favour of Italy, wherein claimants who have passed through there who could
have claimed asylum but did not can be returned to Italy through the procedure enumerated by the
Dublin II Regulation.908 In referencing the ECtHR in M.S.S., the court held that Article 3 of the
ECHR does not entail a corresponding right to grant asylum claimants with accommodation or a
particular standard of living.909 Therefore, a failure to provide an adequate standard of living would
not reach the level of severity required to breach Article 3 of the ECHR.910 The court also examined
the case of EM (Eritrea) and noted that the removal decision through a Dublin transfer would
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depend on the circumstances of the country of removal and, in order to establish an Article 3
breach, the systemic shortcomings must be a ‘widespread problem’ known to exist in the country
of removal.911
The challenge for claimants is that lower courts have interpreted these attempts to either marry the
M.S.S. and N.S. approaches or to choose to interpret N.S. in a restrictive manner. This was evident
in the Ibrahimi decision of the UK High Court, Queen’s Bench, which articulated a three-prong
test for claimants to meet in order to overcome the presumption of mutual trust in a Dublin
transfer.912 The first step is that the claimant must establish that the flaws or weaknesses will lead
to n ECHR human rights violation which would entail examining any potential refoulement chain
reaction.913 The second step is that the claimant must demonstrate that there is a risk of prospective
refoulement to a third State.914 Third, the claimant must show ‘substantial’ grounds for believing
that the risk will eventuate, where ‘substantial’ means ‘real’ - not fanciful or de minimis - and it
requires an overall and thorough review of the facts and evidence.915
Similarly, the lower courts have created certain barriers to the type of evidence claimants can rely
upon when attempting to rebut the presumption of mutual trust. In particular, the UNHCR,916
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International Organization for Migration, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watchare
considered to be ‘reliable sources’. 917 However, the UK High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench,
Administrative Court has indicated that independent expert reports are not.918 As well, as was
found in Medhanye, reports from reputable nongovernmental organizations may not be sufficient
for a claimant to meet the burden of proof.919 Further, it is up to the national adjudicators to
determine whether the test of ‘reliable sources’ has been met by the claimant.920 Thus, for cases
involving assessment of a future risk of refoulement to ill-treatment, the threshold of ‘reliable
sources’ precludes the application of independent expert reports but relies heavily upon published
reports from highly-regarded bodies, though nongovernmental reports might not be sufficient.921
As the above has shown, the UK jurisprudence surrounding the claimant’s burden in rebutting the
presumption of mutual trust leaves the claimant with a significant burden, one which, in practice,
is exceedingly hard to meet.922 For instance, as compared with the ECtHR on the test of rebutting
the presumption of mutual trust, the CJEU’s test involves the specific wording of ‘cannot be
unaware’ that ‘systemic deficiencies’ exist in the asylum procedures and reception conditions of
the Member State to which the applicant would be transferred but for rebuttals that justify his or
her non-removal.923 Another foreseeable issue with the requirement for the claimant to rebut the
of the UK Supreme Court in I.A. (Iran): IA (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 6 at
para 44.
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presumption of mutual trust between EU Member States is the Advocate General’s opinion that
‘the precise working of the procedure for rebutting the presumption ‘were a matter for the legal
orders of the individual Member States’.924 These create additional procedural barriers for
claimants to access international protection for refugee status in the UK and accordingly increase
the probability that the UK will shift its responsibility for processing asylum applications to
another Member State in situations which create risk for mistreatment or onward refoulement, thus
reinforcing the EU’s containment policies.
In sum, the UK’s threshold for rebutting the presumption of mutual trust is a high one. A high
threshold for rebutting the presumption means that the UK uses a blanket assumption and applies
it broadly across all Member States - without procedural safeguards to ensure the country is, in
fact, in compliance with international and European law. A containment policy is therefore
demonstrated in the UK’s practice of returning asylum claimants to another Member State deemed
to be in compliance with its international and European law obligations. First, this containment
policy shows the UK’s attempts at shifting its responsibility for processing asylum applications to
another Member State. Second, this same policy demonstrates that the UK is evading international
law by placing the burden of proving an ‘arguable case’ upon the claimant to discharge. Third, the
UK’s efforts at containing asylum claimants to other Member States means that, where the
claimant is unable to rebut the presumption, his or her return to the country will be without
qualification.925 Finally, an inability to rebut the presumption by a claimant may result in severe
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consequences for him or her, including an increased risk of being returned to face persecution in
violation of non-refoulement. This inability to rebut the presumption of mutual trust by the
claimant may violate international law and European law when it prevents the claimant from
accessing international protection as a result of lacking procedural safeguards against removal to
refoulement - i.e. by not permitting the claimant an opportunity to rebut the case against him or
her.
5.5

Concluding Remarks

Despite the departure of UK from the EU, the legacy of the EU will continue in UK asylum law
for some time, given its transformation of EU law into its system and case law and its continued
obligations under the ECHR. On the other hand, UK law has diverged from EU law to adopt a
narrower approach which benefits the State in either Dublin or ‘safe’ third country transfers, and
in certain procedures which do not allow the claimant to be heard about risks of refoulement.
In a world where there is an increasing number of those forcibly displaced as a result of conflicts
occurring elsewhere, the need for a coordinated response from the international community is
necessary.926 This is also true from the standpoint of international organizations such as the
UNHCR, which has called for solidarity and cooperation among States in order to tackle mass
influx situations as well as to ‘reinforce support for the institution of asylum and international
refugee protection’.927 However, despite these attempts and calls for coordinated response from
the international community, responsibility-sharing has become increasingly difficult especially
in the CEAS when both the deficiencies of the system itself and the inconsistent interpretation and
implementation of the system among Member States contribute towards further instability.928 Most
notably, inconsistencies in the interpretation and application of the Dublin System by the UK are

926

Eritrea supra note 843 at para 40.

927

Vulker Turk and Madeline Garlick, “From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The Comprehensive

Refugee Response Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees” (2016) 28:4 International Journal of Refugee Law
656-678 at 673 [Turk and Garlick].
928

For more on the deficiencies of the Dublin System, as well as inconsistent interpretation and implementation by

Member States, see: Chapter Three.

209

revealed in its domestic jurisprudence, which incorporates references to both ECtHR and CJEU
decisions. There are several inconsistencies which are transposed from regional European
frameworks to the UK’s domestic jurisprudence, including the threshold for rebutting the
presumption of mutual trust and the source of evidence that may be relied upon by Member States
in rebutting the presumption of mutual trust.
This chapter explored the principle of non-refoulement in the UK. It demonstrated that the UK is
showing a concerning trend: that the interpretation of the norm in UK domestic law has become
narrower and more restrictive. For instance, on the threshold to establish a rebuttal to the
presumption of mutual trust to prevent Dublin transfers, UK has not shown consistency with the
approach taken towards the standard of proof for the asylum claimant. In referring to ECtHR and
CJEU case law, UK has not been able to ascertain its own interpretation of the presumption of
mutual trust threshold. Rather, UK is prone to compromise between the two supranational courts’
approaches, leading to more inconsistency and difficulty in implementation for national
adjudicators.
This chapter also examined the procedures for claiming asylum in the UK, including how
applicants for international protection for refugee status qualify for international protection, how
their international protection is granted or withdrawn, and the points in the system during which
the possibilities of refoulement are considered.
The final part of this chapter outlined the UK’s domestic jurisprudence and how it demonstrates
that the country is actually following a policy of containment in three key respects. A trilogy of
cases established the threshold to determine the standard by which claimants can rebut the
presumption of mutual trust in the UK. The threshold on ‘reliable sources’ which claimants must
prove to establish an ‘arguable case’ requires the use of reports or observations from reputable
international organizations such as the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration
and well-respected human rights monitoring bodies such as Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch – but sometimes even that is not enough. Finally, the problem with the rebuttable
presumption is that the onus is placed upon the claimant and is detrimental to the claimant where
he or she is unable to discharge such a heavy burden, potentially being returned to face risks of
persecution, violating non-refoulement. The Committee Against Torture has recognized the risks
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in the UK’s approach – for example, cautioning the UK against the use of diplomatic assurances
(as part of mutual trust) when contemplating the deportation of claimants to third countries.929 The
Committee recommends that the UK adopt a clear policy and to ensure that the transfer of
claimants, including detainees, to another country is strongly prohibited in situations where there
are substantial grounds for believing that their transfer would expose them to a real risk of
torture.930
The next chapter examines the gaps between the law and practice on non-refoulement in Germany,
which makes for an interesting comparison with the UK approach, as another important refugeereceiving country in Europe.
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CHAPTER SIX
Germany and Non-Refoulement
6. Introduction
In 2019, Germany received 165,615 asylum applications for international protection, down from
a high of 745,160 in 2016, and 222,565 and 184,180 in 2017 and 2018 respectively.931 Year over
year since significant refugee influxes began in 2012, Germany has received the highest number
of asylum applications within the EU.932 ‘Germany’s desirability as a destination for asylum
seekers is long standing: over the past 30 years it received a reported 30 percent of all asylum
applications in Europe - a greater share than any other country.’933 As a result of the high number
of asylum claimants, Germany has increased its efforts to transfer asylum claimants from Germany
to other EU Member States, particularly the Member State deemed responsible for processing the
asylum application pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation (known as ‘Dublin transfers’).934 While
Dublin transfers have been temporary halted due to COVID-19-related travel restrictions,
Germany transferred 8,423 asylum applicants under this system in 2019, particularly to Italy and
France.935 Similarly, in 2018, Germany returned the highest number of asylum claimants through
Dublin transfers to Italy, raising concerns about their treatment in Italy and fears of onward
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refoulement to countries of origin.936 As part of this trend, Germany has also reversed policy on
‘church asylum’, under which asylum claimants subject to Dublin transfers who sought shelter in
German churches for fear of onward refoulement are removed and forcibly transferred.937 These
increased efforts of Germany to use Dublin transfers has led to criticism. According to the
European Council on Refugees and Exiles, this practice puts asylum claimants at risk of human
rights violations and exacerbates deficiencies in the domestic German asylum procedures by
creating an additional heavier burden upon claimants to disprove the presumption of mutual
trust.938 Members of Parliament from the German parliamentary faction Die Linke have
commented that this practice, which is permitted within the Dublin System, is ‘unjust in principle
as it tends to shift the responsibility for processing asylum claims to countries that have suffered
from EU austerity measures and treated asylum seekers like tradeable goods’.939 Ultimately,
Germany’s approach raises similar concerns with respect to refoulement as highlighted in the
previous chapter’s case study of the United Kingdom.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how Germany’s domestic asylum system addresses the
principle of non-refoulement. This chapter therefore analyzes and evaluates Germany’s domestic
asylum system as well as Germany’s interpretation and implementation of the principle of nonrefoulement. This chapter also situates Germany’s interpretation and implementation of nonrefoulement within the European legal framework on asylum issues and within the CEAS. First,
the chapter begins by explaining the German refugee law system. Next, it explains the German
domestic asylum system. This is done in order to provide the legal and procedural context within
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which German refugee law, including on non-refoulement, is applied. The chapter then outlines
Germany’s interpretation and implementation of non-refoulement. The chapter ends by discussing
responsibility-sharing and examples of containment policies in Germany. This chapter concludes
that, first, Germany’s interpretation of the principle of non-refoulement is mixed and, in some
cases, becoming narrower. Second, Germany’s reliance on the presumption of mutual trust in
Dublin transfers furthers the EU’s containment policies by shifting the responsibility to process
asylum applications elsewhere - outside of Germany to another EU Member State deemed
responsible or to a third country deemed ‘safe’ under the Asylum Procedures Directive (recast).
6.1

German Refugee Law

German refugee law is informed by three types of law: international treaty law, EU and ECHR
law, and domestic law. This section will explore each of these types of law in turn.
Germany acceded to the Refugee Convention on November 5, 1969 and ratified it on December
1, 1953.940 Germany also acceded to, and ratified, the 1967 Protocol on September 4, 1990, with
the geographical and temporal limitations imposed by the Refugee Convention in Article 1A
removed.941 Germany has not made any reservations to the Refugee Convention.942 Germany is a
monist country which implements international treaties directly within domestic law, particularly
through Article 25 of the Basic Law; therefore, the content of the Refugee Convention forms part
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of German domestic law.943 That said, the Bundesverfassungsgerricht (BverG) - the German
Federal Constitutional Court - has shown tendencies towards the dualist model.944 In particular,
the Basic Law states:
Treaties that regulate the political relations of the Federation or relate to subjects
of federal legislation shall require the consent or participation, in the form of a
federal law, of the bodies responsible in such a case for the enactment of federal
law. In the case of executive agreements the provisions concerning the federal
administration shall apply, mutatis mutandis (emphasis added).945
The German approach means that, in theory, asylum claimants are able to rely directly upon the
Refugee Convention in domestic courts. However, in reality, such direct application may not be
determinative.
Germany, as a Member State of the Council of Europe, has also ratified the ECHR and is legally
bound by it.946 This means, for example, that the non-refoulement provisions of the ECHR are
directly incorporated into Germany’s domestic law since Article 3 of the ECHR prohibits
torture.947 Since the ECHR has been implemented domestically by Germany into its domestic
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legislation, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence therefore serves as ‘interpretative tools of German norms
of a constitutional nature’.948 Also, while the ECHR has been implemented domestically in
Germany, the principle of subsidiarity of the ECtHR jurisprudence suggests that the ECtHR is a
court of last resort and that domestic remedies must have been exhausted before national courts
may refer a case to the ECtHR.949 In particular, the principle of subsidiarity requires national courts
to ‘have the opportunity to consider and redress the alleged violation(s)’.950 In the Case No. 2 BvR
1481.04 before the BverG, the court held that ‘the responsible authorities or courts must
discernibly consider the decision and, if necessary, justify understandably why they nevertheless
do not follow the international-law interpretation of the law’.951 This judgment signals to the
national courts that the BverG’s view of ECtHR judgments - including those on refugee law - do
not oblige German national courts to follow the ECtHR’s judgments in all circumstances, where
they can put forward reasons for deviating from the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.952 However, it was
subsequently held by the BverG that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence must be considered by German
national courts in a ‘methodologically sound manner, but only as long as this did not lead to a
weakening of the Basic Law’s standard of constitutional protection’.953
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As a Member State of the EU, Germany is bound by EU law, especially when implementing EU
law in its domestic legislation.954 The regulations and directives are automatically binding upon
Germany on the date they enter into force and directives must be incorporated by EU countries
into their domestic legislations.955 Germany did not opt out of any of the relevant EU directives
and regulations on asylum.956 Germany has transposed key CEAS instruments into its domestic
legislation. For instance, Qualification Directive (recast) has been transposed as the Act for the
Transposition of the Directive 2011/95/EU, the Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) as the
Asylum Procedures Acceleration Act, the Reception Conditions Directive (recast) as the Act on
classification of further states as safe countries of origin and on the facilitation of access to the
labour market for asylum seekers and tolerated foreigners, and the Dublin III Regulation as the
Act on the redefinition of the right to stay and on the termination of stay.957
In terms of Germany’s responsibilities under EU law for responsibility-sharing, the Dublin III
Regulation applies to determine the Member State responsible for processing asylum
applications.958 The relevant sections in the Dublin III Regulation have been transposed in German
law under Section 71a(1) of the Asylum Act (described further below) and Sections 51(1) to 51(3)
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of the Administrative Procedure Act.959 The Asylum Act specifies additional asylum procedures
to be carried out if Germany is deemed to be the responsible Member State to process the
claimant’s application for asylum and the Administrative Procedure Act sets out the conditions
upon which these asylum procedures are to take place.960
Turning now to domestic German law, there are two sources of German law: statute law (Gesetz)
and customary law (Gewohnheitsrecht).961 The Constitution of Germany, the Basic Law, is the
highest law of Germany.962 Next in the hierarchy of the Gesetz are regulations
(Rechtsverordnungen) and bylaws (Satzungen).963 German refugee law is generally found in the
Gesetz, particularly in its regulations. The courts function to interpret law but the judicial decisions
are not binding upon lower courts.964 This means that, although a certain case may be helpful to
protect claimants from refoulement in Germany, it does not create binding precedent and therefore
lower courts may decide differently, even against the claimant’s protection.
The Basic Law applies to ‘the entire German people’.965 However, the language of the Basic Law
uses repeatedly the terms ‘every person’, ‘all persons’, and ‘persons’,966 whereas other parts of the
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Basic Law refer to ‘all Germans’.967 This distinction is important for asylum claimants, who have
certain rights under certain parts of the Basic Law as a result.
Most relevant to the interpretation of international law is Article 25 of the Basic Law, which
provides for the ‘primacy of international law’.968 It states: ‘the general rules of international law
shall be an integral part of federal law.969 They shall take precedence over the laws and directly
create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory’ (emphasis added).970 This
provision signifies that the Basic Law, as the constitution and the highest law of the land, deems
Germany as a monist system, under which general principles of international law directly become
national law, without the need for separate domestic implementation, as dualist systems require.971
The ‘right of asylum’ is guaranteed to ‘persons persecuted on political grounds’ pursuant to Article
16(a)(1) of the Basic Law.972 However, this ‘right of asylum’ is not invoked where, pursuant to
Article 16(a)(2), the person ‘enters the federal territory from a member state of the European
Communities or from another third state in which application of the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms is assured’.973 In other words, asylum claimants who pass through an EU Member State
on their way to Germany or who pass through a third country where the Refugee Convention and
ECHR are enforced, cannot invoke the ‘right of asylum’. On this basis, Germany draws on the
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presumption of mutual trust which assumes the safety of the third country for the specific asylum
claimant being contemplated for return.
The Basic Law is interpreted by the BverG, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany.974 The
main duty of the court is to interpret the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (the
Grundgesetz or the Basic Law), and to ensure that it is obeyed.975 The Basic Law is the most
relevant law when it comes to refugee law, given its emphasis on fundamental rights.976 The
decisions of the BverG are final and all other German government institutions are bound by its
case law.977 The BverG’s jurisdiction extends to any conflicts which arise in the interpretation of
the Basic Law.978 The BverG has the power to declare a law unconstitutional based on its
interpretation of the Basic Law.979 Unlike ordinary courts in Germany, the BverG is vested with
the power to declare German laws and statutes unconstitutional, void, or reverse a decision to
remand the matter to a competent court, including the competence to enforce fundamental rights
as provided for under the Basic Law.980 The BverG cannot, however, issue awards in damages or
initiate criminal proceedings.981
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As a constitutional court, the BverG sees itself as part of the international legal order, where it
maintains judicial dialogue with other national and international courts.982 Any person may lodge
a complaint alleging that their fundamental rights as provided for under the Basic Law has been
violated by a public authority.983 The BverG is a court of last resort, meaning that all other legal
remedies must have been exhausted before the BverG will consider a complaint.984
There are two methods of application used by the BverG in its interpretation of international law
norms - including refugee law norms - in domestic German case law. The first involves a ‘static
interpretation’ of international law norms, namely through determining Article 16(2) of the Basic
Law according to the contents of international law.985 Another method involves a ‘dynamic
interpretation’ of international law norms through the consideration of the content of such an
international law norm as it is applied by German organs.986 The German legislature has made
clear that it would not follow the dynamic interpretation of international law norms, meaning that
international law norms should be interpreted only according to the content of international law
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rather than how they have been applied by German organs.987 German case law is also not binding
upon lower courts and previous decisions of a court are not binding upon the same court.988
Apart from the Basic Law, the Asylgesetz or, the Asylum Act of Germany (Asylum Act) is a key
aspect of German refugee law. The Asylum Act contains 90 chapters and two annexes which apply
to foreigners. The Asylum Act defines a ‘refugee’ in the same way as the Refugee Convention.989
The Asylum Act allows for three outcomes: a grant of refugee status, a grant of subsidiary
protection as defined under the Qualification Directive, or denial of the claim.990
With regards to the ‘safe’ third country concept, the Asylum Act provides under Article 26 that:
any foreigner who has entered the federal territory from a third country within the
meaning of Article 16(2), first sentence of the Basic Law (safe third country) […]
shall not be granted asylum.991
However, the provision on ‘safe’ third country does not apply where: ‘the Federal Republic of
Germany is responsible for processing an asylum application based on European Community law
or an international treaty with the safe third country’ and ‘[i]n addition to the Member States of
the European Union, safe third countries are those listed in Annex I’.992 The ‘safe’ third countries
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listed in Annex I are Norway and Switzerland.993 This means that Germany unequivocally accepts
and applies the concept of ‘safe’ third countries in its refugee law.994
The principle of proportionality guides judicial decision-making in Germany, including decisions
involving asylum claims. The principle is primarily derived from Articles 2(1) and 14 of the Basic
Law, and this principle was also later incorporated into EU law.995 The principle of proportionality
places fundamental rights as set out under the Basic Law at the centre of German law, including
the right of asylum, with other laws carefully balanced so as to protect those rights.996 The principle
of proportionality states that: ‘the law must be appropriate for attaining its objectives, it must be
necessary in the attainment of its objectives, and its purpose and method should be weighed against
each other in a proportionate manner so that there is minimal interference in the fundamental rights
guaranteed in the Basic Law’.997
In the context of asylum decision-making, German courts have held that the principle of
proportionality is violated when a ‘blanket approach in the absence of a case by case examination’
is used, in particular to justify detention of asylum claimants deemed to be flight risks.998 The
BverG has also held that the principle of proportionality requires that limitations of fundamental
rights as guaranteed under the EU Charter are permitted only if these limitations are ‘necessary
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and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union’.999 The principle of
proportionality is transposed into Section 34a of the Asylum Procedure Act, which also requires
that transfers of asylum claimants under the Dublin procedures be in compliance with the Dublin
III Regulation, and in accordance with the functions of the CEAS.1000 The Baden-Württemberg
State Administrative Procedure Act also stated that, in instances of decision-making (including on
asylum matters), the executive authority must apply a method that is least likely to interfere with
the individual concerned and the general public.1001
In the context of allocating responsibility for determining an asylum application, the
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BverWG), or the Federal Administrative Court of Germany, held in
Case No. 1 C 26.14 that, where an asylum claimant has decided to apply for asylum in Germany
and the decision on the Member State responsible for the processing of the asylum application is
against him or her, the claimant must first lodge an appeal to the Bundesamt für Migration und
Flüchtlinge (BAMF), or the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees of Germany, before he or
she may initiate a second action in court against the responsible authority issuing the rejection.1002
The BAMF is a federal authority within the Federal Ministry of the Interior which makes decisions
on asylum applications.1003 The BAMF works on the basis of interpreting the Asylum Act, as well
as relevant EU directives and regulations such as the Dublin III Regulation.1004 The decisions of
the BAMF can be appealed to the courts. The BAMF produces various ‘soft law’ guidance
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instruments, including official instructions and working guidelines for decision-makers.1005 These
guides aim to ensure uniform assessment of asylum applications but do not replace individual
examinations and assessments of asylum applications by adjudicators.1006 The guides reflect the
current policy of the BAMF and there is an ongoing dialogue between the BAMF and courts in
the practice of asylum decision-making.1007 These ‘soft law’ guidance instruments are not available
to the public and are considered internal documents.1008
Having considered the sources of German refugee law and methods of interpreting German law
that are relevant to asylum cases, the next section turns to the structure of the German domestic
asylum system.
6.2

The German Domestic Asylum System

Germany’s domestic asylum system is structured quite differently from that of the United
Kingdom. Asylum cases are handled by regular administrative courts, rather than specialized
tribunals similar to the ones in the UK.1009 Decisions of the regular administrative courts may be
appealed to the High Administrative Court of the relevant state in Germany, such as Bavaria and
North Rhine-Westphalia, which deal with questions of both fact and law.1010 At the top of the
appeals hierarchy is the BverWG, the Federal Administrative Court of Germany, which is
responsible for the administrative claims of refugee claimants and only decides on questions of
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law and not of fact.1011 On the other hand, the BverG, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany,
can also rule on issues of asylum because the ‘right of asylum’ is guaranteed in the Basic Law.1012
The BverWG may deviate from the BverG’s ruling on asylum issues only where the BverWG’s
ruling concerns EU law, which prevails over German national law.1013 The BverWG can also refer
cases to the CJEU on questions related to interpretation of EU law and has done so on previous
occasions pursuant to Article 267 of the TFEU.1014
There are five main steps in the German asylum process: first instance screening; determination of
the applicable procedure (accelerated, regular or Dublin); substantive interview for refugee
determination; decision on refugee determination; and appeal (if applicable).1015 Each of these
steps will be described in turn. The authority responsible for the domestic processing of asylum
applications in Germany is the BAMF, unless the application for asylum took place at the border,
in which case the German border police will be the competent authority to handle the
application.1016
The first step in the Germany asylum process is first instance screening, which can take place at
the border, at the airport or within German territory. Individuals begin this process by indicating
that they wish to apply for international protection for refugee status. They are then briefly
questioned to determine certain facts, such as where they are from and how they got to Germany
from their country of origin, including the countries they have passed through to arrive at Germany.
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For asylum claimants who arrive at the border trying to enter Germany without the requisite
landing documents such as passports, their entry to German territory will be denied by the border
police on the grounds that they have traveled to Germany through a ‘safe’ third country to which
they should return and from where they should have applied for asylum.1017 Thus, these individuals
are immediately diverted outside of the system by being considered ‘inadmissible’ on the basis of
having passed through a ‘safe’ third country.1018 If, however, they have documentation, then they
are instead permitted to continue to the second step of the asylum process. If an individual applies
for asylum either at the border or at an international airport in Germany, the applicant will be
accommodated in an ‘initial reception centre’ (Aufnahmeeinrichtung) for up to 6 months during
the first stage of his or her asylum procedures.1019 These ‘initial reception centres’ are located on
the premises of the BAMF, but subsequent to the initial reception period of 6 months, for the
remainder of their time, claimants will be sent to decentralized reception centres for appeal
procedures, if applicable.1020 If a person makes an asylum claim while they are already within
Germany territory, then he or she will be sent to the responsible authority (such as the BAMF) to
determine his or her asylum application.1021
The second step in the asylum process involves determining the correct procedure to follow. At
this stage, claimants are briefly interviewed in order to be evaluated against a series of
considerations: is the claimant from a ‘safe’ country of origin? Has the claimant misled German
authorities? Did the claimant act in bad faith in making the application, including attempting to
deceive the asylum official or trying to conceal the truth? Has the claimant filed a subsequent
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application for asylum in another country after leaving Germany? Has the claimant applied for
asylum to frustrate the process, such as applying for the purpose of causing procedural delays? Did
the claimant refuse to be fingerprinted as required under the Eurodac Regulation at the point of
arrival in the EU or in Germany? Has this claimant ever been expelled from Germany on national
security grounds? If the answer to any of these questions is ‘yes’ at this preliminary stage, then the
claimant is subjected to the accelerated procedure. If the answer is ‘no’ to all of these questions,
then the individuals is processed through the regular procedure.
The accelerated procedure is a procedure which takes place in an abbreviated period of time, in
comparison to the regular procedure. Under the accelerated procedure, the BAMF, which is the
office that carries out the procedure, has seven calendar days to decide on a claimant’s
application.1022 During the accelerated procedure, claimants are detained at ‘special reception
centres’.1023 As mentioned, asylum claimants may undertake the accelerated procedure if they are
deemed to be from a ‘safe country of origin’, which is defined as:
a country where, on the basis of the legal situation, the application of the law within
a democratic system, and the general political circumstances, it can be shown that
there is generally and consistently no persecution as defined in Art. 9 of Directive
2011/95/EU (Recast Qualification Directive), no inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of
international or internal armed conflict.1024
Asylum claimants may also be required to undertake the accelerated procedure where they were
found to have deliberately misled the German authorities about their identity.1025 The accelerated
procedure is also used where applicants have acted in bad faith, filed a subsequent application after
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they left Germany and their initial asylum application had concluded, made an application for the
purpose of causing procedural delay, refused to provide their fingerprints, or were expelled from
Germany due to serious reasons of public security or for constituting a danger to the community
of Germany.1026 These claimants are accommodated in ‘special reception centres’ (besondere
Aufnahmeeinrichtung) where they stay for the duration of the accelerated procedure.1027
The regular procedure differs from the accelerated procedure in that there is not a set time limit
for the BAMF, the responsible authority, to decide on an application.1028 Claimants who are
directed into the regular procedure are evaluated to see if they travelled through a ‘safe’ third
country prior to arriving in Germany. If the answer is that the claimant travelled through a ‘safe’
third country which is not an EU country, then Germany’s stance is that the individual should have
applied for asylum in that country. Germany will not consider that person for the granting of
asylum and instead will initiate the ‘safe’ third country transfer process.1029 This is the case even
where it is impossible to return the individual to the ‘safe’ third country (i.e. where there is lack of
information provided by the applicant).1030 Germany uses ‘safe’ third country lists, which include
non-EU countries such as Norway and Switzerland.1031
If, during the personal interview at the competent branch office of the BAMF, the claimant is
determined to have travelled through an EU Member State before filing the asylum claim in
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Germany, then that individual will be considered for a potential Dublin transfer.1032 During this
preliminary interview, the applicant is ‘informed […] about the procedure and asked to state any
reasons why he or she should not be transferred to another Member State’.1033 The content of this
interview is to determine the competent Member State responsible for examining the application
for the claimant and to examine any procedural barriers to deporting the claimant under the Dublin
III Regulation.1034 Germany then evaluates whether it is the responsible Member State or not. If it
determines that it is not the responsible Member State, then German authorities do not conduct a
substantive interview of the claimant, raising the risk of refoulement as the individual is not
provided with a chance to address the situation regarding the State determined to be responsible
for processing his or her claim.1035 Where another Member State is determined, under the Dublin
III Regulation, to be the responsible Member State, Germany will submit a ‘take charge’ request
to the responsible Member State to undertake responsibility for the claimant.1036 Where the
responsible Member State approves the ‘take charge’ request from Germany, the BAMF will find
the application inadmissible in Germany and order the deportation of the claimant to the
responsible Member State.1037 Under the Dublin procedure, Germany is not permitted to transfer
the applicant to another EU Member State where the applicant’s spouse or minor children are
already recognized as a refugee or are entitled to subsidiary protection in Germany; the applicant’s
spouse or minor children have applied for asylum and the responsible Member State is Germany;
the applicant is an unaccompanied minor and does not have parents or siblings in the Dublin
responsible State; the applicant is seriously ill and the illness can be worsened with the transfer;
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or Germany decides to invoke the ‘sovereignty clause’ under Article 3(2) of the Dublin III
Regulation to ‘take charge’ of the applicant.1038 Germany is required to transfer the applicant to
the responsible Member State within six months of the agreement of the Member State under the
Dublin III Regulation.1039
If the applicant is not subject to a ‘safe’ third country or Dublin transfer, then that individual will
be sent to the third step in Germany’s asylum process: the substantive interview, in which case
their refugee status will be determined in Germany.1040 At this step, the substantive interview is
conducted in order to consider whether the claimant fits within the required definition of ‘refugee’.
Under domestic German law, persons who are subjected to serious human rights violations when
they are returned to their country of origin are entitled to asylum where they are able to demonstrate
that they have been persecuted on a number of grounds consisting of: race, nationality, political
opinion, fundamental religious conviction, or membership of a particular social group, without
having access to protection against persecution or an alternative form of refuge in the country of
origin.1041 Examples of acts which may be regarded as persecution under domestic German law
include:
[The] use of physical or psychological violence, including sexual coercion; legal,
administrative, police and/or judicial measures which as such are discriminatory, or
are applied in a discriminatory manner; disproportionate or discriminatory
prosecution or punishment; refusal to provide judicial legal protection, leading to
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disproportionate or discriminatory punishment [and] acts linked to sexuality or which
target children.1042
Under German law, only persecution from the State is considered for asylum applications.1043 In
cases where the persecution was carried out by a non-State actor, Germany will only - in
exceptional circumstances - consider granting asylum when the non-State persecution is
attributable to the State.1044
If the determination of refugee status is negative, then claimants may enter the appeal procedure
and submit their appeal to a regular administrative court (Verwaltungsgericht).1045 Appeals that
take place have ‘suspensive effect’ or ‘suspensive recourse’, meaning that for the duration of the
appeal procedure, applicants are entitled to stay on German territory until the outcome of their
appeal decision is made known.1046 However, in cases where it has been deemed that the asylum
application is rejected as ‘manifestly unfounded’ or ‘inadmissible’, applicants will have one week
to seek leave from the court to restore the suspensive effect so that they may remain on German
territory for a determined period of time.1047
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There are certain procedural guarantees for those exercising their right to suspensive recourse in
Germany.1048 For example, the asylum claimant seeking to exercise his or her suspensive recourse
must be given the benefit of the doubt and this must be balanced against the public interest to
deport the applicant.1049 The factors upon which to assess whether the applicant’s interest in
remaining in the present Member State pending a decision on appeal are whether there is a lack of
knowledge about the actual living conditions of refugees in the third country to which the applicant
is being sent, and whether there are any negative public reports regarding such living conditions
in the country of destination.1050 In the case where there is such a lack of knowledge of the living
conditions and the presence of negative public reports regarding those living conditions, the
applicant’s right to remain in the Member State where the asylum is sought will prevail.1051
The flowchart below depicts the process of claiming asylum in Germany from registration to
appeal:1052
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Figure 6.1 Germany Asylum Procedures
The next subsection discusses the current practice of non-refoulement in Germany. It demonstrates
that Germany’s interpretation and application of non-refoulement reveals and reinforces the EU’s
containment policies.
6.3

Non-Refoulement in Germany

As one of the more powerful and well-resourced Member States in the EU, and as a significant
refugee-receiving country, Germany’s interpretation and application of the fundamental principle
of non-refoulement sets a pattern for other EU Member States. The purpose of this section is to
describe how Germany has interpreted the non-refoulement obligation.
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Under German law, the principle of non-refoulement is formulated as the prohibition against
torture, which is also found under Article 3 of the ECHR.1053 Article 3 of the ECHR is implemented
in German law in Section 53 of the Act Concerning the Entry and Residence of Aliens in the
Territory of the Federal Republic (Aliens Act).1054 Section 53(1) of the Aliens Act prohibits return
to torture, which is a direct implementation of Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture.1055
Section 53(2) prohibits expulsion to a State where the alien is sought for a crime in which the death
penalty applies, while Section 53(4) forbids expulsion if it would be contrary to the ECHR.1056
Obligations within the ECHR have been interpreted by various levels of court within Germany,
including local administrative courts, the BverWG, the Federal Court of Justice, and the BverG.1057
The EU laws on non-refoulement are implemented in Germany through several domestic laws.
The principle of non-refoulement is codified in Section 51 of the 1990 Aliens Act (now Section
53(6)) which ‘forbids deportation to states where asylum-seekers’ lives or freedom would be
threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
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to that State until a decision has been made on the extradition. (4) An alien may not be expelled if the expulsion is
inadmissible under the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, of 4 November
1950 (BGBl. 1952 II, p. 686).
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particular social group’.1058 However, the provision has been critiqued by scholars as ‘lesser
asylum’, wherein the letter of the law protects asylum claimants from refoulement, but does not
provide corresponding protection to asylum claimants with refugee status. Non-refoulement
obligations found under the CEAS’ key instruments therefore bind Germany and the relevant
provisions which protect asylum claimants from torture and cruel treatment also apply to
Germany.1059
It should be noted, however, that Germany has a ‘margin of discretion’ in its interpretation of the
EU laws on non-refoulement.1060 The CJEU has recognized this discretion in the case of Germany
v. Leifer, where it held that ‘Member States have discretion in invoking the security exception to
Community legislation which generally bars the introduction of unilateral sanctions on third
states’.1061 This means that, where there is a threat to public security, national authorities enjoy a
‘scope of discretion’ adjudicating matters of EU law.1062 Other CJEU cases involving Germany
have also recognized the ‘margin of discretion’ doctrine, as well as its limitations, including with
respect to non-refoulement.1063 In the Case No. 21 K 3263/07.A, the Administrative Court of
Düsseldorf, North Rhine-Westphalia, the court rejected the deportation of an asylum claimant back
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to Jordan because of the risk of refoulement in that country.1064 Although Germany sought and
received diplomatic assurances from Jordan, the court held in the case that the assurances were
inadequate to prevent refoulement.1065 In another case regarding diplomatic assurances, the
Administrative Court in Düsseldorf held that an asylum claimant cannot be refouled back to
Tunisia because of the risks of torture and other ill-treatment upon return.1066 The court held that
the diplomatic assurances guaranteed by Tunisia were ‘not legally binding […] and by nature
hardly trustworthy or verifiable’.1067 Again, the courts recognized that Germany’s discretion does
not extend to receiving assurances from third States that are not reliable interlocutors in terms of
non-refoulement. Similarly, German national courts such as the Administrative Court of Hannover
in Case No. 1 B 5946/15 held that, for cases involving humanitarian considerations, there may be
no room for discretion by the BAMF.1068 As in the previous cases of diplomatic assurances, where
the court has held that returning the claimant would be too risky and could potentially expose him
or her to risks of refoulement, the court in Case No. 1 B 5946/15 took a cautious approach towards
interpreting humanitarian cases. Humanitarian cases include cases where the individual is being
contemplated for protection other than refugee status but on humanitarian and compassionate
grounds. This could include, for instance, situations where the claimant may be at risk of facing
serious harm below the threshold of non-refoulement but nonetheless requiring protection.1069 This
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is despite the BAMF’s enjoyment of discretionary powers when applying Article 17(1) of the
Dublin III Regulation.1070 Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation provides that a Member State
of the EU may elect to examine the application of the claimant without being deemed, under the
Dublin rules, to be the responsible Member State.1071 This provision is known as the ‘sovereignty
clause’.1072 The potential for risks of refoulement can occur over the use of the ‘sovereignty clause’
due to the discretion granted to Member States to elect themselves as the responsible Member
State. German courts have taken a broadly protective approach in such cases.
Germany’s domestic law, therefore, reflects the broad nature of the principle of non-refoulement
as expressed in European law. German law indicates it applies at all times to all people under a
country’s control, as is the case under international and ECHR human rights law.1073 It also
specifically protects asylum claimants as a group under the Aliens Act.1074 The prohibition against
refoulement in the Aliens Act is enumerated under Section 53 on the ‘grounds for refusing to
expel’.1075 More specifically, refoulement is prohibited unless the asylum claimant is ‘threatened
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with criminal prosecution and punishment in another State’, which ‘will not constitute a bar to
expulsion’.1076
This fulsome approach within the letter of the law is not, however, always reflected in the
interpretation of the principle by German courts, which have a mixed record in this respect. This
is the case in two main ways: first, with respect to the question of the future-looking nature of the
threat to life and well-being, and second, with respect to the question of undertaking Dublin
transfers.
As was discussed in Chapter 2, non-refoulement is understood as future-oriented in terms of the
assessment made of the risk to harm. For instance, non-refoulement forbids the return of asylum
claimants to territories where they may face a future risk of torture, ill-treatment or mass violations
of human rights.1077 That said, Germany courts have narrowed the application of the futureoriented approach. In Case No. 10 C 27.07, which concerns the interpretation of Article 28(2) of
the Asylum Procedure Act regarding post-flight decisions which the claimant has deliberately
made after fleeing persecution, the BverWG held that the prohibition against refoulement ‘does
not confer any particular status on a foreigner threatened with political persecution elsewhere, but
merely guarantees protection against deportment for the duration of the threat’ (emphasis
added).1078 This interpretation of non-refoulement by the BverWG is a narrow one because it places
a time limit on protecting the claimant from deportation towards a threat, whether perceived or
real. This is contrary to international law, which considers the application of non-refoulement
protection to be a future-oriented one, including protection from future threats that need not have
actually occurred.1079
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On the other hand, the idea that non-refoulement protection must be guaranteed after the granting
of international protection was affirmed in Case No. A 11 S 2151/16 of the Administrative Court
of Justice Baden-Württemberg.1080 In that case, the Administrative Court of Justice held, regarding
the transfer of a beneficiary of international protection to the responsible Member State, that
effective and humane refugee protection must be guaranteed not only during the period of applying
for international protection but also after such period.1081 This interpretation of non-refoulement
protection is in line with relevant international refugee law.1082
Another example of the mixed record of German courts on non-refoulement can be seen in cases
addressing Dublin transfers. This is evident in a case involving an unaccompanied minor who
applied for asylum in Belgium and then travelled to Germany to do the same. Germany deported
the minor back to Belgium as the responsible State under the Dublin transfer system. The minor
appealed in the case of Case No. 1 C 4.15. The BVerWG held that Germany was the Member State
responsible for the processing of the asylum application and not Belgium.1083 This is based on
three reasons. First, Germany cannot evade its responsibilities for the processing of the asylum
application through the use of the ‘safe’ third country concept by requesting that Belgium ‘take
back’ the applicant for processing.1084 Second, Germany is the responsible Member State for the
she would be in danger of being tortured’ in Weissbrodt and Hörtreiter supra note 449 at 14; The duty of States to
evaluate future-oriented risk includes ‘not whether a given event happened but the extent of future risk. This depends
upon an evaluation of the evidence of the appellant’s conduct against a broad range of facts which they may interact’,
see: Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153, [2001] UKHL 47 at para 56.
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processing of asylum applications in this case because Germany is the last country of presence of
the minor applicant where he filed his asylum application.1085 Third, although Belgium is the
Member State where the minor applicant had first filed his asylum application, Belgium cannot be
the responsible Member State to process his claim because the minor applicant falls under special
considerations pursuant to Article 6(2) of the (then) Dublin II Regulation.1086 In the event that there
are competing asylum applications being made by the individual who falls under special
considerations, for unaccompanied minors, the responsible Member State is not the Member State
of first application, but rather, the Member State where the minor was last present where the
application was filed.1087 In sum, the court indicated that a Member State cannot evade its
responsibility for processing asylum applications and shift that responsibility to another Member
State because special considerations must be in place for vulnerable persons such as
unaccompanied minors. This is particularly the case when considerations given to unaccompanied
minors would involve the ‘best interests of the child’ test, which precludes returns to situations
where the child is not able to access ‘suitable care, housing, education, language support and health
care’.1088
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A second case echoes the concerns raised by the applicant in the first case. In Case No. 1 C 4.16,
the BverWG held that the Dublin III Regulation governs the responsibility for the processing of
asylum applications lodged in an EU Member State, and Member States may only refuse an
application as inadmissible on the grounds listed in German domestic law: Section 29(1)(5) of the
Asylum Act. Section 29(1)(5) of the Asylum Act states:
An application for asylum shall be inadmissible if […] in the case of follow-up
applications pursuant to Section 71 or secondary applications pursuant to Section
71a, another asylum application is not to be conducted.1089
The BverWG held in the case that, pursuant to Section 71a(1) of the Asylum Act, where an
applicant of international protection for refugee status applied unsuccessfully in a ‘safe’ third
country before applying for asylum in Germany, Germany is deemed not responsible (through its
domestic law) for the processing of that individual’s application.1090 Under domestic German law,
Germany will not be responsible for a further asylum procedure involving examination of
admissibility and a subsequent procedure of substantive examination of the merits of the
application unless Germany is deemed the responsible Member State to process the asylum
application pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation.1091 In this case, the applicant was an Afghan
national who entered German territory in 2012 and applied for asylum.1092 Upon his arrival, his
fingerprint showed up as a ‘positive hit’ in the Eurodac system, indicating that he traveled through
Hungary before arriving to claim asylum in Germany.1093 Germany determined that he should have
applied for asylum in Hungary but did not and requested Hungary to ‘take charge’ of the

paragraph 84). Similarly, return would not be in the child’s best interests if adequate care arrangements are not
available upon return’.
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applicant.1094 Hungary consented to ‘take back’ the applicant. In this case, the claimant was
concerned that he would be exposed to a real risk of refoulement if returned to Hungary because
of the deficient asylum system there.1095 However, the transfer was still deemed acceptable.
Two recent cases heard by the BverG also illustrate the mixed record of German courts with respect
to Dublin transfers and non-refoulement. In a case involving the transfer of a female asylum
claimant from Somalia and her infant, the BverG stopped the Dublin transfer of the claimants to
Italy.1096 Even though Italy had provided a blanket assurance in January 2019 that asylum seekers
returned to Italy would be provided with due process and adequate living conditions, the court
found that this was not enough in cases of very vulnerable claimants.1097 The BverG had evidence
indicating that the mother and baby would likely be rendered homeless for a period of time on
arrival in Italy, and without access to health care for the baby.1098 This creates peril for the baby in
particular and amounts to a prospective violation of the baby’s fundamental rights and therefore
the transfer must be halted.1099 The second case involved an asylum seeker from Afghanistan
ordered to be sent by Dublin transfer back to Greece. He had registered as an asylum seeker in
Greece before travelling on to Germany and making another asylum claim.1100 The BverG ruled
that the transfer must be paused because of the risk of inhuman and degrading treatment in
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Greece.1101 The lower court decisions denying both requests to freeze the Dublin transfers can be
contrasted with Germany’s highest court’s recognition of the dangers inherent in these transfers.
A legal loophole exists in the Dublin III Regulation which could permit Member States to evade
their responsibility for processing asylum applications during the use of Dublin transfers.1102 The
legal loophole works by requiring that only one Member State be the responsible Member State to
process asylum applications, granting Member States the option of requesting a ‘take charge’ or
‘take back’ of an applicant, and not requiring a substantive review of an asylum application before
making the decision to send that individual back to a third country he or she passed through which
is deemed ‘safe’. It raises three concerns.
First, the Dublin III Regulation requires that only one EU Member State is responsible for the
processing of asylum applications.1103 This Member State is, pursuant to the regular Dublin
procedure (where not falling under the special considerations criteria), the Member State where
the applicant first lodges his or her asylum application.1104 This may make sense in terms of the
situation of some applications, but for other applicants this may create difficulties and dangers.
Second, under the Dublin procedures, Member States have the option of requesting a ‘take charge’
or ‘take back’ of an applicant where they deem another Member State to be responsible for
processing the asylum application.1105 The rules for ‘take charge’ apply when the requirements of
Articles 16(1)(c), (d), or (e) of the (then) Dublin II Regulation are not met, for example when a
person has stayed in another Member State before entering the Member State in which he first
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applied for asylum.1106 In contrast, the rules for ‘take back’ apply if one of the conditions under
Article 16(1)(c), (d), or (e) of the (then) Dublin II Regulation is met, such as when the asylum
applicant has already applied for asylum in another Member State.1107 Although the CJEU has held
that the mere request of a ‘take charge’ or ‘take back’ request of a Member State is not a transfer
of responsibility, in practice, as seen through Cases No. 1 C 4.15 and 1 C 4.16 above, the Member
State that made such a request (including Germany) often presumes that responsibility has been
transferred and deportations of that applicant will follow.1108
German case law consistently holds that an applicant subjected to a Dublin transfer must have, and
be seen to have, a right to a personal interview.1109 This interview must take into account the
subjective circumstances of the applicant and the authorities must conclude that there are no
obstacles to the transfer decision.1110 However, in reality, there is no consistent practice for
interviews in Dublin procedures in Germany.1111 Compounding this is the fact that, in Germany,
the Dublin procedures are part of admissibility assessment - meaning that, once another Member

1106

Dublin II Regulation supra note 1084 at art 16(1)(c), (d) and (e); BverWG, 1 C 26.14, 17 September 2015 at para

32; For more cases on ‘take back’ and ‘take charge’ requests in Germany, see: BverG, 1 C 22.15, 27 April 2016;
Higher Administrative Court of Saxony, C 5 B 259/15.A, 5 October 2015; BverWG, 1 C 32.14, 1 C 33.14, 1 C 34.14,
27 October 2015; BverWG, 1C 24.15, 27 April 2016: ‘Where a Member State responsible for carrying out the asylum
procedure pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation, an applicant may invoke that Member State’s responsibility for
processing his or her asylum application if it has not been positively established that another Member State is willing
to take charge of him or her. In this case, the object and purpose of the Dublin System would require that the individual
applicant is entitled to have his/her asylum application reviewed by the responsible Member State’.
1107

Ibid.

1108

MA et al supra note 1084.

1109

Administrative Court of Düsseldorf, C 12L 4591/17.A, 26 October 2017; BverG, C 2 BvR 1795/14, 17 September

2014; Administrative Court of Wiesbaden, C 6L 4438/17.WI, 15 September 2017; Administrative Court of Minden,
C 10L 314/16.A, 29 March 2016; BverG, 1 C 26.14, 17 September 2015; BverWG, C 2 BvR 746/15, 30 April 2015;
Administrative Court of Freiburg, C A 1K 3128/14, 14 January 2015.
1110

Ibid; Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 5.

1111

AIDA Country Report Germany supra note 1015 at 31-32.

245

State is deemed responsible for the processing of the claimant’s application, the application in
Germany will immediately be deemed ‘inadmissible’, and the claimant transferred to the
responsible Member State without the chance of a substantive interview.1112 This deportation will
take place ‘as soon as it has been ascertained that the deportation can be carried out’.1113
Third, where the asylum applicant has passed through a ‘safe’ third country, the Asylum
Procedures Directive permits the Member State to send the applicant back to that country deemed
‘safe’ without requiring that the sending Member State undertake an examination of admissibility
or substantive examination.1114 Indeed, this is exactly how the German asylum process is
structured. This creates the possibility that the applicant may be sent back to a country that is
deemed ‘safe’ pursuant to the domestic law of the Member State, but that country may in fact be
unsafe based on the individual circumstances of the applicant.1115
The principle of non-refoulement is at risk of being violated in instances such as these - when
responsibility for the processing of the asylum application is shifted elsewhere - where a proper
examination of either the admissibility or the substance of the asylum application does not take
place, before a decision to send the claimant back is made.
Having indicated the law and judicial practice with respect to non-refoulement in Germany, the
next section argues that Germany’s interpretation and application of its non-refoulement
obligations in conjunction with the threshold on the presumption of mutual trust during Dublin
transfers is problematic and demonstrates that the EU’s containment policies are at work in
Germany.
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6.4

Containment in Germany as Illustrated by the Presumption of Mutual Trust

The presumption of mutual trust is the key to permitting Dublin transfers between Member States
as it is the basis upon which Member States may transfer claimants from one Member State to the
Member State deemed responsible for processing the asylum application. The presumption of
mutual trust is an assumption that all Member States of the EU are compliant with relevant
international and European law and this is the basis upon which claimants may be transferred from
one Member State to another Member State without the substance of their claims examined.1116
This section therefore details Germany’s interpretation of the presumption of mutual trust during
Dublin transfers. It begins by comparing the interpretation by domestic German courts of the
presumption of mutual trust against the CJEU and the ECtHR’s interpretations. It then connects
the presumption of mutual trust as interpreted by German courts with the principle of nonrefoulement. Next, it discusses some examples of containment policies at work within the German
domestic asylum system and ends by drawing conclusions on Germany’s interpretations of the
principle of non-refoulement in domestic law.
The Administrative Court of Oldenburg, 12th Chamber, discussed the presumption of mutual trust
in Case No. 12 A 2672/15.1117 The case concerned an Iraqi national who appealed the decision of
the BAMF to transfer him from Germany to Hungary through the Dublin transfer procedures.1118
The Administrative Court of Oldenburg found that the transfer of the applicant from Germany to
Hungary is contrary to Article 4 of the EU Charter as a result of there being a real risk of exposing
the applicant to treatment substantially likely to be inhuman or degrading.1119 The applicant’s
exposure to ill-treatment is also a result of ‘systemic flaws’ in the Hungarian asylum system and
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reception conditions.1120 Most notably, the Administrative Court of Oldenburg cited the ECtHR’s
decision in M.S.S., where the ECtHR held that:
The Court considers treatment to be “inhuman” when it was “premeditated, was
applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense
physical or mental suffering”. Treatment is considered to be “degrading” when it
humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing,
his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable
of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance.1121
The Administrative Court of Oldenburg referred to the ECtHR’s decision in M.S.S., and in
particular, the definitions of ‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading’ to find that the applicant would be at risk
of inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 4 of the EU Charter.1122 In its decision, the
Administrative Court of Oldenburg also referred to the CJEU’s decision in Puid and N.S., where
the CJEU held:
Member States may not transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State which the
criteria set out in Chapter III of the Regulation indicate is responsible, where they
cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the
conditions for the reception of asylum seekers in that Member State provide
substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of
being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (emphasis added).1123
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In addition to the relevant paragraphs cited in M.S.S. and Puid above, the Administrative Court of
Oldenburg held that ‘systemic flaws’:
can be rooted in the national asylum system itself which affects asylum seekers in
a manner that is neither accidental nor isolated and is objectively predictable or may
arise due to an implementation of the system which in practice renders partially or
wholly inoperable.1124
It has also been held by the Administrative Court of Minden that ‘systemic flaws’ are:
structural, significant malfunctions that may be rooted in any stage of the asylum
procedure. According to the court, the personal experiences of the Applicant are
irrelevant to assessing systemic flaws, however, they must be taken into account in
the context of the overall assessment (emphasis added).1125
The Administrative Court of Minden’s interpretation of ‘systemic flaws’ seems to contradict the
ECtHR’s ‘individual assessment’ criterion. The Administrative Court of Magdeburg, Chamber,
regarded ‘systemic deficiencies’ to require that:
the asylum procedure or the terms of reception conditions in the member state
concerned are regularly so deficient that it may be presumed that there is a
considerable likelihood that the person seeking asylum is at risk of suffering from
inhuman or degrading treatment.1126
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The Administrative Court of Magdeburg deviated from the well-cited threshold established by the
Committee Against Torture in deciding whether the claimant would be at risk of being subjected
to torture as defined in Article 1 of the CAT, by using the threshold of ‘considerable likelihood’,
rather than ‘substantial grounds for believing’.1127 While there may not be a universal
understanding or definition of ‘considerable likelihood’, the Committee Against Torture has
proposed a number of non-exhaustive questions as relevant for determining what constitutes
‘substantial grounds for believing’.1128 This is important because the threshold for the asylum
claimant to establish ‘substantial grounds for believing’ is essential for determining whether the
claimant is at risk of being exposed to torture upon return.
The presumption of mutual trust is connected with responsibility-sharing in the CEAS. The
presumption is the basis upon which Dublin transfers are premised: responsibility-sharing in the
EU is based on the reciprocal concept that, in order to share responsibility, there must be mutual
trust among the Member States.1129 In fact, the entire Dublin System is based on the presumption
that all Member States in the EU are safe countries which ‘[respect] the principle of nonrefoulement [and] are considered safe countries for third country nationals’.1130

1127

CAT Committee, “General Comment No. 1: Communications concerning the return of a person to a State where

there may be grounds he would be subjected to torture (article 3 in the context of article 22)”, UN Doc A/53/44, annex
IX at 52 (1998) at para 1.
1128

Ibid at para 8: ‘(a) Is the State concerned one in which there is evidence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant

or mass violations of human rights (see article 3, pare. 2)? (b) Has the author been tortured or maltreated by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity in
the past? If so, was this the recent past? (c) Is there medical or other independent evidence to support a claim by the
author that he/she has been tortured or maltreated in the past? Has the torture had aftereffects? (d) Has the situation
referred to in (a) above changed? Has the internal situation in respect of human rights altered? (e) Has the author
engaged in political or other activity within or outside the State concerned which would appear to make him/her
particularly vulnerable to the risk of being placed in danger of torture were he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited
to the State in question? (f) Is there any evidence as to the credibility of the author? (g) Are there factual inconsistencies
in the claim of the author? If so, are they relevant?’.
1129

Battjes supra note 842 at 2.2.

1130

Ibid.

250

Responsibility-sharing in the context of Germany’s non-refoulement obligations also entails
following one of the core aims of the Dublin System, which is to ‘set up clear, workable and fair
criteria for responsibility so as to guarantee that the persons concerned have rapid and effective
access to a substantive review’.1131 The intent and purpose of the Dublin System also call for ‘a
general effect protecting the individual’ and to prevent ‘the situation of [a] ‘refugee in orbit’’.1132
Other cases in German domestic jurisprudence also demonstrate the tensions between the CJEU
and ECtHR’s tests on assessing whether an applicant may be able to rebut a decision to have him
or her transferred to the Member State responsible for processing the asylum application.1133 These
series of cases illustrate that Germany follows the CJEU approach in determining whether an
applicant’s transfer decision should be rebutted. For example, the German domestic case law
suggests that there is a pattern for determining whether a Dublin transfer of the applicant may be
permissible is whether there are ‘systemic deficiencies’ or ‘systemic flaws’ in the asylum
procedure and reception conditions, which would put the applicant at a serious risk of suffering
inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the EU Charter and Article 3
of the ECHR.1134 The standard upon which to evaluate whether a Dublin transfer would result in
‘systemic flaws’ is based on a standard of ‘substantive grounds for believing’ whether the transfer
would result in a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 4 of the EU Charter or Article 3 of the
ECHR.1135 The assessment involves asking whether the ‘systemic flaws’ within the asylum system
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of the Member State in question would pose a real risk of infringement of Article 4 of the EU
Charter.1136
By analogy, the Committee Against Torture jurisprudence also sheds light on the tensions between
‘systemic deficiencies’ and ‘individual assessments’ tests when deciding on Article 3 of the CAT.
Recall from the Committee Against Torture jurisprudence that the risk of ill-treatment or
prohibition against torture is a personal one, meaning that the test for determining whether an
individual would be at risk of being subjected to torture is an assessment about whether the
complainant would be ‘personally at risk’.1137 This means that, for the complainant to defend the
allegation against the State that he or she would be subjected to torture if returned, the threshold
is on ‘a foreseeable, real and personal risk’ standard.1138 At the same time, where ‘a consistent
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights’ exists in the destination country, such
a pattern is indicative of the possibility or even probability of torture.1139 However, it has also been
held by the Committee Against Torture that even the existence of such a pattern of gross, flagrant
or mass violations of human rights may not, in the specific case of the complainant, amount to
torture for that particular complainant.1140 Therefore, taking into account the Committee Against
Torture’s assessment of the application of Article 3 of the CAT by States Parties, the Committee
seems to side in favour of an ‘individual assessments’ test rather than a ‘systemic deficiencies’
test. In other words, when assessing whether Article 3 of the CAT is engaged, whether the risk of
torture is particularized for the individual is of more concern to the Committee than whether the
risk of torture is a systemic one in the destination country.
This section discussed Germany’s approach when interpreting the threshold to rebut the
presumption of mutual trust to prevent a Dublin transfer. It also demonstrated that the presumption
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of mutual trust is linked with responsibility-sharing within the CEAS, as the Dublin System is
premised upon mutual trust among Member States in the allocation of responsibility for processing
asylum applications. However, the tensions between the CJEU and the ECtHR’s interpretations of
the threshold to rebut the presumption of mutual trust are not resolved by Germany’s domestic
jurisprudence. Unlike the UK, Germany does not have a new approach to interpreting the threshold
to rebut the presumption; instead, Germany seems to agree with the CJEU’s test of ‘systemic
deficiencies’. Lastly, the Committee Against Torture’s observations were also drawn upon to
compare and contrast the international standard with the CJEU and Germany’s domestic approach
to the threshold to rebut the presumption of mutual trust. In sum, German jurisprudence is mixed
on non-refoulement protections. The fact that there is no clear baseline protection in practice in all
circumstances - including, and perhaps especially, with respect to Dublin transfers - is concerning.
6.5

Concluding Remarks

As demonstrated in this chapter, Germany’s non-refoulement obligations entail an understanding
of Germany’s asylum system as it is situated in the CEAS. Regular administrative courts of
Germany, through their cases, have interpreted and applied EU law and ECHR law relevant to
assessing the scope of non-refoulement.1141 Case law of Germany’s administrative courts have
shown the tendency to sometimes interpret non-refoulement obligations narrowly, including
deciding that non-refoulement obligations would apply only during the ‘duration of a threat’.1142
Based on all of the positive case law that is covered above, a pattern emerges indicating that many
German courts adopt a broad interpretation of non-refoulement. The mixed nature of the cases with
negative decisions at the administrative and lower court levels did not adopt as wide a view of
non-refoulement as do other courts. Intrinsically linked to this evaluation of non-refoulement
obligations is the presumption of mutual trust and Germany’s interpretation of this presumption.
Unlike the UK courts, the administrative courts of Germany consistently agree with the CJEU’s
approach of ‘systemic deficiencies’ in assessing whether the presumption of mutual trust is
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rebuttable.1143 Responsibility-sharing in Germany, therefore, reveals a narrower interpretation of
non-refoulement obligations as well as a discrepancy with UK and ECHR jurisprudence in the
interpretation of the threshold for rebutting the presumption of mutual trust.1144
The first part of this chapter examined German refugee law, including its relation to international
and European law. The Basic Law is the supreme law of the land in Germany and provides for the
‘primacy of international law’, which integrates international law as an integral part of federal
German law. The Asylum Act is the main legislation that codified the ‘right of asylum’ for
foreigners. It provides for the definition of a ‘refugee’, the ‘safe’ third country concept, and the
possible outcomes in a refugee status determination procedure. The BAMF is responsible for
making decisions on asylum applications. These decisions may be appealed to the regular
administrative courts and the BverWG or the BverG depending on whether the question is an
administrative or constitutional one.
The second part of this chapter examined the procedures for claiming asylum in Germany. First,
it explained the procedures for applicants to qualify for international protection. Next, it discussed
the procedures for applicants to be granted or have their international protection withdrawn.
Finally, it ended with outlining the reception conditions for applicants of international protection.
The third part of this chapter examined Germany’s non-refoulement obligations. It was
demonstrated through case law that many German courts’ interpretation of its non-refoulement
obligations is twofold. First, these courts seem to have a more liberal reading of non-refoulement
law than UK; Second, the case law on the interpretation of the principle suggests that the mixed
jurisprudence requires fine-tuning for a more streamlined, consistent approach to interpreting the
norm.
The final part of this chapter reviewed evidence of containment theory at work in Germany. It
detailed Germany’s interpretation of the presumption of mutual trust in Dublin transfers. It ended
with examples of containment policies in the German domestic asylum system and explained how
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a legal loophole within the Dublin III Regulation permits Member States such as Germany to evade
their responsibility to process asylum applications and shift that responsibility elsewhere, which
further reinforced the idea that the CEAS is premised upon the EU’s containment policies.
This chapter provides important context for the final chapter of this thesis, which compares the
national cases between the UK and Germany as well as provides an analysis on the future direction
of non-refoulement within the EU. That chapter proposes adopting a new framework that would
enhance interpretations of non-refoulement protection and ends with an analysis of the
implications of this finding, including predictions for the future direction of non-refoulement in
the international refugee law regime.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion: Protecting Non-Refoulement
7. Introduction
This thesis has focused on what has been described as the ‘paradox’ at the heart of refugee law
and policy: the disjuncture between the commitments made by EU Member States to a robust
understanding of asylum rights, including non-refoulement, and the actual implementation of these
commitments as narrowed and constrained through containment efforts.1145 This thesis has
intentionally taken a wide lens - from the international to the domestic, from legal
conceptualization to actual practice - in examining the norm of non-refoulement. Each chapter
provided elucidation on an aspect of the understanding of non-refoulement.
Chapter Two explained the origins and sources of international refugee law, including a brief
history of the treaty negotiations which took place in the drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention,
resulting in the present-day Article 33(1) on non-refoulement protection. It explained the
subsequent dual life of the non-refoulement norm, existing simultaneously in international refugee
law and international human rights law. In refugee law, non-refoulement protection benefits both
asylum claimants and refugees, while in human rights law, its scope is widened to include
protection from torture for everyone. Under refugee law, the principle of non-refoulement is not
guaranteed to everyone without limits. For instance, those who have been deemed to be a danger
to the community of the country of refuge do not benefit from non-refoulement protection.
However, this exception does not exist in international human rights law as the prohibition against
torture protects everyone regardless of their legal or political status. Within both international
refugee and human rights law, the principle applies both territorially as well as outside of the
territories of a State, including over persons or areas where the State can exercise its ‘effective
authority and control’.
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Under EU law, the principle of non-refoulement is found under the EU Charter, the Dublin III
Regulation, as well as key directives, and largely reflects international refugee law’s approach.
However, with the application of ECHR law, the principle is codified under Article 3 as the
prohibition against torture. This means that the law on non-refoulement within Europe is quite
robust, reflecting the simultaneous application of both international refugee law and international
human rights law approaches. That said, the actual practice with respect to this norm has been the
opposite: constrained and contained. This is explored further in Chapters Three and Four.
Chapter Three explained the EU law applicable to the principle of non-refoulement, including its
multi-layered aspects. It also examined how two European courts - the ECtHR and the CJEU have interpreted and applied the prohibition against refoulement. The legislative and
jurisprudential picture that emerged confirmed what had been indicated in Chapter Two: that nonrefoulement is a relatively robust norm under European law. However, this chapter also indicated
that the actual practice of some EU Member States has been to adopt a narrower understanding of
non-refoulement, one that is limited through domestic interpretation as a result of the ‘margin of
discretion’ allowed to Member States when transposing directives, and limited through the
presumption of mutual trust when transferring asylum claimants to other (‘responsible’) States.
Chapter Four described the theory of containment, derived from the fields of human and spatial
geography and migration studies. Containment through migration control seeks to control, divide,
and discipline ‘unruly’ migration (as perceived by states) – that is, migration in which migrants
try to manage where they seek asylum. Techniques to identify and select migrants by categorizing,
partitioning, and channeling them serve as methods to dominate and constrain the ‘disobedience’
of migrants. While rarely applied within public international law and specifically international
refugee law, the theory of containment holds particular significance as an explanatory theory for
these fields. The theory suggests that policies of containment are methods used by EU Member
States to circumvent their international refugee law and human rights law obligations. It also
provides the underlying rationale for violations of non-refoulement by EU Member States. In other
words, containment theory provides a rationale for the gaps between the fulsome statements of
non-refoulement law in, for example, treaties and the actual interpretation and application of that
law through policies within the EU. These gaps were illustrated through explanations of Dublin
transfers, ‘safe’ third country agreements, the interception of asylum seekers prior to reaching
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Europe, migrant tracking, narrow interpretations of the Refugee Convention, and deterrence
policies. The chapter concluded that, while containment may be facilitated by law, containment
occurs not because of the law itself, but because of the policies and practices around the application
of that law.
Chapter Five on the United Kingdom examined the domestic law and procedures for claiming
asylum in the UK, including how applicants for international protection for refugee status qualify
for international protection, how their international protection is granted or withdrawn, and the
points in the system during which the possibilities of refoulement are considered. It also explored
how the principle of non-refoulement has been interpreted in the UK in a narrow, restrictive
manner, particularly with respect to the presumption of mutual trust and the burden placed on the
claimant to rebut that presumption.
Chapter Six on Germany examined domestic German refugee law, including on non-refoulement,
and the procedures for claiming asylum in Germany. German legislation appears to have a more
liberal reading of non-refoulement than the UK, but the mixed jurisprudence suggests that the
application of non-refoulement requires fine-tuning for a more streamlined, consistent approach to
interpreting the norm. The final part of this chapter reviewed evidence of containment theory at
work in Germany, including Germany’s interpretation of the presumption of mutual trust in Dublin
transfers.
The purpose of this chapter is to reiterate the centrality of non-refoulement as a cardinal principle
of refugee protection, and to analyze changes that should be made within the CEAS to better
conform to that principle. In other words, this chapter aims to reduce the disjuncture between the
law of non-refoulement and the practice of that law. This discussion begins with a focus on the
domestic level, comparing the UK and Germany’s practices on non-refoulement, particularly ‘safe’
third country concepts and Dublin transfers. It then considers recommended changes at the
regional level that would help to align the expansive norm on non-refoulement with the actual
application of the principle at the domestic and regional levels.
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7.1 Situating Non-Refoulement within the Domestic: Comparing UK and German
Practices
In order to consider improvements to the system that would better protect against refoulement, this
section compares and contrasts the practices of the UK and Germany on the ‘safe’ third country
concept and Dublin transfers. These practices are the focal point of this chapter because they
evidence containment policies in both countries which have the potential to undermine nonrefoulement protection when misused - and, as shown in Chapters Five and Six, case law has
demonstrated that this has, in fact, occurred in the past. In particular, the misuse of these concepts
can occur when the substance of the claimant’s application is not examined prior to returning him
or her back to a third country deemed ‘safe’. Another way that these concepts can be misused is
when an EU Member State relies upon a blanket declaration that the responsible Member State is
in compliance with relevant international and European law obligations, or blanket assurances to
this effect, in order to return a claimant via a Dublin transfer without an individualized assessment
of whether this is correct vis-à-vis the claimant.
This section therefore begins by explaining how the UK and German practices on ‘safe’ third
country concepts are similar and different. Then, it explores and compares the UK and German
practices on Dublin transfers. This method of comparison between the UK and Germany on the
‘safe’ third country concept and Dublin transfers reveals implications for the future of nonrefoulement in the region.
Both the UK and Germany have different domestic asylum procedures for determining whether an
asylum claimant may be removed to a third country deemed ‘safe’ based on their legislation. For
the UK, in order to initiate the ‘safe’ third country procedure, first the Third Country Unit of the
UK Visas and Immigration division must certify that the asylum claimant came from a ‘safe’ third
country.1146 A ‘safe’ third country is a country which the UK has deemed to be safe and is listed

1146

401

See, for example: Esmaiel Mohammed Pour et al v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWHC
(Admin)

[Pour];

Asylum

Information

Database,

“Safe

Third

Country:

http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/united-kingdom/asylum-procedure/safe-country-concepts/safethird-country.

259

UK”,

in the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004.1147 This Act lists all EU
Member States (except Croatia), Norway, Iceland and Switzerland.1148 Additionally, other
countries can be designated as ‘safe’ on a case-by-case basis, such as Canada and the United
States.1149 Once the Secretary of State for the Home Department has certified that the asylum
claimant has come from a ‘safe’ third country and that the claimant’s application is therefore
‘clearly unfounded’,1150 the applicant may be removed to the third country deemed ‘safe’ unless,
‘on a legitimate view of the facts, a tribunal properly directing itself could conclude that there were
substantial grounds for believing that the return of [the claimant] to [the third country] would
involve a real risk of a flagrant breach of [Article 3 of the ECHR] or a flagrant breach of other
relevant rights applying [the ECtHR] jurisprudence’.1151 Where a tribunal finds that there are
substantial grounds for believing that removing the claimant to a third country deemed ‘safe’
would expose him or her to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR, such a removal is not
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which he or she is not a national, the Secretary of State for the Home Department must certify that such a claim is
‘clearly unfounded’ under paragraph 5(4) of Part 2 of Schedule 3 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of
Claimants etc.) Act 2004 c 19; In order to prove that an asylum application is ‘clearly unfounded’, the caseworker
must be satisfied that the claim cannot, on any legitimate view, succeed: United Kingdom, Home Office, “Certification
of Protection and Human Rights Claims under Section 94 of Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly
unfounded claims): Version 4.0”, 12 February 2019 at 11. Under the guidance notes issued by the Secretary of State
for the Home Department, caseworkers may consider that an asylum application is ‘manifestly unfounded’ where: the
claim is so clearly without substance that it is bound to fail, and it is possible to declare an asylum application to be
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permitted as being contrary to the ECHR.1152 In other words, the UK’s certification system acts as
a double-check that claimants will be able to properly access the asylum system in the ‘safe’ third
State.
For Germany, once an asylum claimant has applied for asylum at the border or at an international
airport and it has been established that the claimant has passed through a ‘safe’ third country on
his or her way to Germany, the claimant will be removed without any further assessment.1153 The
individual’s asylum application will not be considered and that individual will not be granted
asylum.1154 However, exceptions to this general rule may be permitted where the claimant fits
within one of three grounds: first, when the claimant has a residency permit in Germany at the
time he or she entered the ‘safe’ third country; second, when Germany is deemed to be the
responsible Member State pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation or an international treaty with the
‘safe’ third country; and third, when the claimant has not been refused entry or removed pursuant
to a Section 18(4) No. (2) order by the Federal Ministry of the Interior on humanitarian grounds,
for reasons of international law, or in the political interests of Germany.1155
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Ibid at para 9.
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Germany’s Asylum Act defines all EU Member States as well as non-EU countries such as Norway
and Switzerland as ‘safe’ third countries.1156 This blanket designation means that there is no
individualized evaluation to determine whether that individual will be safe upon return to those
countries. This raises the risk that onward refoulement may occur when the individual is returned
to one of these countries deemed ‘safe’.1157 In this respect, the UK provides a stronger safeguard
against refoulement through its certification process, which Germany lacks. Germany does have
some protections, however: German law indicates that asylum claimants cannot receive protection
from a third country when that country is either not listed as ‘safe’ third country or there is not
sufficient information to determine whether it is ‘safe’.1158 This means that Germany will not return
claimants to third countries where there is insufficient information about the third country.
Both the UK and Germany incorporate ‘safe’ third country lists into their domestic legislation.
These ‘safe’ third country lists are lists of countries which are deemed to be ‘safe’ under the
domestic law of both the UK and Germany and, as such, are destinations predetermined to be ‘safe’
to which claimants may be sent to on arrival in the UK or Germany. For the UK, the determination
of whether a third country is deemed to be ‘safe’ is based on a determination of whether that
countries’ domestic asylum procedures comply with the UK’s criteria under Rule 345C of the
Immigration Rules.1159 The text of Rule 345C states:
A country is a safe third country for a particular applicant if: (i) the applicant’s life
and liberty will not be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion in that country; (ii) the
principle of non-refoulement will be respected in that country in accordance with the
Refugee Convention; (iii) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to
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freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in
international law, is respected in that country; (iv) the possibility exists to request
refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with
the Refugee Convention in that country; (v) there is a sufficient degree of connection
between the person seeking asylum and that country on the basis of which it would
be reasonable for them to go there; and (vi) the applicant will be admitted to that
country.1160
Criterion (v) on ‘sufficient degree of connection’ is further defined under the Immigration
Rules:1161 to determine whether an applicant has the requisite ‘sufficient degree of connection’
with the third country deemed ‘safe’ for removal, the Secretary of State for the Home Department
must be satisfied that he or she has spent time in the third country, has relationships with citizens
or habitually resident non-citizens of the third country, or has other close family ties or cultural or
ethnic connections with the third country.1162 The significance of the ‘sufficient degree of
connection’ rule cannot be understated, as, although not required under international law, without
such a connection, it would become unreasonable and unsustainable for a person to claim asylum
in the third country.1163 The UNHCR is of the view that having a ‘sufficient degree of connection’
with the third country increases:

1160

Ibid.

1161

Ibid at 345D: ‘In order to determine whether it is reasonable for an individual to be removed to a safe third country

in accordance with paragraph 345C(v), the Secretary of State may have regard to, but is not limited to: (i) any time
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the viability of the return or transfer from the viewpoint of both the individual and
the state. As such, it reduces the risk of irregular onward movement, prevents the
creation of ‘orbit’ situations and advances international cooperation and
responsibility-sharing.1164
The UNHCR cautions, however, that transfers to third countries should be ‘aimed at enhancing
burden- and responsibility-sharing and international/regional cooperation, and not be burden
shifting’.1165
For Germany, the determination of whether a third country is deemed ‘safe’ is based on a set of
criteria established by the BverG in a 1996 landmark decision.1166 In the decision in Case No. 2
BvR 1938/93, the BverG held that the ‘safe’ third country rule in the Basic Law and the German
domestic Asylverfahrensgesetz (Asylum Procedure Act) is compatible with the Basic Law.1167 The
BverG relied upon a newly-created concept of ‘normative establishment of certainty’ (normative
Vergewisserung), according to which whether a third country is deemed ‘safe’ is based on criteria
set by legislators.1168 This presumption of ‘safety’ in third countries does not need to be
individually rebuttable nor is it possible for claimants to challenge it.1169 This judgment is
problematic: it essentially permits the return of asylum claimants to third countries even though
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there is no opportunity to rebut the presumption of safety or to review the grounds which determine
whether a third country is ‘safe’.1170 Additionally, access to asylum procedures within Germany is
denied to these claimants.1171
The practice of the UK with respect to ‘safe’ third countries clearly reveals two key points of
divergence from the practice of Germany. First, the UK has a certification system in place that acts
as a double-check that claimants will be able to access the asylum system in the ‘safe’ third state,
and Germany does not. Second, the UK has a cumulative list that is considered when designating
countries as ‘safe’, which includes consideration of whether the claimant has a ‘sufficient degree
of connection’ with the third country. Germany’s blanket approach to designation precludes this
consideration.1172
While the UK’s certification process provides an additional safeguard that Germany does not
possess, it should be pointed out that it does not necessarily provide complete protection against
refoulement. As noted by Foster in a compelling analysis, an evaluation of whether or not a third
country is ‘safe’ must - under international refugee law - consider three factors. First, ‘the sending
state must be satisfied that the third (receiving) State has an adjudication procedure in place to
assess refugee status’ and that this procedure is ‘adequate’.1173 The UK certification procedure
considers this through application of Rule 345C(iv), set out above. Second, ‘the third (receiving)
state must guarantee access to that system for refugees in question: thus, for example, the sending
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state must ensure that refugees are not barred from the system by procedural rules or other
impediments’.1174 It is not prima facie obvious from legislation or practice that this evaluation
forms a standard part of the UK’s certification process, though UK case law has considered the
actual ability of claimants to access the third country’s asylum system.1175 Third, ‘the sending state
must be satisfied that the receiving state interprets the Refugee Convention in a manner that
respects the “true and autonomous meaning” of the definition in Article 1 of the Convention’.1176
This means that, if a person is likely to be recognized as a refugee in the UK but, due to significant
differences in interpretation, is unlikely to be recognized as such in the third state, then ‘the sending
state is prohibited from transferring the applicant to the third state’.1177 This requirement has been
recognized by UK courts as serving as part of the UK’s analysis.1178 While this analysis indicates
that the UK’s process reflects best practices, as identified by Foster, there is an area of concern
related to the UK’s method of assessment. An individualized assessment of the risk of refoulement
is required1179 - something more than an ‘initial assessment’1180 - but, as described in Chapter 5,
the UK asylum procedures preclude a truly individualized assessment because the ‘safe’ third
country determination occurs prior to the substantive interview phase. Therefore, the UK’s
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certification process is not based on a substantive understanding of the claimant’s case.1181 As the
individualized assessment does not consider enough facts, the full story has not been gathered yet
from the claimant during this stage in the procedure.
There is another concern with the UK’s practice: the lack of monitoring of an individual’s outcome
after transfer to the third state. The lack of proper post-transfer monitoring in the UK is evident in
the judgment of Ex Parte Thangarasa. In the case, Lord Bingham of Cornhill was of the opinion
that:
the Home Secretary and the courts should not readily infer that a friendly sovereign
state which is party to the Geneva Convention will not perform the obligations it
has solemnly undertaken. This consideration does not absolve the Home Secretary
from his duty to inform himself of the facts and monitor the decisions made by a
third country in order to satisfy himself that the third country will not send the
applicant to another country otherwise than in accordance with the convention
(emphasis added).1182
Furthermore, in Adan and Aitsegur, the UK Court of Appeal held that, unless the Secretary of State
for the Home Department can be satisfied that ‘the third country would apply the Refugee
Convention’s “international meaning” or “core values” then he could not return asylum seekers to
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that country as a safe country’.1183 In contrast with the UK, in order to be eligible to be considered
as a safe country on Germany’s ‘safe’ third country list, German law requires that the country be
a signatory to and have ratified the Refugee Convention and the ECHR.1184 However, it is unclear
how Germany ensures that these countries considered ‘safe’ are in fact observing their
international law obligations as required under these international instruments.1185
The practice of the UK and Germany with respect to Dublin transfers also differs. For the UK, the
procedure involves a separate consideration by the Third Country Unit, which is a unit housed
within the UK Visas and Immigration division that also considers ‘safe’ third country procedures
for claimants who have passed through a third country deemed ‘safe’ before entering the UK to
claim asylum.1186 For Germany, the Dublin procedure is part of the admissibility assessment
conducted in the regular procedure.1187
For the UK, once the Dublin transfer case has been transferred from the National Asylum
Allocation Unit to the Third Country Unit for determination, the Third Country Unit will consider
whether the Secretary of State for the Home Department should decline to examine the asylum
claim substantively before issuing a ‘safe third country’ or ‘asylum’ certificate under Schedule 3
of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.1188 In considering whether
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there are any family members present in a Dublin State, the caseworkers rely on the asylum
claimant to show that they have family connections in those Member States.1189
For Germany, the Dublin procedure is part of the admissibility assessment as part of the regular
procedure.1190 When an asylum claimant is apprehended at the border by the border police, and
where there is an indication that another Member State may be responsible for carrying out the
examination of the asylum application, the border police will inform the Federal Office for
Migration and Refugees (BAMF).1191 The Dublin procedure is then carried out by the BAMF,
which has the power to issue a deportation order as a result of the Dublin procedure.1192 The border
police is then tasked with the forcible return of the asylum claimant or have the option of requesting
a detention order from a court if it is deemed that the asylum applicant is a flight risk.1193
In comparing how Member States designate a third country as ‘safe’, under German law, the
designation of a third country as ‘safe’ is done by way of a predetermined list.1194 The claimant
may challenge the designation of the third country as ‘safe’ by taking the matter to the BverG
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through a constitutional challenge.1195 The designation itself is made through an Act of Parliament
in accordance with Article 16a(1) of the Basic Law.1196 In the UK, the designation of a third
country as ‘safe’ is only challengeable by way of judicial review under Section 80 of the
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002).1197 In the UK, ‘safe’ third countries are
designated as ‘safe’ countries to which asylum claimants can be returned to through the Dublin III
Regulation which provides a mechanism for determining which Member State is responsible for
determining the asylum application.1198 Further, a claimant can challenge the legality of the ‘safe’
third country transfer on the grounds of his or her individual circumstances.1199
The chart below summarizes the similarities and differences between the ‘safe’ third country and
Dublin transfer procedures in the UK and Germany outlined above:

UNITED KINGDOM

GERMANY

‘Safe’ Third Country Concept
1.

Competent
Authority

- Third Country Unit

- BAMF

2.

Certification
Procedure

- ‘A tribunal directing itself properly could conclude that there
were substantial grounds for believing that the return of the
claimant to Cyprus would involve a real risk of a breach of
Article 3, or a flagrant breach of other relevant rights applying
[ECtHR] jurisprudence’ (Esmaiel Mohammed Pour et al. v.
SSHD [2016] EWHC 401 (Admin), para 26)

- Claimants can be sent back to
‘safe’ third countries with neither
an asylum application, nor an
application for international or
national protection being
considered

1195
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1196
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Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimant, etc.) Act 2004 where Schedule 3 maintains a list of countries known
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3.

‘Safe’ Third
Country List

- All EU Member States (except Croatia) as well as Norway,
Iceland and Switzerland

- All EU Member States as well as
Norway and Switzerland

Dublin Transfer
1. Legal Basis

- Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004

- Asylum Act (Asylgesetz)

2. Interview

- Yes (Art 5 Dublin III Regulation)

- Yes, but no consistent practice
(Art 5 Dublin III Regulation)

3. Interview
Factors

- Family details in the UK and other Dublin States
- Travel routes taken on the way to UK
- Previous asylum claims

- Travel routes of the claimant on
the way to Germany
- Existence of relatives in
Germany

4. Competent
Authority

- Third Country Unit

- ‘Dublin division’ of the BAMF

5. Certification
Procedure

- ‘Safe’ Third Country or Asylum certificate
(Schedule 3 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of
Claimants) Act 2004)

- Border police may initiate
removal procedure immediately to
a ‘safe’ third country if an asylum
claimant is apprehended at the
border without necessary
documents

6. Unaccompanied
Minors

- Best interests of the child considerations

- Conducted by special officers
- No specific training for special
officers dealing with vulnerable
groups

7. Take Charge
Requests

- As quickly as possible and within 3 months from the date
which the application for asylum was lodged in UK

8. Take Back
Requests

- As quickly as possible and within 2 months of receiving a
fingerprint ‘hit’ on the Eurodac
- As quickly as possible and within 3 months of the date
which asylum claim was lodged in the UK

- Starts from the moment that a
Member State becomes aware of
an asylum claimant’s intention to
apply for asylum
- Where the Member State fails to
submit a request within the time
limits defined in DRIII, this
Member State becomes
responsible for carrying out the
procedure
(CJEU, Case C-670/16,
Mengesteab, 26 July 2017)

Table 7.1 Comparing United Kingdom and German Practices
The two examples above illustrate that different states – in this case, the UK and Germany – take
different approaches to implementing the ‘safe’ third country concept and Dublin transfers,
therefore creating gaps at different points of the process which raise the risk of refoulement, such
as the lack of substantive personal interviews prior to the decision on transfer. As raised in previous
chapters, this is an example of the exercise of the ‘margin of discretion’, but also of the lack of a
cohesive and comprehensive approach to the practice within the EU to protecting against
refoulement. The next section considers how these gaps and differences might be remedied within
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countries throughout the EU (and the UK, despite its impending separation from the European
asylum system).
7.2 The Future of Non-Refoulement Protection in International Refugee Law
EU Member states have codified a fulsome understanding of the principle of non-refoulement in
regional treaty and domestic laws. At the same time, the EU is following a policy of
‘extraterritorialization’ as a form of containment, in its ‘attempts to regulate migration flows’.1200
El-Anany has characterized EU practices in reinforcing external border controls to counteract
migrant movement as ‘one of the greatest exclusionary projects of today’.1201 The reliance of EU
countries on migration control methods such as ‘safe’ third country or Dublin transfers
demonstrate attempts by Member States to shift their responsibility for processing asylum
applications elsewhere - outside of the EU (to, for example, Turkey), and within the EU
(particularly to countries on the Mediterranean Sea boundary of the EU, such as Greece and
Italy).1202 While the transfer of applicants within or outside of the EU is not in itself a violation of
international law, it is a violation of international law when a Member State evades its
responsibility to process asylum applications without any or with few procedural safeguards to
ensure that claimants are not at risk of onward refoulement. These ongoing patterns of evading
responsibility for processing asylum applications through reliance on ‘safe’ third country concepts
are not only found within the EU: they can also be seen internationally, including in offshore
processing practices in Australia, and in the Safe Third Country Agreement signed between
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Canada and the United States.1203 This is incredibly concerning: it means that there are likely
asylum claimants being sent back from EU countries to persecution and torture.
This thesis therefore proposes four main ways to address and to counteract containment policies
in order to strengthen the implementation of the non-refoulement norm: strengthening procedural
guarantees in order to ensure access to asylum justice; reshaping the determination of mutual trust;
re-evaluating the use of diplomatic assurances in transfer cases; and the implementation of periodic
review coupled with a judicial review mechanism. Each proposal is explained and evaluated in
turn.
7.2.1

Strengthening Procedural Guarantees

The first recommendation for strengthening implementation of the fulsome legal understanding of
non-refoulement is the addition or reinforcement of procedural safeguards where they are currently
limited or do not exist. The question of access to due process in this manner has ‘not been
sufficiently discussed in the literature’, but yet is fundamental to increasing ‘access to asylum
justice’.1204 The procedural safeguards that require fortification are those aimed at ensuring that
claimants received individualized attention to their specific situations and concerns at key
junctures. Individualization is built into refugee status determination, which is based on assessing
the individual’s circumstance and the subjective fear faced by the person fleeing persecution.1205

1203
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In the Hirsi ECtHR judgment, Judge Albuquerque clearly and cogently articulated basic
requirements of individualization in a fair asylum process:
(1) a reasonable time-limit in which to submit the asylum application, (2) a personal
interview with the asylum applicant before the decision on the application is taken,
(3) the opportunity to submit evidence in support of the application and dispute
evidence submitted against the application, (4) a fully reasoned written decision by
an independent first-instance body, based on the asylum seeker’s individual
situation and not solely on a general evaluation of his or her country of origin, the
asylum seeker having the right to rebut the presumption of safety of any country in
his or her regard, (5) a reasonable time-limit in which to appeal against the decision
and automatic suspensive effect of an appeal against the first-instance decision, (6)
full and speedy judicial review of both the factual and legal grounds of the first
instance decision, and (7) free legal advice and representation and, if necessary,
free linguistic assistance at both first and second instance, and unrestricted access
to the UNCHR or any other organisation working on behalf of the UNHCR.1206
Under Judge Albuquerque’s approach, implementing individualization at various points in the
asylum system - through a personal interview, the opportunity to personally respond to evidence,
the receipt of a decision taking into account the claimant’s personal situation, and assistance by
experts - assists in preventing refoulement. Individualization requires States to evaluate the
individual situation of the claimant at various stages in enough depth to understand the nature of
the claimant’s fear of return to his or her original state or to a third State. This includes informing
the claimant of any adverse information.1207
These individualized procedural safeguards must be implemented from the earliest point at which
a state becomes liable for non-refoulement. While this would usually be at the border or when an
individual applies for asylum in-country, this could be as early as at the point of interdiction of a
boatload of presumptive asylum seekers at sea (before these individuals explicitly make an

1206

Judge Albuquerque in Hirsi ECtHR, separate opinion, at 75.

1207

O’Sullivan and Stephens, ‘Access’, supra note 1204 at 25. This is part of ‘procedural fairness’: ibid.
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application for international protection).1208 At any of these points of contact, under EU law
individuals must be proactively informed of the ability to submit reasons as to why they fear
refoulement if transferred to a third country or their country of origin.1209 The problem is not the
law, which requires an individualized procedural safeguard at the point of first contact to protect
against refoulement. Rather, as been argued throughout this thesis, the problem is in the gap
between the law and its implementation: as Pollet observes, ‘the gap between legal safeguards in
the law and the actual practice at the borders could not be greater’.1210
The procedural safeguards can and should take several forms: for example, requiring that claimants
have access to information on how and where to apply for international protection, including
protection against refoulement;1211 requiring that claimants have access to information about the
Member State deemed responsible in Dublin transfer cases or the third state in ‘safe’ third country

1208

Hirsi supra note 231; also Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
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content/en/ALL/?uri=celex:32014R0656; and , Kris Pollet, ‘Accessing Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures in the
EU: Legal Safeguards and Loopholes in the Common European Asylum System’ in Maria O’Sullivan and Dallal
Stevens (eds), States, the Law and Access to Refugee Protection: Fortresses and Fairness (Hart Publishing, Oxford:
2017) 137 at 141 [Pollet].
1209
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which, ‘as soon as a person comes within the jurisdiction and effective control of an EU Member State, authorities are
bound by their obligation to ‘proactively’ ensure compliance with the principle of non-refoulement’, Pollet supra note
1208 at 143-144; See also Hirsi Jamaa: there must be a procedure made available to persons intercepted at sea under
which they ‘obtain sufficient information to enable them to gain effective access to the relevant procedures and to
substantiate their complaints’: Hirsi supra note 231 at para 204.
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Pollet, supra note 1208 at 144.

1211

Ibid at 147-148.
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transfers, and the ability to submit refoulement concerns prior to decisions on transfers;1212 and
access to a quality personal interview and an accurate record of that interview.1213
Of these procedural safeguards, access to a quality personal interview is absolutely central to an
individualized process, as such an interview provides the information necessary for countries to
make an informed evaluation on the risk of refoulement. The centrality of personal interviews to a
fair asylum process is already recognized in Article 14(1) of the EU’s Asylum Procedures
Directive (recast): ‘Before a decision is taken by the determining authority, the applicant shall be
given the opportunity of a personal interview on his or her application for international protection
with a person competent under national law to conduct such an interview’.1214 This requirement
applies both with respect to decisions on admissibility and decisions on the substance of the
claimant’s application.1215 The individuals conducting the personal interviews must be properly

1212

As Pollet notes, this means that anyone who is likely to register an asylum claim (police authorities, border guards

and immigration authorities) must receive the necessary training and instructions to inform applicants of the procedural
safeguards: Pollet supra note 1208 at 151.
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Pollet supra note 1208 at 154-158. Another procedural safeguard is access to well-researched and supported

country of origin and third country information. Access to current and reliable country of origin information is
important because it is used by claimants to support their individual claim of a well-founded fear of persecution under
the definition of ‘refugee’ and any fears of refoulement if returned. It is also used by decision-makers to assess the
credibility of the claimant’s application: Pollet supra note 1208 at 152-153. Country of origin and third country
information comes from sources such as the European Asylum Support Office, UNHCR and ‘relevant international
human rights organizations’: Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) at art 10(3)(b). Decision-makers must protect the
fact that the claimant has made an asylum application, so as to ensure that agents of persecution in the country of
origin do not take actions that ‘would endanger the applicants’ or his or her dependents’ or family members’ safety
and physical integrity’: Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) at art 30.
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Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) supra note 24 at art 14(1).
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Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) supra note 24 at arts 14(1) and 34(1), which states: ‘Member States shall

allow applicants to present their views with regard to the application of the grounds referred to in Article 33 in their
particular circumstances before the determining authority decides on the admissibility of an application for
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trained and competent.1216 The interviews must be conducted by a same-sex interviewers and
interpreter where possible, in a child-friendly manner, and taking into account the claimant’s
cultural origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or vulnerabilities.1217 During the
interview, the claimant must be able to clarify his or her statements, to ensure that the record is as
accurate as possible, and either a transcript or a ‘thorough and factual report containing all
substantive elements’ must be made of the personal interview.1218
Personal interviews are clearly vitally necessary in order to properly assess a claimant’s
admissibility and the substance of his or her application to determine if there are refoulement
concerns, but the Asylum Procedures Directive 2005 - the version prior to the current recast version
- permitted Member States to avoid personal interviews in a wide range of circumstances
(including that the person was from a ‘safe’ country of origin or a ‘safe’ third country).1219 There
are Member States not currently bound by the recast Asylum Procedures Directive, and there are
Member States not conducting personal interviews at the admissibility or substantive decision
stages, raising serious concerns about how such states could make informed decisions on the risk
of refoulement to that individual.1220

1216

Ibid at arts 4(1) and 4(3).
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Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) supra note 24 at art 15(3)(c), which states: ‘select an interpreter who is able

to ensure appropriate communication between the applicant and the person who conducts the interview. The
communication shall take place in the language preferred by the applicant unless there is another language which he
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use small inconsistencies in these statements as a reason to deny asylum: UNHCR, ‘Beyond Proof – Credibility
Assessment in EU Asylum Systems (May 2013) at 164, https://www.unhcr.org/51a8a08a9.pdf.
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An example of a State not fulfilling the personal interview requirement is Germany, which lacks
a consistent practice of requiring an interview with claimants identified for Dublin transfers before
a removal decision is made.1221 This is despite the requirement under EU law and specifically
under the Dublin III Regulation that an interview must take place prior to an applicant being
subjected to a Dublin transfer.1222 As EU law provides the common minimum standards with which
all EU Member States are to comply, and a ‘regulation’ under EU law is binding in its entirety on
Member States, Germany’s inconsistent practice in interviewing Dublin returnees is
problematic.1223 Inconsistency in interviewing Dublin returnees makes access to asylum justice for
those who are being contemplated for return inequitable: there is individualization for some, and
not for others.1224 As well, inconsistency in interviewing Dublin returnees means that some
applicants are able to exercise their right to be heard while others are not, which is contrary to
Article 32(2) of the Refugee Convention, regulating expulsion of claimants:
except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee
shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be
represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or persons
specially designated by the competent authority.1225

supra note 304 at para 351; Asylum Information Database, ‘Not There Yet: An NGO Perspective on Challenges to a
Fair and Effective Common European Asylum System’ (Annual Report 2012-2013) at 57-58.
1221

AIDA Country Report Germany supra note 1015 at 31-32.
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Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 5.
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Similarly, in making a ‘take back’ or ‘take charge’ request1226 to another EU Member State for a
Dublin transfer, Germany presumes that responsibility for the applicant has already transferred
and that deportation of the applicant will then occur without providing the applicant with a
substantive review.1227 The lack of substantive review means that the claimant has no chance to
rebut any allegations against him or her.1228 Germany is therefore an example of a state where
procedural guarantees should be strengthened in order to permit greater individualization of the
Dublin transfer process, so individuals identified for transfer can express any fears of either direct
or indirect refoulement and therefore take steps to appeal the transfer.
Stevens and O’Sullivan identify two branches of access to asylum justice. The first branch is the
one just discussed: providing claimants with access to quality asylum procedures,1229 including
access to quality personal interviews. The second branch is providing claimants with access to
territory, whether by removing unnecessary physical impediments (such as fences and interdiction
at sea) or by removing unnecessary legal roadblocks.1230 The fact that the CEAS provides for
certain legal impediments to access to territory has been discussed throughout this thesis,
particularly with respect to Dublin transfers and ‘safe’ third country transfers. These impediments
include the threshold for claimants to rebut a Dublin transfer, and the use of diplomatic assurances
to facilitate ‘safe’ third country transfers, explored in more detail in the next subsection.

1226

A ‘take back’ request refers to a request by the sending Member State to the Member State responsible to ‘take

back’ the applicant who has withdrawn the application under examination or whose application has been rejected and
who has made an application in another Member State. A ‘take charge’ request refers to a request by the sending
Member State to the Member State responsible to ‘take charge’ of the applicant who has lodged an application in a
different Member State, see: Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at chp V.
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MA et al supra note 1084.
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Stevens and O’Sullivan, ‘Concluding Observations’, supra note 1204 at 297.
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7.2.2

Reshaping the Presumption of Mutual Trust

Within the CEAS, the presumption of mutual trust is the presumption that EU Member States are
‘safe’ destinations to which claimants can return, as explained in Chapter Three. The premise
underlying the presumption of mutual trust is that EU Member States all have asylum systems that
are compliant with EU fundamental rights. However, as discussed in previous chapters, not all EU
Member States are, in fact, compliant with EU refugee law.1231 Despite this, the courts of Member
States place the onus on claimants, rather than the EU Member State wishing to transfer the
claimant, to rebut the presumption of mutual trust in order to successfully challenge a Dublin
transfer. This subsection discusses ways in which the presumption of mutual trust can be
reshaped1232 in order to promote access to asylum justice for claimants and increased compliance
with the principle of non-refoulement by EU Member States.
As outlined in Chapter Three, two European courts have diverged on the threshold to rebut the
presumption of mutual trust. First, in 2011, the CJEU in N.S. held that the test for determining
whether an asylum claimant has met the threshold for rebutting the presumption of mutual trust to
prevent removal via Dublin transfers is demonstration of ‘systemic deficiencies’ in the receiving
country’s asylum system.1233 In the same year, the ECtHR in M.S.S. referred to the CJEU’s
judgment in N.S., but instead of following the CJEU’s ‘systemic deficiencies’ test, it established
its own test of ‘individual assessments’.1234 For the first test of ‘systemic deficiencies’, the onus is
upon the asylum claimant to prove that the presumption of mutual trust can be rebutted where there
are ‘systemic deficiencies’ in the asylum procedures and reception conditions of the Member State

1231

Juss has critiqued this assumption, arguing that the Dublin system is ‘still anchored in the mind-set of colonial

Europe. It assumes that every area in Europe – from Sicily in the south to Scandinavia in the north – is a safe territory
for a refugee to access protection once he or she gets there’: Satvinder S. Juss, ‘The Post-Colonial Refugee, Dublin II,
and the end of non-refoulement’ (2013) 20 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights at 310.
1232

Vicini argues for reshaping the presumption of mutual trust, albeit in a different way than proposed here: Vicini

supra note 518.
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NS/ME supra note 296 at para 86.

1234

MSS supra note 308.
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receiving the claimant.1235 For the second test of ‘individual assessments’, the ECtHR instead took
the view that the particular circumstance and situation faced by the individual claimant at the
moment in time when he or she is being contemplated for transfer back to the responsible Member
State should be the proper test.1236 The CJEU and ECtHR have therefore established different
approaches in interpreting the threshold to rebut the presumption of mutual trust in the cases of
M.S.S. and N.S. The ‘systemic deficiencies’ test, in fact, creates a higher, more ‘restrictive’
threshold for a claimant to meet in order to rebut the presumption of mutual trust.1237 This is
because only the ‘presence of major operational problems’, as opposed to individual human rights
violations, can serve to rebut the presumption of mutual trust.1238 This approach was further
entrenched within the CJEU in subsequent case law.1239 In contrast, the ECtHR has reconfirmed
its ‘individual assessments’ approach in Tarakhel.1240
The UN Committee Against Torture has also entered the debate, indicating that the threshold to
rebut the presumption of mutual trust should be based on an individual’s real risk of facing torture
upon return, which aligns with the ECtHR’s approach of the ‘individual assessments’ test.1241 The
standard of protection envisioned by both the Committee Against Torture and the ECtHR entails
the examination of an applicant’s individual and subjective risk to torture.1242 When the applicant
is able to prove, on an ‘arguable case’, that he or she may be subjected to a real risk of torture upon

1235

Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Vicini supra note 584 at 57.
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Ibid at 60, interpreting para 85 of NS/ME supra note 296.
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return based on ‘individual risk’ or ‘individual assessments’, the presumption that the EU Member
State is in compliance with relevant international and European law is rebutted.1243
Clearly, the test of ‘systemic deficiencies’ is not individualized, unlike the ‘individual
assessments’ threshold, and has been critiqued for this reason as violating fundamental human
rights and the individualization approach of the Refugee Convention. Vicini has argued that the
‘individual assessments’ approach is more widely protective of the principle of non-refoulement
because the application of Article 3 of the ECHR (under which non-refoulement falls) is triggered
in the presence of an individual risk, while the ‘systemic deficiencies’ approach does not
automatically trigger Article 4 of the European Charter (under which non-refoulement also
falls).1244 In other words, the ECtHR’s approach to the threshold to rebut the presumption against
mutual trust creates a lower test for non-refoulement protection, and less of a barrier for the
claimant.1245 Under the ‘systemic deficiencies’ approach, non-refoulement prohibits any removal
from an EU Member State to another EU Member State where there are ‘systemic deficiencies’
that make it highly likely that the claimant may be exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment
upon return.1246 This interpretation of the non-refoulement principle for claimants is narrower in
scope than returns to any territory where ‘substantial grounds for believing’ that a real risk of
torture would occur.1247
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Ibid.
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Vicini supra note 518 at 65.
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Ibid at 66.
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the ECHR’s Article 3 because the former refers only to removal which does not require the presence of an individual
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Some scholars also argue that ‘by requiring the standard of a “systemic deficiency” to be met,
individual suffering, or local, non-institutionalized abuse of power loses its relevance’.1248 Further
to the lack of clarity and consistency of the legal threshold of ‘systemic deficiency’, scholars have
contended that, by creating a legal standard of ‘systemic deficiency’, ‘a hierarchy of suffering [is
created and only the] suffering of some asylum seekers and refugees is recognised as grievable’.1249
This lack of consistency between the interpretations of the two regional European courts
essentially forces Member States to exercise their ‘margin of discretion’ at the domestic level.1250
Some have selected between the two approaches, choosing the higher-threshold approach as
Germany did,1251 or adopting a compromise approach, as was done in the UK.1252 Given that this
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International Law 907-940.
1251

The Administrative Court of Minden in Germany ruled against the test of ‘individual assessments’ established by

the ECtHR and instead agreed with the CJEU’s test of ‘systemic deficiencies’: Administrative Court of Minden, Case
No. 10 L 923/15.A, 2 October 2015. Adopting the approach of the CJEU rather than the approach of the ECtHR means
that the individual circumstances of the applicant is not the focal point of the requirement to rebut the presumption of
mutual trust. Instead, the CJEU approach focuses on determining whether there are deficiencies, of a systemic kind,
in the asylum procedures and reception conditions of the destination Member State for the applicant.
1252

The UK has combined the approach of both the CJEU and the ECtHR in the judgment of E.M. and M.A.: EM/MA
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status decision-making: Ibid; See, also: UNHCR Handbook supra note 36.
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margin is wide, Member States have adopted inconsistent approaches, some with weaker
procedural protections, thereby increasing the possibility of refoulement.
What is the solution for the lack of consistency regarding the threshold the claimant must meet to
rebut the presumption of mutual trust? The solution is three-fold. First, there should be a uniform
assessment within the EU for the presumption of mutual trust - a standard which either adopts the
individualized ECtHR test as more consistent with the individualized nature of refugee
determination, or that harmonizes the tests established by the ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence in
a manner providing some individualization.1253 Second, the presumption of mutual trust should be
reversed so that the presumption is one that is against its use rather than for its use.1254 The
presumption against its use means that the Member State deemed not responsible for the
processing of the asylum application will be required to actively evaluate, in its decision to send
the claimant to the responsible Member State, whether that Member State is in fact in compliance
with its international and European law obligations.1255 Third, the presumption of mutual trust
should be a rebuttable presumption where the burden of proof must be upon the sending Member
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State, rather than the claimant, to discharge.1256 A corollary of this is that the sending state would
have the obligation to evaluate future risks to the claimant when deciding upon transfer.1257
While this threefold approach would radically change the current application of the presumption
of mutual trust, ‘shifting the burden of proof onto the national authorities […] seems fair especially
where it concerns the implementation of the Dublin system, as a decision to transfer an asylum
seeker to another Member State falls completely outside the control or influence of the asylum
seeker’.1258 As Brouwer argues, this approach ‘seems justified to require the transferring state to
substantiate that this transfer does not violate the fundamental rights of the asylum seeker’ when
the state, but not the claimant, may be aware of the systemic and rights-depriving problems in the
asylum procedure and reception conditions in the receiving State.1259 An alternate expression of
this is that there is no ‘equality of arms’ between claimants and the sending state: shifting the onus
to the sending state simply helps to equalize the information available, assisting in the evaluation
of the non-refoulement concerns of the claimant and the opposing arguments of the State.
The UNHCR comes at the issue of Dublin transfers and the problems with the presumption of
mutual trust in a completely different manner: it recommends that EU Member States afford
asylum claimants an opportunity to choose the option of voluntary transfer to another Member

1256

Ibid; See, also: Brouwer supra note 502 at 142: ‘As the general situation was known, the ECtHR held that ‘the
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State under the Dublin procedures.1260 The emphasis under this recommendation is the word
‘voluntary’, so that claimants would have the option of choosing whether to undertake the Dublin
transfer procedures, rather than, as is currently the case under EU law, that such transfers take
place involuntarily.1261 Barring this approach, however, the UNHCR recommends that the EU
Member State undertaking the Dublin transfer ensure that claimants are able to contest the
decision1262 and that the claimant be provided with proper legal representation pursuant to Article
13 of the ECHR on the right to effective remedy.1263 The UNHCR also recommends that EU
Member States suspend transfers to other Member States which do not have proper asylum
procedures in place.1264 This last recommendation has been followed in certain cases - for example,
Dublin transfers to Hungary have been suspended by Member States due to worsening conditions
for asylum claimants in the country and a high risk of onward refoulement to claimants being sent
from Hungary to another country.1265
While there are different options for reshaping the presumption of mutual trust, this thesis
recommends the approach that best balances the human rights of asylum seekers and the duties of
EU Member States (and therefore provides access to asylum justice): articulation of a uniform
threshold assessing in some manner the individual situation of the claimant, a reversal of the
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presumption against its use rather than for its use, and placement of the burden of proof for the
use of the presumption on the sending state, and not on the claimant.
7.2.3

Re-evaluating the Use of Diplomatic Assurances to Facilitate ‘Safe’ Third
Country and Dublin Transfers

As explained in Chapter Four, another containment method used by EU Member States to control
the movement of asylum seekers is to send them back to third countries deemed ‘safe’ or to transfer
them internally. Since the principle of non-refoulement does not permit individuals to be sent to
countries where they are at risk of serious human right violations, EU Member States - including
Germany and the UK (while it was within the EU) - have adopted the practice of relying on
diplomatic assurances from third or EU countries as proof that they properly evaluated the
refoulement risk prior to transfer. These assurances have been used to presume that the receiving
country’s human rights record and access to asylum procedures both comply with relevant
international and European law standards. Seeking these assurances is permitted within the EU, as
is using them as one mode of evaluation.1266 As explained in previous chapters, however, this
presumption of compliance based on a diplomatic assertion is problematic when it does not
correspond to reality and when courts take these presumptions at face value without delving
deeper. According to the ECtHR jurisprudence and, in particular, in Tarakhel, the ECtHR’s
practice has been that diplomatic assurances should be obtained before a transfer decision is taken
under the Dublin III Regulation.1267 This is so that ‘the individuals concerned have the opportunity
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to ask for a comprehensive risk assessment, including of the assurances, by the domestic Courts
under Article 3 ECHR’.1268
International organizations and nongovernmental organizations have pressed EU Member States
(and all States) to restrict their reliance on diplomatic assurances. They urge sending states to carry
out a multi-faceted evaluation by taking positive steps to evaluate any potential future risks to the
claimant of serious human rights violations and examining the human rights record of the receiving
State before the transfer takes place.1269 When diplomatic assurances are used, these organizations
recommend that there should be a presumption against reliance upon these assurances.1270 The
concern here is that requiring claimants to rebut a presumption in favour of mutual trust of those
assurances would put an unnecessary (and additional) evidentiary burden on the claimants.1271
Similarly, these commentators argue that diplomatic assurances should only be used in favour of
the asylum claimant so that the burden to discharge the presumption against the use of diplomatic
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Against Torture (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2017) at 183.
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domestically, see: Michelle Foster, “Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek
Protection in Another State” (2007) 28 Michigan Journal of International Law 2, 223-286 at 239 [Protection
Elsewhere].
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Against Torture in US Terrorism Transfers”, December 2010 at 23: ‘For immigration cases, establish a presumption
against the resort to assurances unless there are compelling reasons for removal, e.g. the deportee poses a danger to
the community’.
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assurances should be a burden for the receiving Member State to discharge, rather than an onus
for the claimant to prove.1272 The UNHCR has reiterated that diplomatic assurances, when used:
should not result in the denial of access to asylum procedures […] Diplomatic
assurances are concerned with treatment of the individual concerned in the receiving
State, and thus affect the substance of the person’s asylum application. They could
not, therefore, give rise to a declaration of inadmissibility.1273
Additionally, they propose that, when diplomatic assurances are relied upon, post-transfer
monitoring should be in place to ensure that the receiving Member State has, in fact, complied
with its relevant international and European law obligations.1274 It has been suggested that posttransfer monitoring can ‘help [to] improve refugee policy in at least three ways: firstly, by enabling
the provision of support to asylum seekers who are deported; secondly, by helping to identify and
document where the fears of forcibly returned asylum seekers are well-founded; and thirdly, by
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providing valuable insights for Country of Origin Information reports’.1275 Further, the Human
Rights Committee is of the view that: ‘When a State party expels a person to another State on the
basis of assurances as to that person’s treatment by the receiving State, it must institute credible
mechanisms for ensuring compliance by the receiving State with these assurances from the
moment of expulsion’.1276
As is evident, these organizations strongly argue that reliance upon diplomatic assurances must
only be used with great caution.1277 The UNHCR has issued a note on the use of diplomatic
assurances and the importance of observing the principle of non-refoulement during their use.1278
In that note, the UNHCR warns that the assessment in determining the weight attached to
diplomatic assurances ‘must be made in light of the general human rights situation in the receiving
State at the relevant time’.1279 Further, the Committee Against Torture has reiterated the need to
prohibit the use of diplomatic assurances ‘as a loophole to undermine the principle of nonrefoulement as set out in Article 3 of the [Convention Against Torture], where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he/she would be in danger of being subjected to torture in that State’.1280
The Committee Against Torture has also stressed that the ‘procurement of diplomatic assurances
cannot be used by States to escape their absolute obligation to refrain from non-refoulement (Agiza
v. Sweden)’.1281 The UN Secretary-General has also affirmed that diplomatic assurances are
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‘‘unreliable and ineffective’ in the protection against torture and other ill-treatment, with postreturn monitoring mechanisms doing little to mitigate the risk of torture’.1282 Further, the UN
General Assembly stated that:
States cannot resort to diplomatic assurances as a safeguard against torture and illtreatment where there are substantial grounds for believing that a person would be in
danger of being subjected to such treatment.1283
Based on these warnings from the UNHCR, the Committee Against Torture, the UN SecretaryGeneral and the UN General Assembly, the presumption in favour of diplomatic assurances should
be removed, so that diplomatic assurances cannot be relied upon by States Parties to the Refugee
Convention as a method to approve transfers to receiving countries deemed ‘safe’.
It has also been suggested by the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), and affirmed in India v. Badesha, that the weight to be given to
diplomatic assurances involves considering multiple factors.1284 These factors include:
the human rights record of the government giving the assurances, the government’s
record in complying with its assurances, and the capacity of the government to fulfill
the assurances, particularly where there is doubt about the government’s ability to
control its security forces.1285
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Further, the ECtHR in Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom has created a non-exhaustive
list of factors for courts in different jurisdictions to consider:
Whether the assurances are specific or are general and vague; Who has given the
assurances and whether that person can bind the receiving state; If the assurances
have been issued by the central government of the receiving state, whether local
authorities can be expected to abide by them; Whether the assurances concern
treatment which is legal or illegal in the receiving state; The length and strength of
bilateral relations between the sending and receiving states, including the receiving
state’s record in abiding by similar assurances; Whether compliance with the
assurances can be objectively verified through diplomatic or other monitoring
mechanisms, including providing unfettered access to the individual’s lawyers;
Whether there is an effective system of protection against torture in the receiving
state, including whether it is willing to cooperate with international monitoring
mechanisms (including international human rights NGOs) and whether it is willing
to investigate allegations of torture and to punish those responsible; and whether the
individual has previously been ill-treated in the receiving state.1286
As State practice from other countries outside of the EU has shown, diplomatic assurances should
be used with caution and must involve the assessment of the situation in the receiving country.1287
This assessment requires the consideration of multiple factors - including those set out by the
ECtHR and courts in Canada and India - and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.1288 Under
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this approach, countries such as the UK and Germany should both amend their approaches to
diplomatic assurances, to ensure that such assurances are not taken at face value; rather, any
diplomatic assurances given by the receiving country should be thoroughly investigated and not
be used as a loophole to circumvent non-refoulement obligations.1289
7.2.4

Periodic Monitoring and Judicial Review of Transfers

The Dublin III Regulation has a built-in monitoring and evaluating mechanism. This mechanism
requires the ‘effective monitoring of the application of [the] Regulation […] at regular
intervals’.1290 What the provision does not specify is how often that monitoring and evaluation
occurs, as well as what type of evaluation takes place by the European Commission.1291 Another
similar provision is found under Article 46 of the Dublin III Regulation, which requires Member
States to ‘forward to the Commission all information appropriate for the preparation of that
report’.1292 In practice, the European Commission publishes a report detailing an evaluation of the
implementation of the Dublin III Regulation.1293 In these reports, the European Commission
highlighted the low percentage rate (8%) of the total number of ‘take back’ and ‘take charge’
requests in physical transfers under the Dublin III Regulation.1294 That means, according to
European Commission statistics, the final stage of the actual physical transfer of the individual
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after a Member State requests a ‘take charge’ request from the Member State responsible often
does not occur as a result of non-acceptance by the Member State responsible. Other potential
explanations can be partly due to delays caused by Dublin transfers or the suspensive effect of the
Dublin transfer pending results of appeal.1295
The reports were published in December 2015 and March 2016 and they reiterated the law
governing EU Member States in their domestic implementation of the Dublin III Regulation rather
than providing a critical evaluation of the application of that law.1296 Thus, they do not, in actuality,
provide monitoring or evaluation of how well Member States’ transfers comply with CEAS law.
There was also a report by the European Parliament on the “Dublin Regulation on International
Protection Applications: European Implementation Assessment”, which highlighted the structural
deficiencies of the Dublin III Regulation.1297 These highlights were no more than a repeat of the
Dublin IV Proposal language calling for stronger coherence in the implementation of the Dublin
III Regulation on transfers among Member States and did not amount to monitoring or evaluation
of EU countries’ laws and practices, nor did they discuss potential solutions or policy
recommendations. Instead, a form of monitoring and evaluation of transfers was done in reports
by international organizations and nongovernmental organizations including the UNHCR.1298
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The proposal to reform the Dublin III Regulation, termed the Dublin IV Proposal, has also
specified a monitoring requirement which states: ‘on an annual basis Member States will report on
the implementation of the multiannual programme’ and they must ‘set up a Monitoring Committee
to which the Commission may participate in advisory capacity’.1299 This monitoring requirement
pertains to the implementation of the Dublin Regulation as a whole in the Member State rather
than a monitoring and evaluation tool to specifically observe the conduct of Member States during
transfer or post-transfer of claimants. Thus, it is unclear how much attention this monitoring
mechanism, once implemented, will pay to Dublin and ‘safe’ third country transfers.
The UNHCR has recommended that States adopt a ‘variety of measures which have proven
effective in preventing unlawful or irregular removal of refugees and asylum-seekers’.1300 These
measures include: ‘establishing a monitoring and reporting mechanism, and conducting regular
checks […] to monitor the safety and well-being of the individuals concerned, and responding to
any threats identified’.1301 These monitoring mechanisms can include the involvement of
independent and impartial international and nongovernmental organizations to periodically
evaluate the relevant Member States’ removal record - to ensure that non-refoulement obligations
are complied with in each case.1302 Further, monitoring mechanisms can include not only a stronger
role from both international organizations and civil society to participate in Member State
monitoring but also the involvement of governments from each Member State in consultation with
each other on best practices.1303
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Problematic application of Dublin transfers and ‘safe’ third country agreements as containment
policies can be counteracted by coupling the existing law (the Dublin III Regulation and its
domestic implementation) with regular and focused review that goes beyond the Commission’s
reporting. In particular, the creation of a periodic monitoring mechanism for the CEAS focused
specifically on Dublin and ‘safe’ third country transfers would permit rights-violating patterns and
practices within EU Member States to be highlighted and corrected, thereby leading to more
consistency within CEAS processes. Such monitoring reports could also be valuable to those
carrying out the certification process within the UK ‘safe’ third country evaluations.
A domestic judicial review mechanism focused directly on Dublin and ‘safe’ third country
transfers could serve as an important second and complementary form of monitoring, providing
individual asylum seekers the chance to challenge these transfers, including the chance to raise
arguments regarding the implementation of non-refoulement protections. This would help to
correct the problems that exist in a number of domestic EU systems, such as in Germany, in which
truly individualized assessments in the form set out above are not currently available. The subjectmatter expertise that is available at a specialized tribunal may offer insights and critiques that a
general court does not and cannot provide. This can potentially lead to faster and more informed
decisions for procedures related to asylum claims and related adjudication. The establishment of
an office or an appeals tribunal similar to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal in Ireland,
which reviews Ireland’s decisions on the Dublin System, might provide a good exemplar for such
a domestic mechanism.1304 This Tribunal can serve as a role model for other Member States
because, similar to the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, the International Protection
Appeals Tribunal in Ireland issues Chairperson’s guidelines to assist members in interpreting
asylum law, including with respect to issues of relevance to non-refoulement and transfers.1305 For
example, the guidance on taking evidence indicates practices to ensure the fulsome capturing of
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an individual’s information, which assists in individualization, discussed above.1306 These
guidelines can serve to enhance procedural safeguards for claimants as they provide much needed
direction for asylum officers.
As considered by the European Policy Centre, the lack of monitoring mechanisms in place is
detrimental to claimants who are being contemplated for return either through a ‘safe’ third country
agreement or through Dublin transfers. Potential benefits of monitoring mechanisms for returnees
include providing information for Member States to correct any action or inaction leading to a
heightened risk of refoulement, the possibility of incorporating non-refoulement safeguards in
current or future third country partnership agreements, and future evaluation of return procedures
for claimants.1307
A supranational judicial review mechanism within one of the regional European courts might be a
viable addition or alternative to the domestic mechanism proposed immediately above. It could
allow asylum claimants who have been ordered to be removed to be able to seek judicial review
of the transfer decision of the government. While currently the ECtHR does offer an avenue for
asylum claimants to bring their cases forward, a sub-committee or a tribunal with specialization
on removal orders and expertise in non-refoulement protection could significantly add to the
strength of the process and counteract containment policies.

1306

See, for example: The International Protection Appeals Tribunal, “Chairperson’s Guideline No. 2019/1 on

Taking Evidence from Appellants and Other Witnesses”,
http://www.protectionappeals.ie/website/rat/ratweb.nsf/page/MXKY-B9KK4514334220en/$File/Guideline%2020191%20on%20Taking%20Evidence%20from%20Appellants%20and%20Other%20Witnesses.pdf and “Chairperson’s
Guideline No: 2018/1: Application of ‘Compelling Reasons’ in the consideration of refugee status appeals originally
submitted to the Tribunal pursuant to s.16(1) of the Refugee Act 1996, prior to the commencement of the
International Protection Act 2015”, http://www.protectionappeals.ie/website/rat/ratweb.nsf/page/MJOFAXAA8J7595728-en/$File/IP%20Guideline%202018-1%20on%20Compelling%20Grounds.pdf.
1307

Olivia Sundberg Diez, “Diminishing safeguards, increasing returns: Non-refoulement gaps in the EU return and

readmission system”, 4 October 2019 at 14.

297

In sum, the four proposals for strengthening access to justice set out in this section aim to address
and counteract containment policies in order to strengthen the implementation of the nonrefoulement norm. The proposals are mutually reinforcing, in that strengthened procedural
guarantees (through individualization) to ensure access to asylum justice can also be backstopped
by the implementation of periodic review and judicial review on Dublin and ‘safe’ third country
transfers. Similarly, reshaping the determination of mutual trust involves a re-evaluation of the use
of diplomatic assurances in transfer cases.
7.3 Conclusion: Future Directions for Non-Refoulement
‘The drive for detailed common standards of the CEAS has not prevented the simultaneous drive
by states to restrict asylum’ through legal, administrative and political measures.1308 In fact, these
methods to contain the ‘unwanted’ have become a globalized trend.1309 The EU’s containment
policies as demonstrated in the CEAS and State practices of both the UK and Germany show that
the principle of non-refoulement is at risk of - and is - being eroded. When the cornerstone of
refugee protection is no longer safeguarded, the human rights of those who benefit from this
principle - asylum claimants and refugees under refugee law, and everyone under human rights
law - are jeopardized.
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As international law sets the standard upon which regional asylum systems, including the CEAS,
carry out important safeguards for asylum claimants and refugees, these standards must be
complied with and interpreted in a manner that continues to protect the integrity of the institution
of asylum, particularly the cardinal principle of non-refoulement. To counteract measures of
containment, the incorporation of additional procedural safeguards, a reshaped approach to the
presumption of mutual trust, a re-evaluated approach to diplomatic assurances and periodic
monitoring plus judicial review mechanisms will enhance non-refoulement protection for
claimants. These recommendations require Member States to take active steps to provide access
to individualized asylum justice and to seriously consider multiple factors before issuing transfer
decisions.
Much more work needs to be done in order to improve the CEAS, including harmonizing common
European standards on asylum procedures and enhancing efficiency in the processing of asylum
applications. While there is no overnight solution to ongoing problems of the CEAS, the human
rights of asylum claimants and refugees need to be at the forefront of the agenda for each EU
Member State. The work that must be done requires the cooperation of all countries including
Member States, governments, civil society, international organizations, as well as private actors.
Now more than ever, the principle of non-refoulement must be safeguarded against erosion and
the rights of asylum claimants and refugees championed above State interests.
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